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Abstract
This Thesisexamines recent trends in flexible forms of employment
and how those forms of employment influence and at the same time are
influenced by the economic, structural and regulatory environments in the
different countries of the European Union, as well as their diverse labour
market regimes. Those interactions are used as the basis for an analysis of
the likelihood of convergence or divergence in European ways of work
organisation; and for a consideration of how much influence decision
makers are capable of exercising on this process.
The Thesisis divided into four parts. The first part starts by discussing
theories of societal development, presenting a model of firms flexibility, and
deals with methodological issues involved in relating firms strategies with
national employment environments.
The second part examines the characteristics of the various European
labour markets using data from the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS,
1984 - 1994) and the New Forms of Work and Activity Survey (NFWA,
1989/90). Firm specific data from the NFWA is used to explain variance in
firms use of new forms of employment with other firm features. The study
argues that European labour markets are still distinct and that differences in
the usage patterns and meaning of new forms of employment can not be
explained by firm characteristics alone; differences in national labour
market regimes have also to be considered.
The third part relates the findings of the previous part to the national
employment systems and compares various aspects of the findings in three
sample countries (Spain, United Kingdom and Germany). It shows that the
various systems function in different manners, and possess competitive
advantages / disadvantages in different areas. Conditions needed for one
system to work are distinct from those needed for the other systems.
Interchanging some features known from other systems to increase for
example flexibility in the short run, might have effects contrary to those
sought and might destroy a system's foundations in the long run.
The fourth part looks into possible converging / diverging trends in
European ways of work organisation, given the different starting positions.
The evidence presented suggest that in the short term gains can be made
through a cost cutting strategy, however this will make in the long run the
creation of the wanted high trust, high wage, high quality economy in
Europe even more difficult. To overcome short term thinking, which could
bring about a convergence towards a economy competing only on costs,
co-ordination on a supranational level is needed. As the situation of the
national systems is still distinct, decision making on this level is increasingly
prone to gridlock. However, recent developments on the company level
towards transnational information and work councils on a European level
might have important effects, even when such arrangements still lag
behind the swift developments towards economic and monetary union.
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ONE FLEXIBLE FUTURE FOR EUROPE? THE CASE OF EUROPEAN CONVERGENCE AND I OR DIVERGENCE
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FLEXIBILITY DEBATE
INTRODUCTION
1. PRELIMINARIES
1. Preliminaries
1.1. Introduction
FlexlbllHy - or the ability of a System, Organisation or Individual to
adapt successfully to altered conditions (see OECD 1986b) - has become a
touchstone of policy for the European Union and its Member States. The
Union, the Member States and different policy makers have sought to
introduce flexibility measures in an attempt to restore competitiveness and
reduce unemployment (see for example the European Commissions 'White
Paper: Growth, Competitiveness, Employment', 1994). However, the
concept of flexibility can be interpreted, and the presence or lack of
flexibility can be perceived, in many different ways. As a result, member
States and the various decision makers at the national level emphasise or
seek different types of flexibility.
The main classification of types of flexibility from a firm's point of view,
distinguishes between functional and numerical flexibility (e.g. Trends, 1995;
Gaudier, 1987;Atkinson, 1984).The concept of numerical flexibility describes
the ability to adapt the labour force to the amount of labour -by hiring and
firing or using forms of work known as Inew' or 'atypical' forms of work, such
as part time work and temporary work. On the other hand, functional
flexibility denotes the adaptability of one's employees to new requirements
and fresh tasks - for example by multi-skilling and retraining.
Current debates on a European level must be viewed against the
background of varying policy traditions resulting from a number of historical,
political, economic and social factors, which have given rise to distinctive
structures in national employment systems. In each case, to improve the
system's flexibility, the entire system - comprising the educational system,
labour law, work contracts, contractual negotiation systemsand the social
security system - has to be mobilised (White Paper, 1994).
Despite the diversity found in Member States, a number of key areas
for employment and labour market policies have been identified by the
European Commission on a European level (for example on the Corfu,
Essen or Cannes European Councils) deriving from the awareness of
common challenges faced by all members and of a common need to
adapt to them. By fixing those common priorities, yet not formulating
possible policies or strategies in concrete terms, it is hoped to establish
'Convergence with respect to diversity' (Com(94) 333, p.12). Thisimplies a
way to guide the progress of the national systems in harmony towards the
fundamental objectives of the Union, by permitting the coexistence of
each different one of them (Com(94) 333, p.12). The question remains
whether the pressure towards greater harmonisation will lead to one single
European system, or whether existing systemswill remain distinct.
However, the aim will be to obtain a "new organisation of work".
which according to the Greenbook: "implies a replacement of hierarchical
and rigid structures by more innovative and flexible structures based on
'high skill' and 'high trust' and new relationships between different firmsand
between firms and workers. A report form the Commission's
Competitiveness Group clarified it further in June 1996: II A co-operative
approach to a different organisation of work within the firm will improve
industrial relations, allow greater worker participation in decisions and
potentially lead to a better product quality. The latter in fact represents an
essential component in any strengthening of the competitiveness of the
European economy". According to the Green Book, the new socio-
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economic and technological context and in particular the present
experiences and trends on work organisation would already have given rise
to a parallel process of reorganisation of labour market policies, including
labour law and industrial relations.
It is the opinion of the Commission that in the context of these new
developments, the likely evolution of labour law and industrial relations
from present systems of statutory regulations to more open and flexible
legal frameworks may pave the way for a change in industrial relations and
allow social partners to advance in the convergence of Europe to the
wanted type of society.
1.2. OuHlne of the study
Thisresearch analyses the likelihood of a European convergence or
divergence in the light of the flexibilisation of work patterns. It examines
whether current trends to more flexible forms of work could lead to the
wanted convergence in European employment systems, or if those trends
result from different underlying factors. The effects some 'new' forms of
employment have on each other and on overall patterns of work
organisation in various countries of the European Union are investigated.
The study checks how far those 'new' or 'flexible' forms of employment
can contribute to the creation of high skilland high wage economies in the
European Union Member States.
Thisthesis investigates the interaction between the use of 'atypical' or
'new' employment relationships as approximation to the numerical
flexibility issueand skill requirements and its provision in firms as a threshold
to the ways functional flexibility issought after In various European countries.
It also analyses under which circumstances firms make use of new forms of
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employment. From this analysis, conclusions will be drawn about possible
effects of the promotion of the so-called atypical forms of work on the
competitive situation of national labour markets. How will these new forms
of work affect the existing mode of labour market management? Can they
be incorporated into the existing mode, to create a sustainably flexible
labour market? Given the different stages the European labour markets are
in, what are the policy options open for decision makers? Is the move
towards more (numerical) flexibility in all European labour markets, as shown
by the extension of certain new forms of employment, the same as the
move towards one mode of labour market management?, or can it lead to
the collapse of individual labour markets, resulting in even bigger
disparities?
The relevance of this topic results not only from the economic and
political dimension of improving European competitiveness and the
continuation in the process of European unification, presented above, but
also from a theory dimension. There is, to start with, a theoretical
perspective of societal development. There are various theories relating to
universalism and diversity in societies proclaiming changes in working
patterns leading either to convergence or to divergence, as I will show in
Chapter 2. These changes, depending on the underlying theory's rationale,
would lead to one post-industrial society in Europe (Le. convergence), or a
continuing diversity or even widening of differences (divergence).
Secondly, even though strongly related to the first factor, theories regarding
systems' prerequisites for establishing functional or numerical flexibility often
suggest some degree of incompatibility between eXisting conditions and
desired ends (see chapter 3), leading to trade-offs between key areas of
policies identified by the European Union, in its search of a flexible future. A
future that should reflect the best of values and traditions in Europe, the
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European Social Model, including competition between firms and solidarity
between citizens. It is important, in shaping the future organisation of work,
to recognise these values, as the new organisation of work cannot be
separated from social conditions, but must be embedded in the wider
organisation of society (Green book). The Commissions feels that the social
partners must playa crucial role in this new organisation of work, although
they do recognise that in many Member States there is a history of distrust
and conflict, that can influence developments, when the new organisation
of work should be based on trust and commitment. The challenge for social
partners, as for policy makers is to develop a new framework for the
organisation of work, a framework that has to be defined through
discussionsin the social dialogue (Green Book). It is my intention to discuss
the possibilities of such a dialogue, Le. of reaching a common
understanding in industrial relations in Europe later in this thesis. See below
the way it will evolve.
1.3. OuHine of method
The question of convergence or divergence can be asked on
different levels and looked at from different perspectives. I have chosen to
investigate trends in work organisation taking the firm's perspective as a
point of reference. Thischoice isbased on two considerations. Firstly,there is
general agreement that convergence in Europe can only take place if
there isharmonisation in the patterns of work organisation (see for example:
Sengenberger 1992; Deakin and MOckenberger 1992; Atkinson 1985).
Secondly, because current European Union policies take a similar approach
to harmonisation. The European Union sees one of the most promising
developments in their efforts to improve economic performance in the
impulse of new forms of work organisation. It hopes that by improving firms'
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flexibility a process of organisational development will emerge, offering a
unique path for the national employment systems to converge: leading
towards a distinctive European way of work organisation, based on 'high
skill, high productivity, high quality -and good real wages' (Green Book,
1997),as I have explained above.
This being so, this study will investigate empirically European
convergence and/or divergence in the light of present flexibilisation efforts,
since (as I will show in chapter 2) theoretical considerations can not resolve
this question. I will try to solve it by analysing developments in the
flexibilisation of work patterns in firms regarding the different socio-
economic systems. Hence, instead of investigating the question of
European convergence or divergence directly, I will follow an indirect
approach. I will examine if current changes in patterns of work organisation
in firmscan be attributed to the same underlying factors and will eventually
lead to a similarform of work organisation across Europe.
I intend to investigate the likely explanations for the variance of
usage patterns of new modes of labour by firms across Europe, using
quantitative data from the NFWASurvey (for exact reference see chapter
6) and combine these with qualitative data in three country case studies -
the United Kingdom, Spain and Germany. Finally I will, based on the
previous results, reach conclusions about options policy makers have to
exercise influence, and what that means for the development of one
European Society.
1.4. Organlsaflon And Preview Of The Study
This thesis is organised In four parts. In Part I 'Theoretical and
Methodological Issues' the question of convergence or divergence in
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European societies will be raised on the level of work organisation, and the
flexibility debate from the perspective of firms' management strategies,
using an 'ideal' type model, will be introduced. The remainder of Part I will
present a methodology to answer the question, starting with the firm's
strategy, to then draw conclusions for the issue of work organisation and
that of convergence of European societies as a whole. Part II will gather
'Statistical Evidence' to investigate the underlying factors in firms' decision
making, and to determine convergence or divergence in patterns of work
organisation across Europe. Based on these similaritiesand differences, Part
III 'National Institutional Systems'will present the country case studies of the
national institutional systems of Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom.
The final Part IConclusion' will, based on the results from the previous parts,
draw conclusions for the question of European convergence or
divergence, evaluating the policy options open to the various, mainly social
actors. Analysing the likelihood of reaching the new organisation of work at
which the Commission aims.
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ONE FLEXIBLE FUTURE FOR EUROPE? THE CASE OF EUROPEAN CONVERGENCE AND / OR DIVERGENCE
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FLEXIBILITY DEBATE
PART I:
THEORETICAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
2.INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSSYSTEMS:CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE
3. FLEXIBILITY:FIRM'S PERSPECnVE
4. METHODOLOGY
2. Industrial Relations Systems: Convergence or
Divergence
2.1. Introduction
There are various theories bearing on convergence and divergence
in work organisation in general and Industrial Relations in particular, that I
wi" analyse in this chapter to introduce the first tier of the theoretical basis
to my investigation.
The European Commission sees the relatively moderate degree
(compared to its competitors) of adaptation of the European Union to the
altered and continuously changing economic environment as the main
reason for the loss of competitiveness in European economies. The
perceived need to increase adaptability within the Union has led the
Commission to identify several key areas on a European level where certain
policies could improve flexibility in work organisation, and between them,
the homogenisation of industrial relations system. However, the need to
respect national traditions to maintain European values is also recognised.
These two (at least partly) offsetting demands on European Social Policy -
the urgency to change in order to stay competitive, while respecting
traditions to avoid tensions between old and new ways of work
organisation- are sufficient to highlight the competing pressures of
convergence and divergence in European Societies. The EUconsiders that
one of the most promising developments of their efforts to improve
economic performance is the progressive adoption of new forms of work
organisation; endorsing these new forms of work organisation would
occasion changes in the world of labour relations and hands in the
Industrial Relations systems.Such changes would be based in the distinctive
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"European way": participation, consensus, skills reproduction, and thus
transform Industrial Relations offering a unique path for the national
employment systemsto converge (Green Book, 1997).The catch lies in the
actual existence of unheralded effects new forms of work organisation, like
more flexible forms of employment, will have on the Industrial Relations
System. Are the benefits of the new forms of organisation selective, Le.
accruing only in certain firms, sectors, countries ...? or are they common to
all, reducing international differences of the Industrial Relations System, as
assumed by EU commission papers such as the Green Book (1997). The
debate on Industrial Relations is connected to the conflicting theories of
economic change that I will describe in this chapter, and that regard the
matter of the possibility of convergence or divergence in European Union
member states production and reproduction regimes.
The two demands on future policies (convergence in a European
level and respecting national traditions), and the conjunction of those two
demands are each attached to certain schools of thought related to
theories of societal development. The aim of this chapter isto present those
main schools of thought, starting with the classical management school of
'culture free' forms of work organisation based on economic rationality,
which we will refer to as 'Universalism'. The second category is labelled
'Characterism', this describes the school of thought which has been
developed as an antithesis to the first and sees national traditions as the
main (or only) characterising force for forms of work organisation. And
finally 'Characteristic Universalism', a synthesisof the two previous lines of
thought, according to which developments in work organisation will be
'filtered' through the traditional system, resulting in a system catering for
both outside trends and traditions. Work patterns will be susceptible to
various influences, newly appeared pressures to change as well as
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traditional patterns. Thismakes prediction of societal development even
more complicated. The choice of these three categories will become clear
in the course of the chapter. The last section of the chapter contains a brief
summary, highlighting the arguments that are relevant to further research.
2.2. Universalism
The dominant schools within classical management thought and
organisational sociology assumed efficiency imperatives created 'one best
way' of managing irrespective of cultural or national context (Smith and
Meiksins, 1995). Whatever differences in organising existed between
societies would, over time, be subsumed by superior general efficiency
methods and practices. At a macro-level, the convergence theory of Kerr,
Dunlop, Harbison and Myers (1960) suggested that, despite differing routes
into 'industrial society', work within it would look increasingly similar. Thiswas
because science and technology were universal ingredients of all I industrial
societies', and the long term solvents of national and cultural differences.
Connected to this issueis the debate on the transformation of the industrial
relations systemsof different countries in response to the internationalisation
of markets, technological innovations and increased work-force diversity,
which has been the focus of much research in industrial relations in the last
decade (Locke, Kochan and Piore, 1995). Lansbury has argued that, even
though 'all European countries are experiencing intensified pressures to
adapt their traditional Industrial Relations practices in response to increased
global competition and changing technologies, most of them are
uncertain about the precise nature of the Industrial Relations system they
should be seeking to establish and which will be appropriate in decades to
come' (Lansbury, 1995:7-5)
Similarly to classical management thought, the contingency theory
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argued that firm structure and social relations were essentially free from
cultural influence; the task environment, product market, sizeof firm, its form
and structure or its production technology were the chief influences in
management, occupational structure and work organisation and these
'contingents' were 'culture free' (Chandler, 1962; Blauner, 1964;
Woodward, 1965; Hickson et ot, 1979). As an example, it seems that
American writers trying to comprehend the rise of Japanese competition
and manufacturing decline in the American economy, have used
comparative analysis to abstract organisational standards which can be
applied as techniques and typologies free from cultural or national
contamination (Vogel 1979; Ouchi 1981; Pascale and Athos 1982). There
has been an ubiquitous attempt to devise universal models, even where, as
in the debate over Japanese transplanted companies, these models are
synonymous with, or reliant upon, a single dominant economy (Womack et
al. 1990;Kenney and Florida 1993).
In their turn, in the same line of thought, advocates of the 'universal
society' approach argue that modern societies, particularly in Europe stand
in tight contact/competition with each other. Actions taken in one society
do not only affect this society, but also all others. Modern information
technology makes it possible to exchange information rapidly and modern
production technology allows industry to produce nearly everywhere. This
strong relationship, so the argument goes, has already caused a degree of
convergence between European societies. Given the fact that technology
and knowledge can be readily transferred from one economy to another,
further convergence will be the natural consequence. Any obstacles in Its
way will slow down this process of universalisation, and will eventually lead
to lossof competitiveness. Since the competitive environment is similar for
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all economies, it is thought that there is no room for different modes of
labour market management or different industrial relations systems.Thiscan
be seen as a renaissance of the idea of a universal evolution of
technological and economic rationality, which will eventually lead towards
the convergence of all societies, towards a 'post-industrial society'.
Consequently policy makers should rally round and establish flexibility,
influenced by abstract models as examples of 'best practise' or 'ideal
type', based on economic and technological rationality.
There are many studies and models in the area of labour market
flexibility, which have implicitly assumed that there are universal rationales
for using different forms of flexibility, and 'that there isa general process at
work whereby most advanced industrial economies are moving in the
same direction, in search of greater flexibility' (O'Reilly, p.219, 1992a).
National traditions and circumstances are seen as obstacles to the
establishment of flexibility, rather than as starting points to develop distinct,
varying modes of labour market management.
Contradicting the assumptions of universal society theorists, cross-
national research which held constant economy, technology, product, firm
size and other tasks 'contingents' found underlying differences in labour
processes, occupational structures and management styles that could only
be connected to the persistence of national differences and the singular
approaches these occasioned (Gallie 1978;Child and Keiser 1979;Maurice,
SeiHerand Silvestre 1979;Maurice, Sorge and Warner 1980).
Due, Madsen and Jensen (1991:88)suggest that: "Actors have arrived
who, via their actions and status, consciously strive to create convergence
in Industrial Relations, across the boundaries of member states... we now
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have actors who, far from being intent solely on promoting national
interests,act solely on the basisof supranational considerations ... and actor
oriented analysis which pays due attention to EC co-operation will
inevitably concentrate on convergence trends deriving from the
supranational character of the actors". Such convergence, will, so their
argument, emerge in parallel to the convergence trends implicit in
technology transfer, market developments and other forms of co-
operation.
2.3. Characterlsm
This category is introduced here to signify the views that are
diametrically opposed to universal society theories, the view that the main
characterising force behind work organisation are national traditions. It has
become necessary to invent this new classification, since in literature
schools of thought belonging in this category are often summarised under
different names, normally taken from the preferred school of thought. I will
broach some of the theories in the following paragraphs.
Resultsof cross-national research, as has been mentioned above,
showed that Universalism could not explain the steadfastness of serious
national organisational and social differences across 'industrial societies',
except perhaps in terms of lags and questionable notions of
'backwardness' (Smith and Meiksins, 1995).To offset these problems there
was a re-evaluation of the role played by political economic systems
(which include Industrial Relations systems), history, tradition and culture in
sustaining diversity within organisations across different societies. However,
the difficulties in making such extensive and uncertain concepts as culture
and tradition workable resulted in critical analysis turning to the media of
social reproduction responsible for transmitting national messages to each
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generation of workers and managers: namely to social institutions. At the
level of the organisation, these 'institutionalist' accounts of national
distinctiveness rested on supply-side assumptions that organisations are
largely determined by their inputs (Smithand Meiksins,1995).At the macro-
level, they suggest that the constitution of the firm and its relationship to
banks, the state and other political, economic and so-called 'social' actors
are socially constructed within different national environments.
Institutionalist explanations for cross-national organisational variance
represent a bringing into focus of the state and an associated shrivelling of
the power of the economy, technology and the market. Institutional
analysis tended to focus on, and reinforce, national differences. The
difficulty this contention presented was how to explain the dynamic nature
of change within economies which are increasingly global, not nationally
confined systems.In Europe in particular, according to Gunnigle and Roche
(1995), the analysis of industrial relations practices and policies has never
been so closely tied to an appreciation of commercial, national and
international political pressures.
Institutionalist therefore, identified a critical weakness in
convergence/'one best way' approaches: their inability to explain the
persistence of significant national differences in economic organisations
over long periods of time. They shifted organisational research towards
comparative, cross-national studies which focused on the sources of
national differences. However, these exercises in comparative analysis
tended to let a kind of universalism in through the back door - certain
national practices were held up as 'models' of 'best practice'. In this way
they seemed to recommend the 'lessadvanced' to follow the example of
the better off, so that they would end up following universal rationales of
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economic organisation and evolution. The debate on the
convergence/divergence issue was thus not resolved. The persistent
ambivalence of organisational theorists regarding these opposing
dynamics islikewise revealed.
As to the convergence - divergence issuein what regards Industrial
Relations, the challenges to traditional or established Industrial Relations
arise from such major forces as intensified international competition,
changes to the structure of product and service markets, European
integration and new approaches to the management of manufactUring
technologies. It has been argued that there has been an explosive
divergence in Industrial Relations, with different strands of development
moving away from each other in different directions, rather than an
implosive convergence towards one central best practice (Streeck, 1988)
and the potentially convergence encouraging process of social dialogue,
has, for itspart, produced little apart from working parties (Baldry, 1994).
Members of the societal effect school, who also disagree with the
idea of a move towards a universal society, reject the concept of a move
towards technological and economic rationality, stressingthe importance
of the human actor, national traditions and cultures. They maintain that
even if something distantly similar to a universal society exists, the way
towards it might be very different for various societies. The term 'societal
effect' is used by LESTon skill hierarchies (Maurice et a/. 1986) to show
"specific national characteristics" of the overall logical process that shapes
"factors of socialisation" (training and mobility of the labour force) and
"factors of organisation" (division of labour, hierarchy within the enterprise
(..) collective labour relations..)" (Desmarez, p 143, 1987). The societal
approach is in some ways an ad hoc theoretical formalisation to meet the
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needs of international comparisons (Michon, 1992, p 235). Dubois makes
clear that other works stressthe effect of "the national culture" or basic
rules of living in a community (...) the system of industrial relations...".
However all of them are trying to establish "what is known in statistical
language as interaction: the relationship between one or a number of
variables (...) depends on the given context" (1989,p207).
Contrary to American writers, who were often seeking to abstract
organisational models from national context (see above), European writers
have stressed the importance of selection, acclimatisation and diversity in
production systems.Neither group has produced anything like a coherent
cross-national comparative theory. The former for reasons explained
above, the latter because they failed to explain the dynamic development
in national systemsbrought about by globalisation.
Recent comparative studies of labour and management across
European societies, debates on the diffusion of Japanese working
practices, and those around 'new production concepts' have highlighted
the competing pressures of convergence and divergence in industrial
societies. They also suggest that neither universalist nor societal effects
defenders offer sufficient grounds to explain existing differences and
diverging pressuresto change.
There exist in the literature some scholars that tend to equilibrate the
extreme positions of universalism and what I have named characterism,
nonetheless their approaches do not normally have a explicit
denomination, thus I decided to introduce a term that would express
clearly what ismeant, an eclectic view between universalismand diversity,
that I am going to cover in the next section.
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2.4. Characteristic universalism
This term was chosen as a means of expressing the existence of
universalistic trends which get a characteristic turn if they are absorbed by
a society, when filtered through its characteristic system. Once the ideas
summarised in this category are presented, the choice of the title should
become clear.
Such universalistic trends include the concept of 'best practice',
which I have already found in universalism. It would seem that the
intensified competition between the different economies, and hence the
different productive systems, with some systems appearing to perform
better than others, is putting pressure on the 'less competitive' ones to
change. Since some systems of work organisation have proved more
successful than others, those systemswill be, in total or through aspects of
their systems,measures for progress and the push will be towards a change
in that direction. So far the Universal Theory sounds feasible. Nevertheless,
several doubts can be raised against giving undue prominence to the role
of best practice in shaping work organisation. First,it could be argued that
such borrowing is superficial, affecting only the firm level and not the
institutional arrangements of the state (legal regulations) or civil society
(particularly Industrial Relations). Second, it might be that whatever is
witnessed in other societies by 'significant' actors - corporate managers, civil
servants or others - cannot simply be imposed in their 'own' SOCietyor firm,
due to the commitment to or embedded nessof existing practices. Thirdly, it
might be that any new standard will inevitably become diluted or adapted
by host institutions and agencies producing a multiplicity of national versions
of ostensible 'best practices' such as Taylorism, Fordism or JIT.As such, we
would be back to institutional cultural pluralism, and not universal ways of
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organising. Clearly, economic performance against other societies qualifies
a country receiving special attention, and through its operation in the
international economy facilitates the diffusion of its practices to other
societies. However, while recognising that international benchmarks affect
all levels, it is obviously the case that adjusting institutional Systems is more
complex than rethinking factory regimes. As such, the factory or
organisational levels may be more dynamic and variable, relative to social
institutions of the state and civil society. As Abo (1994, p.16) notes, 'if the
Japanese production system does establish a clear superiority over other
systems, then within certain parameters, it will spread to other countries.
However the degree to which it permeates a given society will be
governed by conditions in that society'.
And by rote, the response to these pressuresis not the same in every
country. Rather, according to Locke, Kochan and Piore (1995:158),
"employment relations are shaped in systematic and predictable ways by
institutions which filter these external pressures and the strategies of key
actors. Patterns of adjustment in countries that have a history of strong
centralised Industrial Relations institutions tend to follow an incremental,
negotiated pattern and aim to achieve resultsthat balance the interests of
different social groups and economic interests". In other countries the
adjustment has tended towards the unilateral; with unions and their
traditional institutional supports and political allies put on the defensive".
These groups' perspective regarding the creation of a competitive
advantage and converging or diverging trends in Europe are not as clear-
cut as the forecasts of the previous groups. To create a competitive
advantage, the emergence of a system, consistent in social and economic
organisation, is indispensable (Perez 1983,Freeman, 1983).Thisnecessity for
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a new balance has to be considered before embarking on the redesign of
the current structure. As Rubery (1992)explains 'Convergence. in the sense
that some countries might face the disintegration of their existing societal.
regional or specific industry-based productive system. may lead to further
divergence in economic performance.' (p.259) However one should also
be careful not to overstress the internal coherence and functioning of a
productive system. neglecting internal contradictions and pressuresfrom in
and outside the system to change (Rubery. 1992). The central question
remains. of whether the current situations in the European labour markets
can be regarded as sufficiently similar. for a policy based on the idea of
one system of work organisation. leading to or deriving from a 'unified' or
parallel system of Industrial Relations for the whole of Europe to be
successfuI.
In the last decades or so the context and consequently the nature of
Industrial Relations in Europe has undergone major changes. which were
associated with changes in labour markets. "The composition of
employment shifted from traditionally highly unionised to non-union sectors
and workers and collectivist ideologies lost favour for individualist ones"
(Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992;57) This approach tried to deal with
individual employees and included what are often denominated HRM
techniques, It was an approach in which employers sought new systemsof
work organisation, employment contracts and working-time arrangements
to provide the flexibility necessary to adjust to the competitive conditions of
the 1980s (Kern and Schuman, 1990; Rubery and Wilkinson, 1994).
Management capacity to pursue strategies aimed at increasing labour
flexibility and productivity increased in the 1980sas unemployment steadily
increased and as trade union membership declined in some economies
(MOiler-Jentsch. 1987).Therefore, management has had the opportunity to
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define the nature and conditions of the employment relationship to a
greater extent than previously. And this has been connected to a
questioning of traditional forms of regulation external to the firm, whether
by law or by sectoral collective agreements (Hyman, 1995).Such changes
have taken place across Europe, and their effect has been to reactivate
the debate about 'convergence'. Described as an 'old debate' (Locke et
at.. 1995), it argues that the effects of increasing internationalisation in
general, and the role of the EUin particular, will eventually give rise to an
increasing similarityof Industrial Relations,at least in Europe.
Despite such arguments, it is widely recognised that Industrial
Relations in Europe differ significantly from country to country and that the
extent and nature of change varies considerably. Moreover, in most
European countries it is possible to speak of national Industrial Relations
systems, "in the sense of institutional arrangements shaped by legislative
frameworks, historical traditions, accumulated vested interests and learned
patterns of behaviour" (Hyman, 1994:2).Thisnational divergence points to a
number of important issues,particularly as relates to the extent to which
governments recognise trade unions as social partners, and the way in
which trade unions are organised to relate to governments. What operates
successfully in one country may not be appropriate for another (as I have
argued above when talking about societal differences); besides, while
importation of specific features of one system may occur, a blanket
approach to the transposition of complete Industrial Relations systemsonto
pre-existing ones appears limited. In Europe specifically, laws and directives
are not in themselves sufficient to bring about significant change, and will
only be important if there is a willingness to use them and institutions to
implement them. Thisrefers in particular to awareness and capabilities on
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the part of employees and trade unions. Here it is true that at the European
level there are significant institutional gaps in this respect, as is evidenced
by the difficulty of developing the social dialogue. At the level of the
individual countries there are also gaps, with weak union movements in
some member states (Gospel, 1992:488)
There is empirical evidence (Morley et ai, 1996) to support the view
that there are elements of both convergence and divergence at work in
European Industrial Relations; however, it appears that national differences
remain more significant than sector or size dimension. My study will deal
with issuesrelated to Industrial Relations, when intertwined with new forms
of work and activity in the European Union as to Labour flexibility and
convergence.
Its lack of generality in predicting future societal developments, is
probably the reason, why 'Characteristic Universalism' is not as much seen
as a theory, but more as an approach to comparative analysis. At the heart
of the approach lies the idea of interaction, between 'borrowed' forms of
work organisation, which are thought to be the reasons behind another
country's competitive advantage, and traditional systemsof labour market
management in the target society (see for example: Smith and Meiksins,
1995; Sorge 1991;Whitley 1992).Writers taking this perspective also agree,
that in order to predict future developments, the particular pattern of
interaction has to be understood and attention has to be given to
combinations of different and opposed forms of work organisation. In that
respect, the approach raisesmore questions than it answers.
2.5. Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown how perspectives holding that industrial
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societies were moving towards one 'universal society' were incapable of
giving a consistent explanation to persistent differences both social and
organisational. The only way in which they could begin to explain the
differences was with the notion of tardiness and slow development.
Nonetheless some cross-national research that held the above mentioned
contingents constant, found latent differences in labour processes,
occupational structures, management styles, and Industrial Relations
systemsproving the inaccuracy lying in the notion of lagging (Gallie 1978;
Child and Keiser 1979; Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre 1979; Maurice, Sorge
and Warner 1980). These differences were only explainable in terms of
national characteristics: national differences that occasion diverging
attitudes and diversions from the path to Universalism.These differences
were attributed to different cultures and traditions. National differences
would then be normal because economic rationality would be mediated
by national institutions, so that managers and workers would interact with
society and within firms in distinctive ways, which shape or are derived from
the Industrial Relations system. While Universalism stressed similarities,
characterism emphasised national differences, but could not explain the
dynamic nature of change within economies which are increasingly global,
not nationally bounded systems.Moreover, it does not take into account
the changes that globalisation is occasioning in national institutions, which
according to Hyman (1994:2) include the national Industrial Relations
systemsof each European country.
Future labour market systems will be the result of the interaction
between both new models of work organisation borrowed from other
systemsand the existing systems.A prediction of the future system depends
much more on the individual case, taking into account how those two
23
forces might interlock, to form the base of the new labour market system.A
general answer regarding convergence or divergence seems not to be
possible on a theoretical basis. I will thus turn my attention to empirical
methods to attempt to predict whether the new systemsderived from the
intermeshing between conflicting forces: universal and national tensions,
will lead to increasingly similar ways of organisation in Europe or will
separate European economic systemseven further. An empirical study of
current trends in work organisation and their underlying factors in the
Industrial Relations system- production and reproduction systemcan help to
find out if those are so similaras to lead to one European system, based on
a unified or at least co-ordinated Industrial Relations system or not. In the
next chapter theories regarding the new forms of work and flexibilisation of
work (from the firm's perspective) are introduced to lay the foundations of
the empirical study.
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3. Flexibility: Firm's perspective
3.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter we have introduced theories regarding the
convergence or divergence of work organisation both in general and
across Europe. The current chapter will present an ideal type model for the
flexibilisation of work from a firm's perspective. Thismodel will only be used
as a framework for discussion. The needed improvement in flexibility and
competitiveness of firms is at the heart of European policies (White Paper,
1994). The firm is an interesting unit of inquiry -below the level of the
economy as a whole, and above the level of the individual-, since it is here
where demand and supply in the labour market meet.
In order to analyse firms' flexibility and changes to it, a closer
definition of flexibility than that given in the introduction to this thesis will be
developed. To illustrate what is understood by flexibility of firms and clarify
issues of flexibility, the 'Flexible Firm Model', which is often used as a
'blueprint' to ideate flexibility strategies, will be introduced in section 3.2.
The Model's strength lies in its simplicity; however this also opens it to
criticism. Its use as an agenda, does not prejudge its accuracy; it only
affirms its serviceability. Nevertheless it seems well suited to structure the
discussion on flexibility, in particular on interactions between various forms.
At the same time, the flexibility of firms cannot be seen in isolation from the
flexibility of individuals or institutions (Bosch, 1995).Thisissuewill be dealt with
when discussing the validity of the model, which highlights the societal
construction of firms' flexibility. The validity of the model is not prejudlcated
by its use, it is firstand foremost an instrument for analysis. The final section of
this chapter will discuss the issuesraised, and examine the implications for
the remaining research.
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3.2. The Flexible Firm Model
As mentioned above, for further analysis a better understanding of
flexibility is needed. The concept of flexibility encompasses various notions
and carries ideological values. Discussionsare often characterised by the
ambiguity resulting from this ill-defined nature of the term flexibility. The
'Flexible Firm Model' of Atkinson (1984) is an attempt to resolve those
problems.
Atkinson tries to give an answer to the controversial question: 'What is
flexibility?' by identifying four types of flexibility:
• Numerical Flexibility
• Functional Flexibility
• Distancing Strategies
• Pay Flexibility
Those four types of flexibility will be described next and possible
interaction between them highlighted, before presenting the Flexible Firm
model, which inserts the different types of flexibility into a common
framework.
3.2.1. Types of Flexibility
Numerical FlexlbDIty is described as a firms' ability to adjust the
amount of labour it employs at anyone time to the demand for labour it
has. There are different ways to achieve this flexibility, according to the sort
of workload variations occurring. Common ways of adapting the number of
employees to the amount of work are altering the working time patterns of
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current employees -overtime, annual average of working hours, part-time
work, etc.- or by the use of additional labour -fixed term employment,
casual workers, part-timers- or also by hiring and firing according to
demand. Thistype of flexibility has received attention as resultsseem to be
achievable in a relatively short time (when compared to the following type)
and policy makers tend to measure the success of their policies in the take
up rates of new forms of work.
Functional Flexibility isnot concerned with a firmsability to adjust the
amount of workers, but the task they are employed at. It denotes a firm's
ability to adjust and deploy the skillsof its workforce in order to meet its
requirements of skilled labour. The demand for skilled labour and the skills
needed change because of workload fluctuations and changes in the
technology used for production. This definition makes clear that the
functional flexibility of a firm/ labour market will be difficult to measure. The
rate of adaptability of employees to new unpredictable demands can
most likely only be fathomed when the changes have occurred. What is
generally recognised, and probably the least controversial point in the
whole issueof flexibility, is the importance of instruction, vocational training
and skill. Everyone recognises their key-role in the move towards more
flexible societies and that the present rigidities in the educational system are
firmer obstacles to the achievement of flexibility than the rigidities in the
labour market (GECD, 1986b). That a 'far-reaching reform is necessary to
enable education and vocational training to prepare the public and
especially modern youth, for flexibility' (Gaudier, 1987, p. 50) is taken for
granted. 'It is as if education had become one of the instruments of
economic policy to promote competitiveness.' (Marsden, 1992, pp 158-
159). However, success or failure will only be visible in the long term
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perspective.
An alternative approach to creating flexibility is represented by the
'Distancing Strategy'. Distancing describes the substitution of employment
relationships by commercial relationships. Rather than reorganising its own
manpower allocation, a company can give work to other companies, for
example by sub- or out- contracting. Since our main preoccupation is the
effect on the whole labour market, rather than on particular firms, this
strategy will not be examined in this study. The problem of adjustability is
only passed on to another firm, remaining a problem in the labour market.
Pay Flexibility has a different nature from numerical or functional
flexibility, since it is of an ancillary nature to the latter two. Pay flexibility is
the extent to which the salary/reward structure supports the required
numerical/functional flexibility. The incentive structure iscertainly important,
but an analysis of pay flexibility is rather in the area of econometrics, and
this study ismore concerned with the first two types of flexibility.
3.2.2. Numerical vs. Functional Flexibility?
Referring to possible interactions between the various types of
flexibility, Boyer (1987) notes that some forms of flexibility could turn out to
be substitutes rather than complements. For instance, one way of achieving
flexibility on the intensive margin is through internal labour markets. These
offer a high degree of job security to employees in return for functional
flexibility. Thissort of labour market structure is unlikely to be compatible with
pay flexibility or adjustment on the extensive margin. Therefore, we must
take into account that there is more than one path to flexibility in the
labour market, and more than one goal.
The other side of labour force adjustments isof course the job security
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of employees. Most workers depend on their work for their income;
additionally, to probably different extends in different societies, work is the
basis for their standing in society, their satisfaction and their self-esteem.
Social inclusion is often treated as synonymous with employment. It would
appear that having a certain degree of job protection maybe considered
a profound human need. It is also widely considered to have benefits for
the employer: "It isgenerally considered to be more efficient to work with a
stable, integrated labour force than with a constantly changing one. If
rncnv workers stay only a short time, the cost of recruitment, induction and
training become disproportionately large. Workers who feel secure - and
the fact that when losing their jobs will be fairly and generously treated -
are likely to accept change more readily and to be more motivated and
co-operative than workers who feel insecure. (...) If dismissal is costly, the
employer will be more careful in recruitment, planning manpower policies
on a long term basis, and keeping and making better use of the existing
labour force, retraining workers to meet new needs rather than seeking
trained workers from outside." (Clarke, O. 1988p. 10).
The expected impact of numerical flexibility on functional flexibility,
here approached from the angle of investment into training and re-
training, is negative, as an increase in numerical flexibility might run parallel
to a decrease in training efforts. If the emphasis ison numerical flexibility, it is
antiCipated that firms are 'less willing to train for it (functional flexibility),
while workers have little motive in supplying it' (NEDO, 1986, p.84). The EU
realises that long term employment relationships generally increase firms'
investment into training (White Paper, 1994). The promotion of more
numerical flexibility might go hand in hand with the creation of more
unskilled, low productive workers, unresponsive to major changes in
demand (NEDO, 1986), and actually increase functional rigidity (pollert,
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1987). It is thought that some correcting measures, like giving more
responsibility for the training of the currently unemployed to the state (White
Paper, 1993),could help avoid such a development.
The 'Flexible FirmModel', generates much of its attraction from the
very fact that it seems to remove partly the contradiction between the
conditions needed for numerical and functional flexibility (Brown, 1990).
3.2.3. The Flexible Firm Model
Having briefly described the four types of flexibility and possible
interactions between those taken into account by Atkinson in his
formulation of the Flexible FirmModel, I will go on to describe the model
itself,which isbased on the assumption that a firm will seek to achieve both
functional and numerical flexibility from different groups of workers, and
hence divides the workforce into two groups, the so called 'core' and the
'periphery'. The peripheral group of workers -who mayor may not be
employees- is needed to create numerical flexibility. Thisgroup surrounds
the core of employees, with whose help, supported by incentives (e.g. pay
flexibility) and eventually employment protection, the firm will try to
generate its functional flexibility.
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The essence of the flexible firm model has been summarised by
Atkinson (1984) in Figure3.1:
Such a split in the workforce as that shown in the above figure, would
make both functional and numerical flexibility achievable. Additionally,
since the periphery of workers cushions the core from workload fluctuations,
the core employment relationships will be long employment relations, a
factor that is normally considered to augment investment into training. Thus
the 'extra' numerical flexibility created by the periphery might actually
support the creation of more functional flexibility. Firmsare thought to be
increasingly willing to bear the cost of adjustment to change only for the
core group. Such costs including training and retraining, relocation, pay
maintenance, etc. all of them necessary disbursements to secure functional
flexibility. It isalso thought that at the same time a firm will try to avoid these
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disbursements in relation to workers on the periphery.
3.2.4. Validity of the Model
The Flexible FirmModel has exercised considerable influence in policy
making, and has been popular in both academic and commercial circles,
but many question its validity when used as a basis to firm's actual labour
market management. Research has shown (Marginson 1989, Hakim 1990,
Hunter and Mcinnes 1991)that the flexible firm model does not seem to be
an empirically valid description of how employers [in Britain] make decisions
about the structure of their work force. The model of the flexible firm has
come under considerable criticism for being developed in a cultural
vacuum (Pollert, 1987). Gallie and White (1991) state that the model
conflates diverse elements under generalised categories, comparing
heterogeneous groups, with the problems such a comparison entails. Walby
(1989) points out that the gendered division of many flexible forms of work
has not received great attention under the model. The strong demand side
orientation of the model has led to a neglect of the influences of the
supply side (Robinson and Wallace, 1984).And Rubery (1988) has criticised it
for concentrating on the problem of labour allocation, but paying little
attention to issues like product market competition, retail and after-sales
service. The flexible firm model also neglects the impact of institutional
segmentation, the concerns of interest groups, unions and state
interventions in employers attempts to introduce flexibility and restructure
the workforce (O'Reilly, 1992b). Brown (1990) concludes that the 'Flexible
FirmModel' can be useful as an agenda for discussion, if it is used as an
example of an 'ideal type' rather than a description of reality. Thisuse was
also intended by the creators of the flexible firm model, who pointed out
that the model is designed to be an analytical construct, uniting the
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occurring changes in a common framework (NEDO, 1986), rather than an
empirical description or presumption.
Nevertheless, the immense influence the model had and will
continue to have on policy makers -as it has been turned into something of
a 'common sense' construction (Pollett. 1987,p.32) has created one of the
universal trends mentioned in chapter 2 which exercise influence on
national ways of work organisation. Attempts to estimate flexibility, using
indicators like the Part Time rate, temporary contracts, between-job mobility
and subcontracting (Trends, 1995), can be traced back to the model's
culture free approach to firms flexibility. However, the degree in which
employers will make use of these forms of work will not only depend on
rigidities set by regulatory and legislative regimes and the labour demand,
but also hang on the degree of 'flexibility' offered by typical employment
relationships, Le. the rigidity experienced by employers when using full time
permanent employment relations. The flexibility offered by employees can
for example be influenced by the flexibility required from the employee in
his family life or rigidities set in this sphere. All of them are clearly factors
beyond the scope of firms strategy. The question is not flexibility vs. rigidity,
but of finding a balance between various demands on flexibility/stability
and rigidity /insta bility.
3.3. Summary and Conclusion
Thischapter has introduced the 'Flexible FirmModel' which has to be
considered a force in policy making. The Model, due to its neglect of the
cultural context of firms isnot suited to be a real model of firmsstrategy, but
does provide an agenda for discussion.
The distinction between various types of flexibility introduced by the
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model can be useful to highlight interaction between the various kinds of
flexibility. The model can only resolve the controversy between numerical
and functional flexibility in a culture-free perspective. However, firms'
strategies will also be influenced by the various national circumstances.
Hence it will be necessary to free ourselves from the concept at a later
point, to concentrate on actual trends in the labour market and how
national labour market systemsinteract with firms' strategy.
Given the current reality in which policy makers try to establish
(numerical) flexibility, borrowing heavily form the Flexible FirmModel while
neglecting its shortcomings, it is important for this study on European
convergence or divergence to analyse the following question: How will
numerically flexible forms of work effect the various national employment
systems?
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4. Methodology
4.1. Introduction
In the previous chapters it has been suggested that new forms of
work organisation will be diffused by national ways of work organisation.
That will also be the case with the numerically flexible forms of work
borrowed from the Flexible Firm Model and seen as firms' strategic,
economically rational choice to increase competitiveness. However the
strategic choice exercised by firms will also be influenced by the cultural
context in which the firm isembedded. An intermeshing of new forms with
the traditional labour market systemwill take place. The resulting systemwill
depend on various influences and needs to be analysed empirically.
What is needed is a methodology that relates firms' strategies and
organisational forms to national circumstances. ThisChapter presents a
methodology which tries to do just that. Firstly,firms' strategy in relation to
flexibility and the dichotomy between functional and numerical flexibility
will be analysed. To that end, I will evaluate survey data to come to grips
with organisational strategy and to ascertain national differences or
similarities. Secondly, I will look into the matter of how organisational
strategies relate to cross national differences or similarities, taking into
account the dynamic nature of the process of change taking place. I also
intend to analyse the effect legal changes can have on employment
strategies and on the systemas a whole.
Bearing in mind the question to be tackled, comparing new forms of
work organisation in different socio-cultural settings, the comparative
approach seems to be well suited to achieve the necessary insights. Cross
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national comparative research offers an analytical framework for
examining social and cultural differences and provides a means of gaining
a deeper understanding of different societies, their structures and
institutions. It can establish a classification of Inew' forms of work, and
analyse whether those Inew' social phenomena in the various countries
can be explained by the same causes. Furthermore it will also be useful to
analyse solutions adopted or suggested to deal with common problems
and assesstheir transferability between different states.
Thischapter will first present the general methodology which will be
followed throughout the study, secondly changes which had to be made
due to pragmatic decisions will be introduced and thirdly limitations and
constraints will be discussed before the chapter is summarised. Fora more
detailed account of surveys or techniques used please refer to the
following chapters.
4.2. General Research Design:
This research is first of all concerned with the question of whether
there isconvergence within Europe in the pattern of work organisation. The
hypothesis of a convergence in working patterns is supported by the
general struggle of policy makers to increase flexibility in the labour market
(see also Chapter 1) and a European-wide increase in so-called flexible
forms of work.
To be able to set the later analysis in the context of the current trends
and structures of the labour markets, some labour market indicators which
are thought to be of importance for the discussion are presented in
Chapter 5. A number of data sources are available on the national and
international levels. To achieve some degree of comparability I selected
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the Eurostat Labour Force Survey, which uses the same definitions in all
European Union states [See also chapter 5 for a description of the survey
and comparability of the data]. Thisdata will be teamed with data coming
from a survey based on the establishment level. Since the survey used a
different universe over which more detailed information was gathered than
the Eurostat survey, (see Chapter 6 for a description of the survey) data
from it will be summarised in different manners as a preparation for a
deeper analysis. Using this detailed information on organisational
characteristics, rather than aggregated data for the societies as a whole,
should allow us to come to better comparable groupings and more
systematic comparisons. Comparisons on a higher aggregated data level,
might disguisesome aspects we are interested in.
Having laid those foundations, the question of firms' strategy will be
tackled, regarding the strategic choice between numerical and functional
flexibility. As a base for the further analysis of firm's choice between
different types of flexibility, an explanatory model for firm's need/use of
flexibility using firm characteristics from the survey will be built. With the use
of the explanatory model factors for a firm's decision to use more or less
employees with 'new' working time arrangements can be established.
Questions regarding the influence of the national circumstances can be
raised:
• Are the reasons for the use of 'new' form of employment similar
across the countries?
• How can variations in the take up patterns be explained?
• Are legal constraints or company characteristics more important for
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explaining variations?
The quantitative part of the study serves as a base for further
analysis. After classifying different types of work organisation, the question
ariseswhether current differences on the national level rather than at firm's
level are due to different stages of economic development in the various
states, or are due to other factors, like varying cultural value systems. In the
same way the question concerning similaritieshas to be whether those can
be explained by the same causes, or are the result of different underlying
conditions and might evolve differently. The emphasis will be shifted away
from the static data of the survey used initially, treating the firm as if it was in
a rather culture free space, to more contextualisation.
This implies that I will try to identify the social and institutional
structures behind firms' ways of work organisation in order to find
explanations for national differences in firms' labour use strategies in the
wider social context. Setting the results of the first part of the study into
context will require increasingly multidisciplinary analysis, to consider as
wide a range of factors as necessary. To get a broad base, a secondary
data analysis using literature from academics from various fields will be
carried out, using the results from the quantitative part of the study to filter
and summarise those aspects in a new way.
4.3. Specific Research Design
In this section I will expose two changes to the general research
design which result not from theoretical issues alone, but from more
pragmatic issueslike the manageability of the study. Firstlythe limitation to
two new forms of work only - Part Time and Fixed Term Work.
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There are many different forms of work commonly labelled as flexible
or new forms of work. To keep this study manoeuvrable I was compelled to
make a choice between them. The next section will endeavour to justify
why Part Time employment and Fixed Term employment have been
chosen as the object of the study of flexible forms of work, which of course
implies that other new forms of work are not considered further.
Secondly limitation to three countries only . Spain, Great Britain,
Germany, in the third part of the study. The analysis will be restricted to
three countries to ensure that the qualitative study carried out is sufficiently
in depth. Otherwise, pressure of time would not allow me to deepen the
study, however, statistical information is presented for all countries covered
by the used surveys. The three countries finally chosen for in depth analysis
seemed to us sufficiently different in culture as to make it possible to enjoy
the advantage of gaining insight in different labour market regimes and
obeying the pressure of time.
4.3.1. Which Flexible Formsof Work?
in this section I will explain why I selected Fixed Term and Part Time
employment as representatives for the so called 'new' flexible forms of
work, whose impact on national employment systemswill be investigated in
this study. In choosing those two types I make no assumption as to the
definitional validity of part-time or fixed term work as a flexible form of
working.
The focus on part-time and Fixed Term work isbased on the fact that
together they make-up a significant part of the so-called flexible working
patterns across Europe (Mayne et ol.. 1996; Delsen 19900) ), a fact that
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makes them interesting in themselves, if only quantity-wise.
Part time work is, for various reasons, one of the fastest growing forms
of flexible working. Besides, I must concur with Bruegel and Hegewisch
(1992) in their assertion that the growth in Part Time employment in the face
of high unemployment is one of the more distinctive features of labour
market change in Western Europe over the last decade.
Furthermore, the final selection was made regarding two criteria, one
was the difference of meaning in comparison with 'typical' employment,
and the other was the importance of a given form of work in political
discussion.
New forms of work which retain the quality of being permanent full-
time employment relationships, like week-end work, evening/night work or
shift working, are likely to have an impact on society as a whole. Services
can be available throughout the day and this might bring a diversification
of people's use of time during the course of a day or week. These forms of
work are also likely to have an effect on a firm's competitive position and
machinery use, since the time range for the utilisation of capital might be
extended. However, this study isprimarily interested in the effects new forms
of work might have on the system of social reproduction, training and
retraining. So a change in the balance between capital use and
manpower use will inevitably also affect this area. It can be expected that
employment relationships which deviate from permanent full time
employment, like Part Time employment, and the use of Fixed Term
contracts, with the reduced return on investment (into training) due to
shorter job tenure, will have bigger impacts. Fixed term employment, and
the deregulation of dismissal protection have likewise obtained much
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attention. Part Time work can possibly offer advantages for employers as
well as for employees, and has been growing speedily over the last years.
Part time work could help to offer better job opportunities to women, and
promote the redistribution of the available work. Thistwo traits situate it in
the centre of interest. Thusthe appearance of the "Working time directive"
and the IDraft Directives for Fixed term and Part time employment', as well
as the various legislative changes in different countries.
The distancing strategy, i.e. the substitution of employment
relationships by contracts, has various degrees of usage in the European
Union. However, given that it involves the displacement of employment
relationships (NEDO, 1986) by commercial ones, and that our principal
interests are employment relationships, I decided not to include it in our
main analysis. Moreover, when this distancing strategy means contracting
out to other companies, they are as such inside the labour market, and I
would therefore analyse their behaviour as to Part TIme and Fixed Term
employment.
A relevant part of the controversy over the extension of Part Time
labour has revolved around whether such extension is the product of an
underlying change in employers' labour use strategies (implicit as well as
explicit) or stems from more traditional forces. Forces of that kind would
comprise sectoral and/or occupational shifts in the economy and
traditional short term responses to economic uncertainty.
Recently, many Member States of the European Union have decided
to lessen the requisites for the appointment of fixed-term employees, so
that at the end of the prescribed term, the employer does not have to
face many of the legal obligations resulting from employment protection or
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dismissalregulations that apply in the case of long term employees. It isnot
only policy makers who are interested in the job-creation potentiality of
fixed-term employment (Buchtemann, 1989),this matter has newly found its
way back into the theories of the labour market. The paramount objective
of deregulation concerning fixed-term contracts has been to increase
flexibility in the labour market, assuming that increased flexibility in labour
market regulations will induce higher levels of employment (Buchtemann,
1984) and thus palliate unemployment. Measures taken towards the
deregulation of fixed-term contracts in Member States have hence to be
evaluated against the broader background of labour market flexibility,
occupational mobility and job creation (Schorncnn and Kruppe, 1993).
4.3.2. Choice of Countries
The restriction of the study to three countries in Part III is a pragmatic
decision, in order to keep the work manageable. A selection of countries
will always be to some extend arbitrary. Based on the idea of trying to
cover different types of labour markets, where policies have to be aimed at
different ends, three countries will be selected next and a justification for
their selection will be given.
Contrasting patterns of economic organisations provide different
ways of dealing with the basic issues of any market economy: which
activities and capabilities should be co-ordinated through authority
hierarchies and which through market exchanges, how should exchanges
be organised and how should activities within firms be structured, directed
and controlled? Each businesssystem represents a particular configuration
of hierarchy-market relationships that responds to these issuesin a distinctive
manner as a result of the institutional context in which it developed. The
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way labour market management and institutional systemshave developed
and shaped each other are different in the different member states.
However, it ispossible to distinguish three broad types with regards to labour
market management (Rhodes, 1993): 'Northern', 'Mediterranean' and
'Anglo-Saxon', illustrated in Rhodes' Table 4.1 below. Thisclassification does
not contain all components of the systems, however it seems to be
sufficient with respect to the flexibility of work organisation.
Table 4.1.: Modes of Labour Market Management
Northern Mediterranean Anglo-Saxon
BOOK Nl E F GR I P IRl UK
state Intervention Traditionally limited; Strong state role through legal Stale role traditionally weak;
bargaining important in system; bargaining also little legal regulation until the
setting rules; high level of; important; low level of active 1980'sin the UK;decline in UK
spending on active labour labour market spending bargaining but not in Ireland;
market policy low active labour market
spending in the UK.higher in
Ireland
labour Low level of hierarchy in firms, High level of hierarchy in firms; High level of hierarchy; union
organisation union membership density union density lower, density traditionally high, but
high, little change in the 1980's significant decline in the Significant decline in the
1980's 1980's
Workers' Important influence over Traditionally weak: of greater No formal mode of
participation decisions which affect importance since 1980'swith participation; traditional
organisation of work and shift towards northem model defence of craft organisation
training in France and expansion of / demarcation significantly
quality circles weakened since the early
1980's
Educatlon& High level of participation In Lower level of participation, Low levels of participation in
Training vocational. and continuing higher levels of education higher levels of education
training and training; poorer skills and training; poor levels of
provision skillsprovision
Labour market High levels of skillsallows Lower skillslevel restricts Collapse of apprenticeship
flexibility organisational flexibility; organisational flexibiRty; system adds to deficiency in
restricted external flexibility; restricted extemal flexibility skills,reducing organisational
flexiblRty and exacerbating
employment problems few
restrictions on extemal
flexibifitv in the UK
Source: Rhodes. 1993
The European labour markets differ in the amount of numerical and
functional flexibility they possess.The long term aim of policy makers is to
create labour markets (possibly one single European labour market) with a
high degree of functional and numerical flexibility. Countries selected for
the further analysis, should in some way represent extreme poles from this
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ideal type, i.e. lacking one the other, or both types of flexibility.
The United Kingdom is often used as the example of a European
labour market which has a high degree of numerical flexibility. Many
policies during the last two decades have been aimed at this objective. At
the same time, the United Kingdom has to cope with the highest degree of
skill shortage in Europe, and the traditional apprentice system is
disappearing. In Spain, due to its high unemployment rate, pressure is
mounting to change the current labour market regime fast, and to create
jobs. Given that background, recent changes towards more numerical
flexibility have had to be considered. However this might have implications,
for the outcome of recent changes in the vocational training systems,
intended to improve the skill structure of the Spanish labour market. In
Germany, the situation as to functional flexibility seems to be relatively
good, due to its systemof training, however Germany has been advised by
the World Bank that its scope of numerical flexibility should be improved
upon.
A more detailed description of the current situation in the labour
markets will be given when going into the different sample countries, in Part
III. However, I can now say that I consider that given those three countries
very different historical and institutional developments to be discussed later,
comparison between them will provide insight into the social construction
of gendered work, employers' use of flexible work (particularly of the
chosen types) and the Impact legislation and/or deregulation of labour
markets have on their relative competitive positions.
4.4. Llmltaflons and Constraints
When drawing conclusions from the survey data analysed, one has to
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keep in mind that the influence of the various national contexts which I
want to analyse, will already have played a role when the questionnaires
were agreed upon and or answered. Given that the survey was carried out
by an experienced research group, these errors should be minimised.
Nevertheless, in the absence of a single indicator for flexibility, trying to
estimate functional flexibility with skill levels, and using the data not just in a
descriptive way but also in an interpretative one, those errors might
influence any conclusion.
Similarly, in the secondary data analysis it is also highly likely that
national disturbances occur. There will be more literature on certain topics
in some countries, since a given topic ison top of the agenda there; while
on other topics less information is available. The way results are presented
will also be influenced by the objective of the writer, which is likely to be
influenced again by national values and traditions. In this way, one will
never have a set of data completely cleared from national perspectives.
However, in the absence of 'perfect' data, it seems to be possible to
come to working conclusions, by using information from many different
sources, so that eventual errors will balance out and some degree of
objectiveness isachieved.
4.5. Summary
The chosen way forward to study the questions under consideration is
to embark on an empirical study, using existing Survey Data. Thisshould
warrant that, if assessed accurately, actual developments in the labour
market are studied, rather than the strategies proposed by theorists and
policy makers. To make the task achievable and to be able to go into
certain depth, only two forms of atypical labour, -part time work and Fixed
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Term employment- are considered. These two are the most important in
terms of number of people employed. They have also had the fastest
development in the recent past, and are at the heart of the debate on
flexibility in the Union. However due to the absence of one single indicator
for labour market flexibilities,an indirect approach to measure flexibilitiesvia
the experienced rigidities and firms' strategies had to be taken. The study
concentrates on Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany, to analyse the
impact the new forms of work can have on each of their national
employment systems.
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ONE FLEXIBLE FUTURE FOR EUROPE? THE CASE OF EUROPEAN CONVERGENCE AND / OR DIVERGENCE
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FLEXIBILITY DEBATE
PART II:
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
s, EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE
6. NEW FORMS OF WORK AND ACTIVITY: A EUROPEAN SURVEY
7. EXPLANATORY MODEL
5. Employment Structure
5.1. Introduction
The aim of the present chapter is to present the employment
structure, including recent trends, in the European Union as a whole. This
description will be based on the European Labour Force Survey. The
analysiswill be confined to the 12countries that were member states of the
European Union before its enlargement in 1995,data will be presented for
the years 1984, 1989 and 1994. The period taken covers many labour
market reforms which have been taking place to increase labour market
efficiency. Hence the period I consider here should be sufficiently relevant
to monitor recent changes.
The comparability of survey results over time is complicated by
changes to questionnaire design as well as changes in definition. A major
change in the definition of economic activity was introduced in the 1984
survey (hence, my choice of period) when the measure of unemployment
was changed to that used by the ILO. Data from 1984 onwards are
generally comparable. For notes on the comparability of results please
refer to Appendix A; for a detailed description of sampling methods please
check the original surveys.
Having introduced the employment structure in the European Union
and its member states, I will go on to outline the regulatory framework for
part time work and temporary employment in force during the last year of
the data (Labour Force Survey from 1994) utilised in the chapter. In the
Summary of this chapter I provide a list of the main aspects of the current
differences in labour market structure.
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5.2. Total Employment
The service sector enjoys an overriding hegemony over total
employment in Europe. It has increased its importance over the last
decades, and in 1994 accounts for more than 60% of total employment.
Moreover, in all member states the service sector is the most important
employer, having increased its share over the last years, reaching from
around 55% in Portugal and Greece to more than 70% in the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. Lessthan a third of all employees in the European
Union are working in Industry, which has lost much of its weight in the total
employment numbers over the last years to the tertiary sector. In Germany,
the secondary sector has with about 37% an above average importance
for employment. The drop between 1989and 1994ismainly due to the fact
that 1994data are for the unified Germany, in the old FRGIndustry has lost
only little of its presence during the last years. The smallest proportion of
employees in the Union works in Agriculture, which has been decreasing its
share steadily. The loss is especially precipitous in Greece, Spain and
Portugal. In Greece the primary and secondary sectors are of nearly equal
importance for employment.
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Table 5.1. Proportion of Employment by Sector of Activity
E12 B Dk D GR E F IRL I L NL P UK
Agriculture
1984 °8.1 3.5 6.7 5.3 29.4 °16.2 8.7 16.9 11.7 4.7 5.4 2l.5 2.6
1989 7.1 3.3 5.7 3.9 25.3 13.2 6.9 15.5 9.2 3.8 4.8 19.3 2.2
1994 5.5 2.9 5.0 °3.3 20.8 9.9 5.2 12.6 7.7 3.2 4.0 1l.8 2.1
Industry
1984 °33.8 32.6 26.7 40.7 26.1 °3l.8 32.1 30.3 34.6 32.3 28.3 °33.9 34.0
1989 33.2 3l.4 27.4 40.2 25.7 32.7 30.3 28.8 32.0 29.2 26.7 34.6 32.6
1994 30.7 28.9 26.5 °37.0 23.6 30.1 26.9 27.8 32.1 27.0 23.3 32.5 27.8
Service.
1984 °58.1 63.9 66.6 54.0 44.5 °52.0 59.2 52.8 53.7 63.0 66.3 °44.5 62.2
1989 59.8 65.2 66.9 56.0 48.9 54.2 62.8 55.8 58.8 67.0 68.5 46.0 65.1
1994 63.8 68.2 68.4 °59.7 55.6 60.0 67.9 59.6 60.2 69.9 72.7 55.8 70.1
°Data from 1986
°Data from 1994, including the territory of the former GDR
55% of the European population over 14 years of age are
economically active, Le. are classified either as employed or as
unemployed. Thisrate has steadily increased over the last years in Europe,
in Denmark, France, Italy and Greece the activity rate of 1994 is lower than
that of 1984. This later two countries have together with Spain the lowest
activity rates in Europe, all ranging below 50%. In the Netherlands the
increase in the activity rate by more than 8% has been most sharp, this
tallies with the biggest increase in the activity rates of women (Table 5.4).
Table 5.2. Activity Rates
E 12 I Dk D GR E F IRL I L NL , UK
1984 °53.7 48.9 65.4 54.0 SO.7 °46.0 56.2 52.7 49.1 SO.2 SO.2 57.S 58.6
1989 54.2 47.7 66.S 55.5 49.7 47.1 55.2 51.3 49.0 SO.4 55.3 57.9 62.9
1"" 55.0 SO.3 64.4 °58.2 49.1 48.4 55.5 53.9 47.4 52.7 58.9 58.5 61.7
"Data from 1986
·Data from 1994. including the territory of the former GDR
The situation for males and females is wildly divergent. While two
thirds of all males in Europe are economically active, less than half of the
women are likewise economically active. Only in Denmark and the United
Kingdom are more than half of all women economically active. With
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around a third of all women economically active, the lowest activity rates
for women can be found in Italy, Spain and Greece. In all countries the
activity rate for women in 1994 has increased compared to the one of
1984, the increase is especially marked in the Netherlands. Male activity
rates have declined in most countries, or have stayed nearly constant in this
time span, with the exception of the Netherlands where a rise in male
activity rates can be found. Thesechanges can partly be explained by the
changes in employment structure, Le. the shift mentioned above towards
more Service, rather than Industry.
Table 5.3. Activity Rates, Males
E 12 , Dk D GR E F IRL I L NL P UK
1984 -68.7 63.3 72.7 69.7 70.0 -66.6 67.9 72.B 67.3 68.9 67.3 -72.2 71.9
1989 67.9 60.6 74.0 70.3 65.6 64.1 65.4 69.2 64.7 67.B 69.4 70.B 73.3
199" 66.6 61.2 70.7 °69.4 64.5 64.B 63.7 68.9 62.4 67.7 70.4 68.5 71.5
-Da1a from 1986
-Data from 1994, including the territory of the former GDR
Table 5.4. Activity Rates, Females
E 12 , Dk D GR E F IRL I L NL P UK
1984 -39.3 35.5 58.4 40.1 33.4 27.1 45.6 32.7 32.4 32.7 33.6 45.0 46.3
1989 41.7 35.7 59.9 42.1 35.1 31.4 46.0 33.7 34.6 34.1 41.7 46.5 51.4
199" 44.2 40.2 58.3 °47.B 35.0 35.0 47.9 39.5 33.7 38.4 47.7 49.6 52.5
-Data from 1986
-Data from 1994, including the territory of the former GDR
It is not only the activity rates for men and women that are different,
also the unemployment rates differ enormously. Firstof all, I will relate the
total unemployment rates for the European Union and itsmember states.
Table 5.5: Unemployment Rates
E12 , Dk D GR E F IRL I L NL P UK
1984 -lO.B 11.9 B.9 6.7 B.l 21.3 9.5 16.5 9.5 2.7 12.4 -B.B 10.9
1989 9.1 B.3 B.l 5.7 7.5 17.3 9.6 16.1 11.1 1.6 B.B 5.2 7.4
199" 11.4 9.6 B.O °B.7 B.9 24.3 12.7 14.6 11.3 3.5 7.2 6.7 9.7
-Data from 1986
-Data from 1994, including the territory of the former GDR
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More than 10% of the European Labour Force are unemployed.
Unemployed persons according to the Survey are those who, during the
reference week, had no employment and (1) were actively looking for
paid employment and immediately available to start work, or (2) were
looking to set up their own business or professional practice, or (3) were
waiting to be called back to a job from which they had been laid off, or (4)
had found a job to start after the reference week. The proportion satisfying
these criteria varies from about 4% in Luxembourg to nearly 25% in Spain.
The trends observed in the different countries are contrasting. Only in
France and Italy has the situation steadily worsened in the period under
consideration. In all other countries a relaxation of the position took place
towards the end of the 80's.
The unemployment rate for women is generally higher than that for
men. The United Kingdom is the only country where a smaller proportion of
women in comparison to the male rate is unemployed. Thismeans not only
that a smaller share of women is part of the labour force, comprising both
the employed and the unemployed, but also that of this lessershare also a
larger part is unemployed, compared to the rates for men. The overall
development of the unemployment rates of men and women issimilar.
Women's unemployment rate in the UKis unique, but it may reflect a
substantial under-recording of unemployment by women. Women's
invisibility in the official statistics may result from (1) non-entitlement to
benefits, as many women (20% in 1989), still pay reduced National
Insurance contributions and about 18%of the earnings of working women
fall below the threshold for payment (Callender, 1992) (2) not registering for
work: the EC report on Employment in Europe 1991suggests that only 40%
of women in the UKrecorded as being unemployed actually registered at
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an employment exchange; (3) a third reason might be nor defining
themselves as unemployed (Cousins, 1994). (One of the problems I have
identified in the Labour Force Survey, as it relies in the definition people
gives of their own situation, see Appendix A.)
Table 5.6. Unemployment Rates, Females
E 12 B Ok 0 GR E F IRl I l Nl ,. UK
1984 ·12.9 18.3 10.2 8.2 12.1 ·25.0 12.1 17.5 15.4 3.8 14.4 ·11.6 10.0
1989 12.0 13.0 8.9 7.5 12.4 25.3 12.6 16.5 17.4 (2.3) 11.9 7.4 7.1
1994 13.0 12.4 9.0 °10.3 13.7 31.4 14.6 14.7 15.6 4.3 8.1 7.8 7.4
·Data from 1986
·Data from 1994. including the territory of the former GDR
Table 5.7. Unemployment Rates, Youth
E 12 B Ok 0 GR E F IRl I l Nl ,. UK
1984 "22.3 25.2 14.0 10.3 23.9 "46.5 24.6 23.5 31.8 5.5 23.2 "20.3 19.1
1989 17.6 15.5 11.5 5.5 24.8 34.3 19.6 21.9 31.9 (3.3) 13.4 11.7 10.3
1994 22.0 21.8 10.2 ~.O 27.7 45.1 28.8 23.0 31.6 7.9 11.3 14.5 16.3
"Data from 1986
"Data from 1994. including the territory of the former GDR
The Youth unemployment rate, Le. unemployed persons between 15
and 24 years of age, remains the highest of all groups, about twice the
average rate, and is in Greece and Italy nearly three times as high as the
overall unemployment rate. Only in Germany is the youth unemployment
rate about the average unemployment rate. The reasons for this divergent
position from the overall tenor might be that young people choose
schooling over unemployment. Other factors include the generally long
school time (longer than in most of the other European countries) and the
military service, mostly served directly after school, which reduces or retards
the inflow of youth into the labour market. The high rates in other countries
show the difficulties that inexperienced newcomers encounter in finding
employment in the labour market in its present form, and within the current
economic climate.
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5.3. Part-Time Employment
Part time work is defined as all working time arrangements with a
contractual working time below the full-time level which is applicable to
the establishment in which the interview was held. Thisapproach does not
provide cross-national comparability as far as the actual weekly working
time isconcerned (Bielenski,1992).
On average 16%of all employees in Europe work part time. In the
extreme side of the spectrum, clearly below average part time rates can
be found in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, while the Netherlands with
36% of part-timers are characterised by an above average rate of part
time employment. With the exception of Denmark and Greece part time
rates have increased in all countries over the last 10years.
Table 5.8. Part-Time Employment Rate
E12 8 Dk D GI E F IlL I L NL P UK
1984 - 8.4 22.1 11.8 4.2 - 9.6 5.5 4.2 5.4 - - 21.3
1989 13.7 11.7 24.5 13.0 3.8 4.1 12.1 8.0 5.2 7.3 30.8 3.7 22.3
1"4 16.0 14.6 22.5 °15.9 3.7 6.6 15.4 12.5 5.9 8.1 36.2 4.3 24.3
-Data from 1986
-Data from 1994. including the territory of the former GDR
The high proportion of women working part time supports the
assumption that one likely cause for the different levels of part time
employment are the different level of female employment rates. In the
Graph, this rates are printed against each other (for 1994), and it can
clearly be seen that a certain level of female employment does not
necessary imply a certain level of part time employment. The Netherlands
have a much higher part time rate than that to be expected from the
employment rate, whereas for Portugal the opposite holds. Still, a
relationship between the two isalso obvious.
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In this context the proportion of men and women that work part time
becomes relevant. The statistics are presented in the following tables,
whereby considerable differences between the countries can be noticed.
In the European average about one third of all employed women are
working part time, yet this rate reaches from lessthan 10%in Greece and
Portugal to nearly two thirds in the Netherlands. It can also be perceived
that over the years in most countries an increasing share of employed
women are employed as part time workers.
Table 5.9. Proportion of Females Working Part· Time
E 12 B Dk D GR E F IRL I L NL P UK
19a.i - 22.2 37.0 28.2 7.6 - 19.8 11.5 8.1 15.0 - - 43.9
1989 28.9 28.0 40.6 30.4 6.8 11.1 23.6 15.3 10.0 16,4 58,4 7.7 43.5
1994 31.4 31.5 35.5 033.1 5.6 14.9 28.3 21.4 11.9 20.0 65.4 7.4 43.8
"Data from 1986
"'Dolo from 1994, including the territory of the former GDR
An even bigger proportion of married women isemployed on a part
time basis, which probably reflects the family responsibility these women
sustain and their lack of freedom of choice when they opt for part time
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work. Yet in some countries the differences between married and single
women are lessmarked: the case of the southern member states. In these
countries the demand for part time workers is relatively small and the
alternatives seem to be either work part time or no work at all. The overall
course of the developments issimilar to that of all women.
Table 5.10. Proportion of Married Women Working Part· nme
E 12 8 Ok 0 GR E F IRl I l Nl P UK
19&4 - 24.4 44.1 42.3 9.6 - 24.0 21.0 9.4 24.1 - - 54.6
1989 37.1 32.5 46.6 46.9 7.3 14.2 27.3 24.9 11.5 27.7 76.4 8.5 51.8
199.. 38.7 36.5 37.3 °45.4 5.4 16.8 31.9 30.4 13.1 28.7 80.9 8.1 53.3
·Data from 1986
·Data from 1994. including the territory of the former GDR
Table 5.11. Proportion of Males Working Part· nme
E 12 8 Ok 0 GR E F IRl I l Nl P UK
19&4 - 1.3 8.8 1.6 2.7 - 2.3 2.2 2.2 (1.1 ) - - 3.9
1989 3.4 1.8 9.9 1.7 2.1 1.0 3.3 3.4 2.5 1.8 14.8 0.9 4.6
199.. 4.4 2.8 10.8 2.9 2.6 2.2 4.5 5.6 2.4 (1.1 ) 15.6 1.8 6.4
"Data from 1986
"Data from 1994. including the territory of the former GDR
The proportion of men working part time is,compared to the female
rates, modest. The European average amounts to lessthan 5%of employed
men contracted on a part time basis, except for Denmark and the
Netherlands, where more than 10% of men (in 1994) are part time
employees. The rate of male part timers has nonetheless grown over the
years.
It is apparent that part time work is to a large extend carried out by
women. To show how much part time work iswomen's work, the following
table shows the rate of female part timers. The majority of part time
employees in all countries are women, with more than 80% of female part
time employees. In the last years this share has decreased slightly, but part
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time employment seems to be still a female form of employment, at least
for the time being.
Table 5.12. Proportion of Part· Time Workers who are Female
E 12 8 Ok 0 GR E F IRl I l Nl P UK
19&4 - 89.7 78.8 91.9 55.1 - 86.1 74.6 64.1 86.6 - - 89.8
1989 85.0 90.3 78.8 92.0 62.2 82.7 84.5 74.0 69.4 82.7 69.8 85.0 89.1
1994 81.8 88.1 74.4 °88.1 58.9 74.9 82.8 71.5 71.1 89.5 73.8 67.1 83.6
"Data from 1986
"Data from 1994, including the territory of the former GDR
5.4. Temporary Employment
Fixed-term contracts are work contracts for a definite period. The
contract expires automatically at a certain date or -more seldom- when
the task has been carried out. This last possibility is most often call a
temporary contract, as it can take a different form from a fixed-term
contract.
The Fixed-Term Employment rate varies largely in the European
member states, reaching from below 3% in Luxembourg to more than 33%
in Spain, with a rate in most countries of about 10%.The numbers given
include forms of temporary employment devised as a period of training.
Additional information as to the number of temporary contracts due to
training, and other reasons for working on a temporary basis are given in
the next table.
57
Table 5.13. Temporary Employment Rate
E 12 a Dk D GR E f IRL I L NL P UK
1984 - 5.8 12.5 9.9 18.5 - 3.3 6.7 5.1 3.1 - ·13.3 6.1
1989 9.9 5.1 10.0 10.9 17.2 26.5 8.5 8.6 6.3 2.9 8.5 16.5 5.3
1994 10.9 5.1 11.9 °10.2 10.3 33.7 10.8 9.4 7.3 2.7 9.2 9.3 6.3
·Data from 1986
·Data from 1994. including the territory of the former GDR
More than 1/3 of all temporary employees in Europe, accept
temporary employment because they are unable to find a permanent job.
The highest rates of involuntary temporary work can be found In Greece,
Spain and Portugal, while The Netherlands account for the biggest
proportion of voluntary temporary work. Training is an important reason for
using temporary contracts in Germany and Luxembourg.
Table 5.14. Employees In Temporary Jobs by Reason, 1994
E12 a Dk D GR E F IRL I L NL P UK
Training 18.1 18.9 29.6 38.2 4.9 3.1 19.6 14.0 23.2 49.5 1.3 5.8 6.5
Could not find other 37.5 48.4 47.3 - 77.6 86.2 - 64.0 53.6 16.5 47.0 79.5 43.3
Did not want other 6.6 (1.6) 22.4 - 5.2 0.3 - 18.2 4.3 - 46.5 (1.2) 26.1
Probationary Period 2.3 6.2 - - 9.3 0.5 8.0 (3.2) 2.8 23.4 - 11.5 -
No realon given 35.5 24.9 - 61.8 3.0 9.8 72.3 - 16.0 - 5.2 1.9 24.1
A likely explanation for these differences in temporary employment
rates and in the breakdowns reason-wise, are the big differences in
dismissalprotection for employees. In a setting where dismissalisrather easy
and not too costly, the advantage to employers of using temporary
contracts is smaller than in settings were dismissalsare either difficult or
expensive, or both. A more detailed discussion will be held in the next
section and also when analysing the differences between forms of fixed
term employment, including differences in duration of fixed term contracts
used by establishments In the sample.
58
Table 5.15. Grouping by legislative constraints on dismissals and fixed term
contracts
Low dismissal protection High dismissal protection
many restrictions on the use of fixed term contracts Belgium
Italy
few restriction on the use of fixed term contracts Denmark France
Ireland Germany
United Kingdom Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
It is thought that dismissal protection and/or the possibility of using
fixed term contracts has an influence on the Long Term Unemployment
Rate, by reducing the barriers between insiders and outsiders in the labour
market. In its general outline this theory is supported by the numbers in
Table 5.16: countries with high dismissalprotection and constraints on fixed
term contracts have above average rates of long term unemployment,
while countries with low dismissal protection and few constraints on fixed
term contracts have below average rates.
Table 5.16. Long Term Unemployment Rate
E 12 I Dk D GR E F IRL I L NL , UK
1984 - 67.1 30.9 43.3 37.1 - 39.1 - 61.2 29.2 - - 45.5
1989 51.6 75.0 20.9 48.4 50.1 56.1 43.7 64.9 68.4 34.1 45.4 44.8 38.1
199.. 48.2 58.3 32.1 °44.3 SO.5 52.7 37.5 64.3 61.5 29.6 49.4 43.4 45.4
-Data from 1986
-Data from 1994. Including the territory of the former GDR
5.5. Regulatory Framework
The rights part time workers and employees on temporary contracts
had in 1994, in relation to the rights of permanent full timers, i.e. typical
employees, are given in Table 5.17. and Table 5.18. From these tables, the
broad picture for the legal situation of part timers that emerges, is as
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follows: Part time work is permitted in all member states, and in some
member states bears also a direct cost advantage, since part time workers
below a certain hourly or earnings thresholds are excluded from certain
social security provisions and related payments. However for the big
majority equality seems to be given formally, even though it is known from
numerous studies, that part time workers' wages and benefits are often
lower than those of comparable full-timers (Kravaritou-Manitakis, 1988:
Buchtemann and Quack, 1989).
Table 5.17. Regulation of Part· Time Work
Country Legal deftnltlon of
part· time
or
How I. It regulated:
statute/collective
agreement
Rightsof part·tlmers compared with fuH.tlme
employee.
Belgium
In practise less than binding collective dismissalsprotection and severance pay.
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Specific statute and By low equality with full timers on pay, leave.None.
agreement Some companies pension schemes have
minimum hours/eamings thresholds.
No equality on paid educational leave .
timefull norm.
Employers must offer
at least 1/3 of full time
hours.
None. By collective De facto equally with full-timers on pay, leave.
Many collective agreement where dismissals protection. notice periods (no
redundancy pay provisions exist).
Part·TImers may be excluded from ATP
pensions/unemployment benefits.
agreements define appropriate
as <30 hours/week.
Some set 15hrs/wk as
lower limit.
By low less than full By statute and By low equality with full-timers on pay,
including sick pay. leave, dismissal protection.
Some company pensions exclude Part-TImers.
Thresholds for coverage by sickness and
time norm. Some collective
collective agreements.
agreements set a
lower hours limit. pension insurance (15hrs/week
53ODM/month) and unemployment insurance
(18hours/week).
By low less than 40 By statute and By low equality with full-timers on pay.
hours/week or less binding collective benefits, dismissal protection. By coUective
than agreed full-time agreement agreement equality regarding annual leave,
severance payments. additional social
security programs. Special low pay insurance
class.
norm
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Same as full timers on pay and (with minimum
of 8 hours/week and 13 weeks service)
dismissals protection. severance pay. Different
formula for leave calculation. Some company
sick pay. pension schemes exclude Part-
TImers.
and By low same as full-timers pro rata for pay.
time norm
statute and By low same as full-timers pro rata for pay.
collective agreement bonuses. leave. notice periods. dismissal
protection. severance pay.
Pensions low to be amended.
By low same as full-timers pro rata for basic
pay (from 1993).dismissals protection.
Some collective agreements specify equaRty
on bonuses. increments. leave.
Some pensions exclude Part-TImers.
By low same as full-timers pro rata in hours
worked where appropriate.
Spain By law less than full By statute
time norm (can be
annualised)
France By law less than 4/Sth By statute
or less of statutory or
agreed working
week
Ireland None. Statute governs some
In practise less than rights.
full time norm.
By statuteItaly None.
In collective
agreements usually
less than permanent
full-time hours
By low less than full By
collective agreement
Luxembourg
The Netherlands None. By statute and
In collective collective agreement
agreements usually
less than full-time
norm
Portugal None. Part-time work not
In practise less than specifically regulated
full-time norm. in low nor in
collective
agreements
United Kingdom None. Statute governs some
In practise iess than rights.
full-time norm.
By low pro rata with full-timers on pay.
Some company pensions exclude part timers.
By low equality with full-timers on pay. leave.
dismissals protection. severance pay.
leave. dismissals protection. severance pay.
Overtime working forbidden (under review).
In practise some times pro rata on pay and
leave (i.e. via collective agreement or
contract). Some company sick pay/pension
schemes exclude part timers. Stafutory
redundancy pay depends on hours
worked/service: thresholds under review.
Source: IDSEuropean Report. 1994.p.14-1S
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For fixed term employment a rather different picture emerges. In Italy
and Belgium there are relatively many restrictions on the use of fixed term
contracts (see Table 5.18), which results in the relatively moderate fixed
term rate in these countries (see Table 5.13), given the high dismissal
protection.
Table 5.18. Regulation of Temporary Work and Fixed Term Contracts
country LImits on use Maximal length. Including Employment rights
renewals. compared with permanent
staff.
By law defined term/task or 2 years for temporary Some rights as permanent
replacement. replacement. staff (pay. terms)
No limits. No limits. By collective agreements
Spain
France
Italy
same as permanent staff.
Before 1985 used for 'material 1.5 years maximal for By law same as permanent
reason'. Post 1985 without contracts without 'material staff.
'material reason'. including reason;.
new recruits or completion of
training.
By law if justified by nature of No limits.
work
By law same as permanent
staff regarding pay and
leave.
By law special task, workload, TIme limits on some contracts. Same as permanent staff.
Case law rules temporaries
must be covered by
collective agreements.
By law defined/ temporary 2 years maximal. renewals By law same as permanent
temporary replacement. new
activity, job creation.
task
temporary replacement,
workload, seasonal work, job
creation, training.
No limits.
By law in
inherent in
temporary
circumstances
work, e.g.
replacement.
special task.
By law 9
circumstances,
youth jobs/training
sets of
including
Covered by collective
agreements.
exceptionally staff regarding pay rates,
leave (or pay option), plus
severance bonus.
No limits. No statutory right to equal
rights with permanent staff.
By law same as permanent
staff.
1 renewal for no longer than
1stterm.
2 years maximum for training
contracts.
Maximum 2 years including
renewals
By law same as permanent
staff.
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TheNetherlands By law specific task/term, No limits, By low same as permanent
temporary replacement staff,
Portugal By low wide circumstances Maximum 3 years, including By low same as permanent
including new activity, 1st renewal (2 for new activities) staff,
jobbers, Long term
unemployed
No limits. No statutory right to equal
rightswith permanent staff.
United KIngdom No limits.
Source: IDSEuropean Report, 1994,p.16
There are substantial differences in the protection for typical
employees with respect to dismissals,Denmark, Ireland and the United
Kingdom have rather weak dismissalprotection legislation in place, which
reduces the 'flexibility advantage' normally related to fixed term contracts
in these countries and finds its expression in the low to moderate rates of
fixed term contracts. The situation in the United Kingdom differs from all
other countries in that employees in order to qualify for any form of
protection against unfair dismissals,must fulfil a job tenure of two years.
Since the employer can layoff redundant workers without any difficulty
during the first two years, there seems to be a significantly reduced need for
fixed term contracts for periods under two years in the UK.
5.6. SUmmary
Our chosen labour market indicators show strong variations between
the member states of the European Union. Variations in the part time
employment rate can partly be explained by other differences, like the
sectoral distribution and the female employment rate. The variations in
temporary work, including fixed term employment, seem to be based
largely on the differences in the regulatory framework for temporary
contracts and dismissalprotection in general.
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One can conclude that part time employment accounts for a
considerable part of the net employment growth since the first oil shock
(Delsen, 19900).The growth of part time employment has been important
for female employment growth. Moreover, the rapid growth of part time
employment over the last two decades can be attributed to both
demand and supply factors.
On the demand side, the continued move towards the service
sector is a decisive factor. Part time workers provide an essential integral
part of the flexibility on the labour intake in many service concerns. Labour
costs appraisals also appear to be a grass-roots inducement to part time
employment. The hourly wage rate for part time workers is often lower
than for full-time workers, and in some countries, certain groups of part
time workers are not safeguarded by employment protection legislation.
On the supply side the major factor is the growing female
participation in the labour market. This trend has been especially
noticeable in married women. There is a correlation between the overall
female participation rate and the progression of part time employment. In
the next chapter I will show how in periods of high unemployment workers
often take part time jobs not ad lib but because full time jobs are not laid
at their feet. Research has shown that the extent of involuntary part-time
work in the total of that kind of employment has increased over the past
few years. Therefore, the deterioration of the employment situation has
shaped the labour market for part time work. At all events, the
overpowering mass of part time jobs are elective (Delsen, 1986).The main
cause of the increase in part-time work isto be found on the supply side of
the labour market: even if the deterioration of employment market
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circumstances affect the progression of part time jobs figures, the major
factor at the back of the increase in part time work is the quest by female
employees (whose choice, as pointed out by Maier (1991a), might not be
as voluntary as it seems, see Part III).
As to temporary work, those jobs are not defined consistently across
countries and encompass a wide range: from fixed-term contracts to more
casual employment arrangements inclusive of seasonal work. Temporary
work is concentrated among the young. The share of temporary
employment varies between countries, and reaches a peak in Spain.
There are three major contributory factors on the demand side that may
underlie the apparent growth of temporary work over recent years. In the
first place, there isthe state of the economic cycle: the share of temporary
work typically varies according to the point the cycle is in, as employers
have a tendency to layoff temporary workers in the trough and hire them
again at the peak of the cycle. In the second place, there may be some
underlying course towards more temporary work consistently with the
structural shift towards services. In the third place, faced with greater
uncertainty about product demand and increaSing labour costs,
employers may fall back on hiring more temporary workers to be able to
match their labour intake to seasonal and cyclical variations in demand.
Supply factors such as combining work with other activities or seeing it as a
form of underemployment can also affect the growth of this kind of
employment.
One may conclude that the demand side of the labour market is
the most relevant factor behind the growth of temporary jobs, whereas
part time work increase restsmore on the supply side of the labour market.
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6. New Forms of Work and Activity: A European
Survey1
6.1. Introduction
In this chapter I will provide some general background information to
set the subsequent work in context. The chapter is organised as follows: first
the survey on which the analysis of the current and the following chapter is
based will be introduced, to get an idea of the sort of data which have
been collected. Also to settle on the definitions of new forms of work which
have been used in the survey and will be used throughout the examination
of the data. An extended description of the methodology of the survey,
including references to more technical documents is provided in Appendix
8. After the description of the survey, the objectives of the chapter are
presented. Data examined include the sectoral distribution of employment,
female participation rate, part time and fixed term rates. The emphasis here
is on giving general background information. More specific information,
including that from other sources outside the survey, will be brought in when
necessary to further the depth of the analysis. Finally, in the concluding
remarks the main findings will be summarised and the ultimate bearings to
lead the analysis further sketched.
6.2. The Survey
The survey on which the analysis will be based was conducted by the
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
1 Original title: ISurvey of Experience at Establishment Level in Eight European Countries'.
carried out by Infratest Sozialforschung for the European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions.
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Conditions, an autonomous body established by the European Commission.
The Foundation had been interested in the development of new forms of
work and activity and this large scale, establishment-based survey was
conducted among managers and employee representatives in eight
European Community Countries under the direction of Infratest
Sozia/forschung. Thedata was collected in spring 1989in Belgium, Germany
(restricted to the territory of the former Federal Republic of Germany), Italy,
Spain, and the United Kingdom; one year later, in spring 1990 in Denmark,
Ireland and the Netherlands; covering 51% of all employees in the sample
countries. The universe of the survey was defined as all private sector
establishments with ten or more employees, excluding agricultural
establishments. The aims of the study were: (1) to identify the reasons for
the development of new forms of work (here: part time work, fixed term
contracts, Saturday and evening work; even though for this thesis the only
applicable parts are those focused on the data relevant for part time and
fixed term employment); (2) to study the perceived advantages and
disadvantages of those atypical forms of employment; (3) to analyse in
how far an increase in this employment relationships can meet employers
and employees wishesand/or economic and social needs.
6.2.1. Definition of Part time and fixed term employment
Atypical or new forms of work are a well publicised but poorly
defined phenomenon. Given the extent and the long time span they have
been in existence, it must be declared that they are neither atypical nor
new, despite the fact that they are commonly referred to as atypical or
new forms of work. The definitions used for the survey, which had to be
broad enough to allow comparability between the member states are
given below.
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Part time work was defined for the purpose of the survey as all
'working time arrangements with a contractual working time below the full
time level which is applicable to the establishment in which the interview
was held' (Bielenski, 1994a, p. 12). Thissort of definition was necessary in
order to achieve national comparability on the question of whether
somebody is working an agreed lower number of weekly hours (thus,
atypical number of hours) when compared with the 'typical' employee.
Cross national comparability is not given in relation to actual weekly
working time. National or international statistics might use a different
definition, but in practise those differences seem to have little impact on
the different statistics, given the few contracts which are in the critical
range, Le. close to full time hours (Bielenski,1994a).
'Fixed term contracts are work contracts for a definite period. The
contract expires automatically at a certain date or - more seldom - when
the task has been carried out.' (Bielenski,1994a,p. 173).Attention has to be
drawn to the difference of what is normally understood as temporary
contract, even if there exist a close relationship between them. Temporary
jobs are normally carried out under fixed term contracts, however they
might also be carried out under permanent contracts, which are ended,
that is to say the worker is dismissed,when the job is terminated (this is the
general practise in the UK). However here the interest was focused on
contracts which terminate automatically in which protection from (unfair)
dismissalsdo not (fully) apply.
6.3. Main Alms
The data collected in the survey makes it possible to gain insight into
the degree to which different employers make use of part time work and
68
fixed term employment. Moreover, it also helps clarify which circumstances
led to the introduction of those atypical forms of work.
Very often rates of atypical labour are taken as synonyms for labour
market flexibility, i.e. the higher the rate of part time and fixed term
employment relations, the greater the numerical flexibility for the firms.One
of the aims of this chapter will be to dispose of these simple indicators for
labour market flexibility, by showing that large proportions of atypical
labour relations can be explained by other than the numerical flexibility
rationale. Secondly it will be shown that the notion of atypical work israther
unhelpful, and that, to avoid describing a very heterogeneous group with
one identifier, it would be useful to break down the groups of part-time
workers and fixed term employees into several subgroups. In particular, we
will show that it is inaccurate to count all 'non-full-time permanent
employment workers' as part of the periphery of a firms workforce.
Simultaneously, since the flexible firm model is very much based on
allocating 'atypical employees' in the periphery, and holding the periphery
responsible for the numerical flexibility, by the end of the chapter it should
be clear that the flexible firm model is not the appropriate one for
analysing firms' human resource management.
Since the degree to which 'atypical employees' are part of the core
or periphery workforce varies in the different countries and the extent to
which the use of new forms of work isdriven by demand side or supply side
variables also varies between the countries, foundations for linking these
variations with national differences in production systemswill be laid. Thiswill
still be discussed in depth, in particular with regard to skill levels and
implications to functional flexibility, in the following chapters.
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6.4. Employment structure
6.4.1. Full-Time 'Permanent' employment
Table 6.1 Distribution of employment by sector of main activity
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
Energy & Water 2 3 3 1 3 1 2 2 1
Chemical Industry 7 11 9 4 11 13 7 4 2
Metal Manufacture 20 16 26 17 23 25 15 13 12
Other Manufacture 22 18 16 18 22 29 29 15 26
Building 8 7 10 11 9 7 5 9 6
Retail. Hotel. Repair 19 19 19 22 15 9 23 21 26
Transport. Communication 4 5 3 6 3 3 1 5 6
Banking. In.urance 11 14 8 17 11 10 11 18 12
Other Service. 6 6 5 4 4 2 5 12 8
Others 0 1 - 0 - - - - -
Total Industry 59 55 64 51 68 75 58 43 47
Total Service 40 44 35 49 33 24 40 56 52
Note: Employee proportional analysis
59%of the workforce in the Universe of the sample are employed in
the industrial sector. NACE 3 -Metal manufactures-, NACE 4 -Other
manufactures- and NACE 6 - Retail, Hotel, Repair- each account for around
1/5th of employment. However, there are considerable national
differences in the distribution of employment over the Industry and Service
Sectors and the different NACEsectors (see Table 6.1) (for an explanation of
differences between results from the LFSand NFWAsurvey please refer to
Appendix 8.5). When concentrating on the two main areas in the survey,
industrial and service sector, one finds that in Italy, Spain and Germany, the
industrial sector is over-represented. This is in Italy and Spain due to an
above average rate of all NACE sectors belonging to the industrial sector,
while in Germany mainly warranted by the dominant metal manufacturing
industry. In The Netherlands and the United Kingdom the industrial sector is
underrepresented. The employment structure in the United Kingdom is
further characterised by one of the highest proportion of employees in
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'Other Manufacturing Industries'. The United Kingdom also has the highest
proportion of employment in 'Retail, Hotels and Repair', having a rate
nearly three times that of Italy, which has the smallest rate of employment
in this sector among the eight countries in the study. Denmark and the
Netherlands have relatively high rates of employment in NACE 8 -Banking
and Insurance-, additionally The Netherlands also have a big proportion of
employment in NACE 9 -Other Services-. The importance of these two
sectors for employment isbelow average in Germany.
The distribution of employment by size classes of establishments is
given in Table 6.2. The Netherlands are characterised by the lowest rate of
employment in very small establishments (10-19 employees), and the
highest rate of employment in very large establishments (1000 or more
employees). An above average rate of employment in very large
establishments can also be found in Belgium and in Germany. The latter
also has an above average proportion of employment in large
establishments (500-999 employees). In these two size classes Ireland has
the lowest rate of employment, while having a highest share of
employment in medium sizedenterprises (200-499employees). Employment
in this type of firms isrelatively low in Belgium and in Denmark.
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Table 6.2 Distribution of employment by size classes of establishments
EUR8 a 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
10·19 emplov"s 15 15 12 24 13 21 17 8 16
20·49 22 16 20 21 25 21 21 22 25
50·99 13 12 12 15 11 14 18 8 16
100· 199 12 19 13 14 14 12 13 17 9
200·499 17 11 13 11 15 22 27 20 19
500·1000 14 15 19 11 14 7 5 13 12
1000 + 7 11 10 4 7 4 1 12 3
No answer 0 0 - - - - - - -
Note: Employee proportional onolvsis
Related to the above distribution of employment by establishment
size classes, is the distribution of establishments by size class. The numbers
are given in Table 6.3. In the European average, more than 90% of
establishments have less than 100 employees. This is also true for each
individual country. Italy has a relatively high rate of very small
establishments (10-19 employees), Spain and Germany have a relatively
small share of establishments of this type. Spain has a high rate of small-
medium sized enterprises (100-199 employees).The Netherlands have a
relatively high rate of very large establishments.
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Table 6.3 Distribution of establishments by size class
EUR8 B D DK E I IRL NL UK
10 - 19 employees 40 40 32 45 30 61 54 50 34
20 - 49 46 42 52 41 55 26 28 33 52
50 - 99 47 9 8 8 5 6 9 8 7
100- 199 4 5 3 3 7 5 6 5 4
200 - 499 2 3 3 2 2 1 3 3 2
500 - 1000 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
1000 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
No answer 0 - - - - - - - -
o number of employees
per establishment 48 63 55 39 51 40 45 58 44
Note: Establishment Proportional Analysis
The average establishment in the sample had 48 employees on the
payroll, but the average size in the eight countries varies largely from this
value. In fact, only the average establishment size in Spain and Ireland
came close to this overall average, varying by lessthan 10%.The average
establishment size was biggest in the Benelux countries (63 employees in
Belgium, 58 in the Netherlands). The average establishment size in Denmark,
with only 39 employees, isthe smallest of the eight countries studied.
The questionnaire also contained inquiries about the past
developments of employment in the enterprises. On average in the eight
countries, establishments representing more than 40% of employees (see
Table 6.4) were employing more employees at the time of the survey, than
three years before. Establishments representing about one quarter of the
workforce had decreased their workforce in the period under
consideration.
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Table 6.4 Trend over the Last Three Years In Total Employment 1986-89
fUR8 8 0 OK s I IRl Nl UK
Mor. now 44 49 41 44 40 42 55 51 49
F.w.rnow 25 24 28 24 33 29 25 22 20
Sam. 29 26 30 31 27 29 19 26 29
Don't know 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 3
Note: Employee proportional analysis
Information collected allowed me to estimate the magnitude of
change in employment, The rough estimates of the change, in absolute
numbers and percentage points, are given in Table 6,5, For all countries as
a whole, employment has increased by nearly three quarters of a million, or
2%. But the trends have been different in the countries in the survey.
Reaching from a 2% decline in Belgium, to a 7%increase in the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. I will return to the developments in employment,
when discussingdevelopments in new forms of work.
Table 6.5 Trend over the Last Three Years In Total Employment 1986-89
fUR8 8 0 OK f I IRl Nl UK
chang. In '000. 746 -35 - 183 13 -7 -48 12 172 821
chang.'n% 2 -2 - 1 2 0 - 1 4 7 7
Note: Establishment proportional analysis
6.4.1.1.Soclo-Demographlc Structure of Employees
The female participation rates in the sample are represented in Table
6.6. Variations with the rates given in the previous chapter can be
explained again by the sampling and weighting conventions, for further
explanation see Appendix 8 5.
Table 6.6 Proportion of Females In Total Employment
fUR8 8 D DK f I IRl Nl UK
F.mal •• % 31 28 30 32 21 30 37 28 36
Note: Establishment proportional analYSIS
On average of less than one third (31%) of all employees in the
sample were women. The highest proportion can be found in Ireland (37%)
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followed by the United Kingdom (36%),Denmark, Germany and Italy had
with 30 and 32%about average rates. Spain had the by far lowest rate with
just 21%.
The proportion of women in employment in the different NACE
sectors isgiven in Table 6.7. The rate of female employment is higher in the
service sector than in Industry in all eight countries in the survey. With the
exception of NACE4 -Other Manufacture-, all sub-sectors of industry have a
female employment rate lower than the average female employment
rate, this holds for the average values of the eight countries as well as for
the distribution in the individual countries. With the exception of The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, all female employment rates in
NACE 4 are higher than the average rate. Unusually low rates of female
employment can be found in the Building sector. The different sub-sectors
of the Service Sector very much show the reverse position. With the
exception of NACE 7, Transport and Communication, the female
employment rate in all sub sectors ishigher than the average rates for each
individual country. In the Banking sector in Ireland and in Germany, female
employment accounts for 50% or more, in these countries and Italy the
female employment rate in 'Other Services' is higher than 50%. With the
exception of Ireland all female employment rates in 'Transport and
Communication' are lower than the average rates in the individual
countries, and in their average.
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Table 6.7 Distribution of Female Employment Rates
by Sector of Main Activity
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
Energy & water 16 9 14 25 10 5 28 15 23
Chemical Industry 24 15 24 18 19 28 23 16 29
Metal Manufacture 20 12 23 20 12 18 37 11 23
other Manufadure 36 32 36 38 29 41 37 20 37
Building 11 6 10 12 6 14 8 6 15
Retail. Hotel. Repair 39 43 39 36 30 39 38 37 41
Transport. Communication 25 24 24 25 20 32 49 20 27
Banking. Insurance 43 44 50 49 27 34 51 40 47
other Services 48 40 55 40 32 54 56 47 45
Total Industry 25 18 24 25 18 28 33 14 30
Total Service 40 41 43 39 27 39 46 38 42
Note: Employee proportional onolvsis
Table 6.8 presents the qualification structure of the workforce in the
sample by country, while Table 6.9 shows the qualification structure for
female employees. Total employment is almost evenly distributed over
manual and clerical tasks (on average 52%and 48%),it is to be expected
that the distribution by sector of main activity in the sample is reflected
here. However, when looking at the same division taking the gender
perspective, one can see that female employment is strongly
concentrated in clerical tasks (more than 60%),and male employment in
the manual area. Looking at the total employment situation again, it can
further be noted that there are relatively few workers in the clerical low
qualification level, while employment is relatively evenly spread over the
other levels. Thisaspect has once more to be completely modified when
taking the gender perspective, thiswill be further discussed after presenting
the data in Table 6.9. In addition to the differences in the qualification
structure by gender, there are also strong national differences in the
distribution of the qualifications.
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Table 6.8 Distribution of Total Employment by Qualification Level
EUR8 8 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
unskilled manual 26 28 26 30 28 23 36 45 23
skilled manual 26 24 z:; 25 34 28 21 10 23
clerical low 18 21 17 17 13 15 20 22 20
clerical high 30 27 27 z:; 25 34 23 23 34
Note: Establishment proportional onolysis
By far the highest proportion of unskilled manual workers can be
found in the Netherlands, where 45%of all employees fall into this category,
subsequently the lowest proportion of skilled manual workers can be found
in the Netherlands too, accounting for only 10%of total employment. The
lowest proportion of unskilled manual workers is found in Italy and the
United Kingdom. These two countries also share the highest rate of
employees with 'clerical' qualifications (49%and 54% respectively). Spain
has, followed by Germany and Italy, the highest proportion of skilled
manual employees. In these three countries and in Denmark below-
average rates of employees with low level clerical qualifications can be
found. The Netherlands have, followed by Ireland, the highest proportion in
clerical low level employment, and share the lowest proportion in high level
clerical employment.
When combining the two lower and the two higher qualification
levels (Le.adding up the proportions of 'unskilled manual' and 'low clerical'
and the remaining proportions) the following picture emerges. The
Netherlands (67%)and too a lesser extend Ireland (56%)are marked by a
high share of employees in the lower qualification levels, the lowest shares
of employment in these qualification levels can be noted in Italy and In
Spain (38%and 41%). However this difference varies less from the average
(44%)than the rate of Ireland and principally the rate of the Netherlands.
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Table 6.9 Distribution of Female Employment by Qualification Level
EUR8 8 0 OK E I IRl Nl UK
unsklll.d manual 28 27 34 30 29 25 34 39 21
sklll.d manual 10 8 6 7 25 14 14 6 11
cl.rlcallow 33 37 32 33 23 25 35 38 38
cI.rlcal high 28 28 29 31 23 36 16 17 29
Total 99 100 101 101 100 100 99 100 99
Note: Establishment proportional onolvsis
There isonly a very small share of women working as skilled manuals.
accounting only for 10%of all female employment. Thistrend isvery strong
in Germany and in the Netherlands (both 6%). In Spain female employment
is relatively evenly spread over the four qualification levels. and 25% of
women are employed as skilled manuals. Generally women are employed
in lower qualification levels than men. However. in some countries (Belgium.
Germany. Denmark and Italy) high level clerical employment is more
common for women than for men. In Ireland and in the Netherlands
around three quarters of female employment is concentrated in the lower
qualification levels. About half of all women in employment in Italy and
Spain work in higher qualification levels. representing the highest shares
across Europe.
6.5. Part-nme Employment
6.5.1. Part- nme Employment Structure
The distribution of the part time rates by the NACEsectors. introduced
earlier on. and the total part time rate isgiven in Table 6.10. The total part
time employment rate varies largely between the countries. reaching from
1% in Spain and 2% in Italy to 15%in the Netherlands. The average part time
employment rate is 7%. with the United Kingdom being closest to that
average (8%).Asexpected. the part time rate ishigher in the service sector
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than in the industry sector. On average, the part time rate in the service
sector is three times as high as the part time rate in industry. In Belgium the
factor between the rates is4, in most other countries this difference is close
to the average. In the United Kingdom the difference is lessmarked, and in
Spain the sectors have the same part time rate.
Table 6.10 Distribution of Part·Time Employment Rates by
Sector of Main Activity
EUR8 8 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
En.rgy , Wat.r 4 1 3 10 1 0 0 7 7
Ch.mlcallndustry 3 2 5 6 0 2 1 6 4
M.tal Manufactur. 3 1 5 4 0 1 1 6 4
oth.r Manufadur. 5 4 8 7 1 2 1 8 6
Building 3 1 3 3 0 2 - 3 3
R.tall. Hot.l. R.palr 13 7 14 15 1 4 2 22 14
Transport. Convnunlcatlon 7 6 12 6 0 4 1 8 5
Banking. Insuranc. 9 6 14 14 2 4 1 19 6
oth.rS.rvlc.s 18 16 26 19 1 16 8 33 11
Total Industry 4 2 5 5 1 2 1 6 5
Total S.rvlc. 12 8 16 14 1 5 3 22 11
Total 7 5 9 9 1 2 2 15 8
Note: Employee proportional analYSIs
The incidence of establishments practising part time employment, i.e.
having at least one part time employee on the payroll vary largely in
Europe. On average, establishments representing only one third of all
employees do not have any part time worker on their payroll. However, this
incidence ranges from just 13% in the Netherlands and less than 20% in
Germany, to more than 55% in Italy and Ireland and more than 80% in
Spain. With the remaining countries being close to the average values.
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Table 6.11 Incidence of Part·Time Employment
EUR8 8 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
With at least one 66 65 81 70 19 44 41 87 69
Without any 34 35 19 30 81 56 58 13 31
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Employee proportional analysis
Managers of companies currently not practising part-time
employment were asked whether they were interested in doing so in the
future. The answers are summarised in Table 6.12. The big majority of
employees (84%, in the establishments under consideration) work in
establishments not interested in introducing part time work. This picture is
surprisingly similar in all eight countries, given the large differences in the
incidence across the countries. Furthermore, above average rates of
interest were found in Denmark, The Netherlands and Germany, countries
which already have an above average rate of part time employment
incidence.
Table 6.12 Interest In the Introduction of Part·Time Employment
EUR8 8 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
Int.r.st.d 16 12 18 23 15 15 13 19 15
Not Int.r.st.d 84 88 82 77 85 85 87 81 85
Note: Employee proportional analysis
Two thirds of all employees working in establishments practising part
time work, have lessthan 10% part time colleagues. But these shares vary
considerably between the countries studied. The variations are listed in
Table 6.13.An above average share of establishments with high proportions
of part time work (>10%) can be found in Denmark, Ireland and the
Netherlands. These countries and the United Kingdom are also marked by
above average shares in the proportion, i.e. bigger than 25%. On the other
hand Spain and Italy are marked by the large number of employees in
establishments practising part time work who have only 5%or lesspart time
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colleagues (69%and 67% respectively). In general, it can be said that in
establishments practising part time work, part time employees are normally
'atypical', in the sense that they only account for a relatively small
proportion of total employment. The average percentages of part timers in
establishments with at least one part timer is given in the last row of the
table, being on average 11%. Ranging from 5 and 6% in Italy and Spain, to
15%in the Netherlands.
Table 6.13 Proportion of Part-Time Employment In establishments with Part
Time Employees
EUR8 B D DK E I IRl Nl UK
o < 5% Part Timers 45 55 45 28 69 67 48 35 39
5 < 10'1. 23 17 22 29 18 24 10 25 23
10 < 15% 11 11 12 16 5 3 14 14 13
15 < 20'1. 6 5 6 7 4 4 7 8 6
20<25% 4 3 5 6 1 0 1 4 5
_._-----------------_ .._-- ..._-_ ......... _--_ ....... -------------------------------------------------------------25 < 50'1. 7 6 6 9 1 1 16 7 9
-------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------50 < 100'1. 4 2 4 5 2 0 3 7 6
o Percentage of part·
tlmers/ establishment 11 9 11 13 6 5 12 15 13
Note: Employee proportional analysis
From the distribution of recent developments in the number of part
time employees, we can see that, on average, establishments representing
more than a third of all employees are employing more part time workers
at the time of the survey than three years befores. Establishments which
represent about half of the workforce are employing the same amount of
part timers as three years before the study.
2 Only establishments which had at least one part timer on the payroll at the time of the
study were asked this question. that means that establishments which stopped completely
using part time employment relations in the three years before the study are not
represented.
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Table 6.14 Trend over the Last Three Years In
Part·Time Employment 1986·1989
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
Mor. now 35 50 31 23 50 53 37 50 29
F.w.r now 11 8 11 9 4 5 8 7 15
Sam. 52 40 57 65 44 43 54 41 53
Don·t know 2 1 1 2 2 - 2 2 2
Total 100 99 100 99 100 101 101 100 99
Note: Employee proportional analysis
The rough estimates of the magnitude of change in absolute
numbers and percentage points are given in Table 6.15. In the eight
countries in the study the number of part time employees in establishments
in the universe of the study had increased by more than 230.000,
representing an increase of around 7 %. The number of part time workers
had increased in all countries included in the sample. Notably dynamic
developments could be found in Italy and Spain, countries with a relatively
low rate of part time employment. In Germany and the United Kingdom,
countries with a relatively high rate of part time employment the increase
had been below the average. The Netherlands had, despite its already
high rate of part time employment, a high rate of increase and does not fit
this general picture of countries with a high rate having a rather slow
development, while the other countries catch up.
Table 6.15 Trend over the Last Three Years In
Part·Time Employment 1986·1989
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
chang. In '0001 233 9 60 7 6 40 2 67 42
chang. In" 7 10 4 10 19 28 11 18 4
Note: Establishment proportional analysis
When taking the development of part time employment, together
with the development of total employment (see Table 6.10), one can find
that 30%of the increase in total employment is due to an increase in part
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time employment. In all countries, except the United Kingdom, and the
average points to an increase of part time employment stronger than the
increase of employment as a whole. Thisindicates that the overall rate of
part time employment has increased.
6.5.1.1.Soclo-Oemographlc Structure of Part- Time Employees
The next table gives the female share of the part time employees by
sector of activity. Thisshare is on average 85%, ranging from just 42% in
Spain to more then 90%in Italy. With the exception of Spain, all proportions
of female part time employment are well above 75%.Thisshows that part
time work ismainly women's work.
Table 6.16. Proportion of females In Part Time Employment
EUR8 a D DK E I IRL NL UK
Female."" 85 80 87 86 42 91 86 77 87
Note: Estabhshment proportional onclvsis
When focusing on the qualification levels of part timers, one can
make the following observations: part time employment is concentrated in
the lower levels of the qualification hierarchy, Le. the clerical low and the
unskilled manual level, accommodating 80% of all part time employees.
This trend is very strong in Ireland, where more than 90% of all part time
employees have lower qualification levels. In Italy and Spain a relatively big
proportion of part timers has higher qualification levels, as well skilled
manuals as high clerical, in Denmark only the latter istrue.
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Table 6.17 Distribution of Part·Time Employment
by Qualification Level
EUR8 a 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
unskilled manual 42 33 40 38 60 35 61 53 41
skilled manual 7 9 4 4 11 11 5 4 13
clerical low 38 47 43 37 9 24 32 34 37
clerical high 13 11 13 21 20 30 2 9 9
Note: Establishment proportional analysis
The situation for female part time employees varies only little from the
total situation. The distribution of female qualification levels isgiven in Table
6.18. A slightly bigger proportion of female employees has clerical
qualifications, and the proportion of employees with lower qualifications is
slightly higher than the proportion in total part time employment.
Table 6.18 Distribution of Female Part·Tlme
Employment by Qualification Level
EUR8 a 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
unskilled manual 40 31 39 33 55 36 61 48 39
skilled manual 6 8 3 4 12 10 6 3 11
cl.rlcallow 41 49 44 41 11 25 32 39 41
cl.rlcal high 13 12 14 22 21 29 2 9 10
Note: Establishment proportional analysIs
6.5.1.2.Typlcal and Atypical Forms of Part Time employment
So far I treated part time work, and presented the information as if
there were no differences in meaning in the diverse sorts of part time jobs.
However, given the fact that under the common denominator 'part time
work', employment relationships from 1 hour to nearly full time level were
included, I will now introduce a distribution of part time employment by
hours of work per week. The various forms of part time work are distributed
differently in the various countries, and one can infer from Table 6.19. that
working time arrangements between 15 and 25 hours represent the most
important category. On average this category accounts for more than half
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of all part time contracts. In Italy 80%of part time employees work between
15 an 25 hours. Working times of less than 10 hours are of relatively small
importance in Italy (1%), Denmark (3%)and Ireland (4%).In Italy contracts of
between 10 and 15 hours are also comparatively unimportant, this is also
the case in Spain, while in the United Kingdom this type of part time
employment accounts for nearly a fifth of total part time employment.
Part time contracts with an agreed weekly working time from 25 to 30
hours are relatively important in Spain (27%)and in Denmark (23%),while in
the latter also part time contracts with long hours (more than 30 hours) are
of above average importance. Part time contracts with long working hours
are relatively important in the Netherlands (13%), but comparatively
unimportant in Spain and Ireland.
Flexible working time arrangements, Le. where there are no agreed
fixed weekly working hours, are generally of very low importance,
accounting on average for only 4 %. Only the Benelux countries have, with
5%, a slightly higher rate than average of this type of part time
employment. Below average rates of 'flexible working time arrangements'
can be found in Spain, Denmark and Italy.
85
Table 6.19 Distribution of Part· Time Employment
by Weekly Working Times
EUR8 8 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
below 10 hours 9 8 11 3 10 1 4 8 8
from 10 to 15 hours 14 9 14 9 4 1 13 13 18
from 15 to 20 hours 28 24 28 23 18 6 33 ')!f 33
from 20 to 25 hours 30 32 ')!f ')!f 40 74 30 23 26
from 25 to 30 hours 10 13 11 23 27 13 13 8 9
more than 30 hours 5 9 4 12 2 4 2 13 3
no fixed number of hours 4 5 4 1 0 1 4 5 4
Note: Establishment proportional onolvsis
Together with the differences in hours worked per week, there are
also other differences in working time arrangements. And some that are
prevailing are the times when those working hours are worked. Table 6.20
gives the distribution range of times part time work takes up. By far the most
important type of part time work isworking every morning, being the most
common type of part time work in establishments representing more than
half of all employees in the EUR8.However, the differences among the
countries are very considerable. In Italy and Germany establishments
representing more than 70 % of employees ranked this working time
arrangement as the most important one. In Spain this proportion was 60%,
while the rate of the remaining countries for this type of part time work is
below 50%, ranging between 31 and 47 %. With the exception of Belgium
this working time arrangement is the most important in all the countries,
while in Belgium it only holds rank 2. There the most important type is to
work some days full time and have the other days off. Thisworking time
arrangement is also of relatively high significance in The Netherlands, and
has above average importance in Ireland and in Denmork: Some other
fixed hours everyday are relatively frequent in the United Kingdom. In Spain
and Ireland part time work during the afternoon is of above average
relevance.
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One explanation which comes immediately to mind are the differing
opening times of schools and child care facilities. Thispoint will be discussed
further, after introducing the main reasons for the use of part time work to
the discussion.
Table 6.20. Distribution of Part·Time Contracts by Working Time Arrangement
EUR8 a 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
Some fixed hours every momlng
57 31 71 44 60 80 33 47 40
Some fixed hours every aftemoon
7 6 8 8 18 6 14 6 6
Some other fixed hours every day
13 6 3 18 7 8 10 6 30
Some ftxed days of the week full-time, the others off
12 38 9 19 10 1 20 30 12
One week full time, one week off
0 3 - 2 1 1 3 0 0
Flexible working hours, according to establishment
needs 6 11 6 7 3 2 8 7 7
others
4 5 4 3 1 2 13 5 5
Note. Employee proportional onolvsls
6.5.2. Reasons for using Part Time Work
6.5.2.1.Maln Reason
The data set also contains information about the main reasons why
part time work had been introduced; whether the main intention was
answering the needs of the establishments, or if it was done because of
employee wishes. Thisinformation isrepresented in Table 6.21, even though
the employee representative questionnaire will not be given much
consideration here, Bielenski (1994a) has found 'surprisingly little difference
between the answers' in the different types of questionnaires. 'Needs of
establishment' was the main reason for the use of part time employment in
establishments representing 45 % of all employees, this reason was of
particular importance in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and in Spain; in Italy this
was the main reason for the use of part time work in establishments
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representing only 14%of employment; there, employee wisheswere by far
the most important reason. 32%of all employees in the eight countries work
in establishments were this reason was the most important one. On
average, in 22%both reasons have been equally important. Thisreason was
nevertheless given in Italy by establishments representing only 14% of
employees, while the same rate amounted to twice this value in Germany.
Table 6.21 Main Reason for the Use of Part-Time Employment
EUR8 8 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
Needs of establishment 45 30 42 30 61 14 51 37 61
Employee wishes 32 46 27 44 29 70 15 44 19
80th reasons equally 22 23 28 27 9 14 17 18 18
Other reasons 2 1 3 0 2 1 17 1 2
Note: Employee proportional cnolvsis
The numbers in Table 6.21 alone show that in general most
employees do not work in establishments were the most important reason
for the use of part time work was based on economic or organisational
considerations only. Given the high rate of part time jobs which would
generally be defined as half time, or half-day jobs, most employees work in
establishments where part time jobs being carried out in the morning hours
are the most important type of part time employment. This fact rather
suggests that most of the jobs are not introduced for demand side reasons,
i.e. to increase Inumerical flexibility', but rather for supply side reasons, i.e. to
improve labour supply.
6.6. Fixed TermEmployment
6.6.1. Fixed Term Employment Structure
Fixed term contracts as defined previously must not be confounded
with "temporary employment". Of course, both are often related closely to
each other. A fixed-term contract, so Bielenski (1994a), mostly implies
temporary employment only. And if there is a temporary job, employers
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usually make fixed-term contracts. But there are some differences. A
temporary job which might as well be carried out under a permanent
contract and notice of termination be given at the moment in time when
the job isconsidered to be finished. On the other hand, in some countries it
happens quite frequently that fixed-term contracts are made for
permanent jobs when new personnel are hired (e.g. in order to provide the
employer with a longer than usual probationary period, see Chapter 10
below, on the use made in Germany of fixed-term contracts for screening
employees).
As can be seen in Table 6.22, which gives the fixed term contract
rates by NACE sectors and the total fixed term contracts rate, the rate of
fixed term employment shows considerable variation between the
countries. The average for the eight countries included in the study is 4%,
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark have the lowest rates with only
1%. Unequivocally above average rates of fixed term employment can be
found in Spain and in the Netherlands. Spain has with 13% the by far highest
proportion of fixed term employment. The relatively high rate in Italy is due
to the fact that 'contratti di formazione' had been included, the fixed term
rate would on average be about 60% lower if 'contratti di formazione'3
were excluded.
When considering the rates in Industry and Service, or in the different
NACE Sectors, no visible pattern, like the one that appeared in the part
time employment rates, emerges. With the exception of NACE 1 -Energy
and Water which has clearly below average fixed term rates in all but one
country (Denmark), all other sectors have rates close to the average.
3 training contracts
89
Whether a rate is above or below average in a certain sector depends
likewise on the country. That means that the use of fixed term contracts is
substantially lessinfluenced by reasons which can be related to a particular
sector of activity.
Table 6.22 Distribution of Fixed-Term Employment Rates by
Sector of Main Activity
EUR8 a 0 OK E I IRl Nl UK
Energy & Water 1 0 1 3 4 1 0 1 0
Chemical Industry 4 3 3 1 8 6 1 5 0
Metal Manufacture 4 3 3 1 7 6 2 5 1
other Manufadure 4 2 3 1 15 8 1 6 1
aulldlng 4 1 2 5 31 4 1 7 1
Retail. Hotel. Repair 3 2 2 0 16 10 0 10 0
Transport. Communication 3 5 4 1 11 5 0 6 1
Banking. Insurance 3 4 1 1 9 4 1 8 3
other Services 4 6 5 3 14 5 4 10 2
Total Industry 4 2 3 2 13 7 1 6 1
Total Service 3 4 2 1 13 6 1 9 1
Total 4 3 3 1 13 7 1 8 1
Nole: Employee proportional analysis
The survey allows us to investigate differences in the incidence of
establishments practising fixed term work, Le. counting with at least one
employee on a fixed term contract on their payroll. The incidence varies
largely in Europe; on average, establishments with at least one worker on a
fixed term contract and establishments without any fixed term employee
keep more or less the balance (representing 48% and 52% of all
employees). Thisincidence ranges from just 14%in the United Kingdom to
more than 75%in the Netherlands and in Spain.
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Table 6.23 Incidence of Fixed Term Employment
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRl Nl UK
With at I.st on. 48 49 57 27 76 69 32 75 14
Without any 52 51 43 73 24 31 68 25 86
Note: Employee proportional analysis
In like manner to the rate of part time employment by establishment,
the rate of fixed term employment is on average in the majority of cases
smaller than 5%. The actual proportions are listed in Table 6.24. An above
average share of establishments with high proportions of fixed term
employment can be found in the Netherlands and Spain.
Table 6.24 Proportion of Fixed-Term Employment In Establishments with
Flxed- Term Employees
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
0< 5,}!; Fixed Termers 54 66 63 74 22 67 51 43 59
5 < 10% 21 16 21 11 21 14 25 24 22
10 < 15,}!; 9 7 8 4 18 7 8 14 4
15 <20% 5 4 4 1 8 2 5 7 5
20 < 25,}!; 3 2 1 1 6 1 5 4 4
_._----------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------25 <50% 5 2 2 6 17 3 2 7 7
-------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------50< 100% 2 2 1 2 9 5 3 2 -
e Percentage of Fixed-
TImers/ establishment 8 6 5 6 18 8 8 10 7
Numbers for Italy exclude 'contratti di formazione'
Note: Employee proportional analysis
The following trends on the number of fixed term employees over a
three years period were observed. Establishments employing 44% of the
worktorce-. are now employing more employees on a fixed term basis.With
• Only establishments which had at least one fixed term employee on the payroll at the
time of the study were asked this question. that means that establishments which stopped
completely using fixed term employment relations in the three years before the study are
not represented.
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the data collected it was again possible to make a rough estimate about
the magnitude of change. Theseestimates are given in Table 6.25.
Table 6.25 Trend over the Last Three Years In
Fixed Term Employment 1986-1989
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
More now 44 40 42 20 51 39 34 45 57
Fewer now 11 12 10 19 14 9 20 14 7
Same 41 46 45 60 33 49 43 39 31
Don·t know 3 1 4 2 2 4 2 2 5
Numbers for Italy exclude 'contratti di tormozione'
Note: Employee proportional analysis
There has been an increase of 28% or of about 300.000 employees
hired on a fixed term contract. In all countries the number of fixed term
contracts has increased. An exceptionally strong increase can be found in
the United Kingdom (57%),which has still one of the lowest rates. Italy had
the slowest development, which might be due to legal requirements, which
allow fixed term employment only under certain circumstances.
Table 6.26 Trend over the Last Three Years In
Fixed· Term Employment 1986-1989
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRL Nl UK
change In '0001 305 12 78 1 113 17 2 37 46
changeln% 28 30 21 11 26 7 33 19 57
Numbers for Italy exclude 'contratti di formazlone'
Note: Establishment proportional analysis
When this trend is compared with Table 6.5, it can be noted that
about 40% of the increase of employment is due to the increase in fixed
term employment. The development of fixed term employment has been
in all countries more dynamic than the development of total employment',
indicating the rising importance of fixed term employment for the labour
market.
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6.6.1.1.Soclo-Demographlc Structure of Fixed Term Employees
The female share of the fixed term employees by sector of activity is
on average 36%, ranging from just 26% in Spain to 42% and 44% in Ireland
and Germany.
Table 6.27 Proportion of Females In Fixed Term Employment
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRl Nl UK
F.mal.s% 36 31 44 31 26 37 42 39 33
Note: Establishment proportional analysis
Given the numbers from Table 6.27, one can see that fixed term
employment is slightly male dominated, however this should not obscure
the following facts. Granted that the female rate of total employment is
below 1/3, there are proportionally more women working under fixed term
contracts then men. Furthermore, accepting the highly female character
of part time employment (see Table 6.16. in previous section), one has to
conclude that it ismuch more likely for a woman to be employed in a non-
standard employment relationship (See Chapter 5).
Lets now turn to the qualification levels of employees with a fixed
term contract. The following points can be identified, fixed term
employment is, like part time employment, concentrated in the lower levels
of the qualification hierarchy, Le. the clerical low and the unskilled manual
level, accommodating nearly three quarters of all fixed term employees.
The United Kingdom and Spain do not fit this picture completely. The United
Kingdom has above average rates in both higher qualification levels, while
Spain has a higher proportion solely in skilled manual professions. Clerical
and manual skillsare equally distributed.
Thisobservation also holds for the cross-tabulation of women workers
on fixed term contracts and qualification levels. However, female fixed term
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employment is slightly less concentrated in the lower qualification levels,
and more concentrated in manual work than in clerical work. Thispattern
differs from the Inormal' female employment pattern.
The Netherlands show, in an analogous way as for other forms of
work, a dense concentration of employment of low skilled personnel.
..
Table 6.28 Distribution of Fixed- Term Employment by
Qualification Level
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
unskilled manual 41 26 52 '29 44 36 50 48 2
skilled manual 9 2 6 8 22 6 9 3 17
clerical low 33 55 '29 44 20 40 32 39 37
clerical high 17 18 13 19 15 18 9 10 45
Note: Establishment proportional analysis
Table 6.29 Distribution of Female Fixed- Term
Employment by Qualification Level
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
unskilled manual 48 40 51 34 51 51 41 61 6
skilled manual 17 20 20 35 27 9 15 3 32
clerical low 20 26 18 19 11 26 17 26 17
clerical high 15 14 10 12 11 15 27 10 46
Note: Establishment proportional onolvsls
6.6.2. Long and Short Fixed Term contracts
After the general analysis of fixed term employment, Table 6.30
presents a way of splitting up fixed term contracts in different categories by
period. The length of fixed term contracts appear to be different in the
various countries. In average, the majority of contracts have a length of
between 3 and 12 months, accounting for more than 60%of all contracts.
In Spain and The Netherlands contracts for this length account for 76%and
79% respectively. Contracts for a shorter period are relatively common in
Italy (77%),where contracts of between 3 and 12months account only for
21% of all fixed term contracts. Short fixed term contracts (less than 3
months) are relatively unimportant in Spain and in the Netherlands.
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Contracts of between 12 and 18 months are in comparison frequent in
Germany. Fixed term contracts for long periods (more than 18 month) are
comparatively usual in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In the United Kingdom
this is solely due to the number of contracts running for more than two
years.
Table 6.30 Distribution of Fixed- Term Contracts by length
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
I.ss than 3 month. 18 24 12 26 5 77 14 1 7
from 3 to 6 month. 32 40 26 52 39 14 25 47 25
from 6 to 12 month. 30 28 30 12 37 7 22 32 44
from 12 to 18 month. 10 3 21 1 6 1 6 13 3
from 18 to 24 month. 3 1 6 2 2 1 12 3 0
more than 24 month. 7 5 5 7 11 0 22 3 21
Total 100 101 100 100 100 100 101 99 100
Numbers for Italy exclude 'contratti di formazione'
Note: Establishment proportional analysis
The overrepresentation of relatively long contracts (two years and
more) in the United Kingdom can probably be ascribed to the fact that two
years are the minimum qualifying period for unfair dismissalprotection. That
being so, the fixed term contracts for shorter periods have less importance
than in other countries, where dismissal protection normally starts after a
shorter qualifying period. The high rate of short fixed term contracts in Italy is
likely also to be the result of the legal system. The numbers had excluded
'contratti di formazione', and all other contracts are only allowed under
special circumstances, one of those being seasonal work.
6.6.3. Reasons for the use of Fixed Term employment
6.6.3.1. Traditional versus 'new' reasons
Table 6.31 shows the main reasons given by management for the use
of fixed term contracts. The main reasons for the introduction are the
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replacement of absent staff, and the nature of the task being only
temporary. These two reasons taken together make up for 50 % of fixed
term positions. These two reasons have been described as traditional
reasons, because 'they have always been accepted in all countries
including those with a very restrictive legislation on fixed term contracts'
(e.g. Italy, Belgium or Germany before 1985)' (Bielenski19940).
The intermediate three reasons 'Not sure about future workload',
'Long probationary period' and 'Dismissalsdifficult or expensive' have less
weight than the firstgroup (40%), and are summed up as new reasons. And
this, despite the fact that in some countries these reasons have always
been accepted as well (e.g. United Kingdom, Ireland). These motives can
be interpreted as a transfer of a certain degree of riskfrom the employer
to the employees, thus making it easier for the firm to adapt the size of its
workforce, increasing the firm's numerical flexibility. The remaining purposes
are of relatively low significance. This picture looks different when the
national perspective is chosen. In the United Kingdom 'employees wishes'
and 'other reasons' are of relatively considerable importance, accounting
for around 30%, while the category of 'new reasons' is underrepresented.
Such an underrepresentation is mainly the product of low rates for a
prolonged probationary period and the negligible effects of labour law. In
the case of Ireland the third grouping of reasons is the second most
important group, due to the importance of 'other reasons' which are not
more closely identified. In Spain and in The Netherlands the 'new reasons'
were of particular importance for the use of employees on fixed term
contracts. In Denmark and Italy the first group of reasons is by far the most
important group, this might be ascribed to the weak dismissalprotection in
96
operation in Denmark. For Italy the second group are not legal reasons,
and hence those reasons were not available for selection.
Table 6.31 Main Reason for the Use of Flxed·Term Employment
EUR8 B D DK E I IRL NL UK
Task only lasts for a ftxed period
27 40 23 52 26 32 20 24 42
Replace temporarily absent staff
25 22 34 33 5 61 20 7 8
-~--------------------------------- -- .. ----- ... ---_- ........ .. ............ .......... .. .. ......... .............. ............ ............Not sure about Mure workload
20 13 20 3 33 • 26 21 18
Long probationary period,
before permanent contract 16 15 12 2 24 • - 38 4
Dismissals dltftcult or expensive
4 6 5 2 5 • 2 5 -
----------------------------------- - ............... ............ ..... _-- _ ........... .......... .. ........ ... - .... _-_ .. _ .. - .... ... ...........Employee wishes
3 3 2 4 - 1 - - 13
other reasons
6 2 4 5 7 6 32 4 15
Total 'traditional reasons' 52 62 57 85 31 93 40 31 50
Total 'new reasons' 40 34 37 7 62 • 28 64 22
Total 'other reasons' 9 5 6 9 7 7 32 4 28
Numbers for Italy exclude 'contratti dl formazione'
• Answer not admitted in Italy
Note: Employee proportional analysis
The next table gives the ranking of Table 6.31. It should be clear from
this table that there appears no conclusive pattern, with one reason having
a high rank in one country, while having low ranks in the others.
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Table 6.32 Ranking of Main Reason for the Use of Fixed- Term Employment
EUR8 8 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
Task only lasts for a fixed period
1 1 2 1 2 2 4 2 1
Replace temporarily absent staff
2 2 1 2 6 1 3 4 5
.Not·sur. abo'ut tUtur. workload'" .... ----_ .. ........ .. ........ .......... - ........... .. ...... --- .. _- _ .. _--_ ............
3 4 3 5 1 • 2 3 2
Long probationary period,
before permanent contract 4 3 4 7 3 • 6 1 6
Dismissals difficult or expensive
6 5 5 6 5 • 5 5 7
.EmpiOY •• Wtii;.i················· -----_ ..... ........... ........
.............. .... _- ... .... - .. .. .......... .. .......... .............
7 6 7 4 7 4 6 7 4
other reasons
5 7 6 3 4 3 1 6 3
Total 'traditional reasons' 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
Total 'new reasons' 2 2 2 3 1 • 3 1 3
Total 'other reasons' 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 2
Numbers for Italy exclude 'contratti di formazione'
• Answer not admitted in Italy
Base: 1282 cases
Note: Employee proportional analysis
All in all, it seems to be more difficult to compare fixed term rates
across the countries, since differences in employment protection have
probably a much bigger impact here, than on part time rates (see chapter
5). I will reconsider this question in the next chapter when I attempt to
explain the variance in the rates. Nonetheless, these data already
contribute relevant facts: e.g. that also in countries with relatively tight
dismissalprotection, traditional reasons are the most important ones for the
use of fixed term contracts in establishments accounting for a third of
employment (of establishments employing at least one fixed term
employee) in Italy and Spain and more than 50%in Germany.
The reasons given as most important for the employment of staff on
fixed term contracts are listed in Table 6.32. Generally speaking, the main
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reasons for employing on a fixed term basisappears to be the replacement
of absent staff. This occurs notably in Italy, where there are strong
restrictions on the use of fixed term employment, this reason being one of
the admitted ones. In mean values, this ground isfollowed by having only a
temporary task to discharge, being uncertain about the future workload
and the wish to have a longer probational period. Thisreason enjoys the
top of the ranking in the Netherlands (37.8%)and is also very important in
Spain (rank 2, 26.3%).
6.7. Summary and Conclusion
One finding of the above analysis is that women are more likely than
men to work in an atypical employment relationship. Thisholds both for part
time work, where the likelihood is several times higher, and for fixed term
work, where the likelihood isonly slightly higher.
In establishments representing only 45 % of all employees, the main
reason for using part time work has been the need of the establishment
only. Thiscan be pruned as the use of part time employment being supply
side oriented. The degree of this dominance varies though in the different
countries.
Given the similarity of the existing legislation in the field of part time
work, the differences in part time work rates must be explained by the
degree of flexibility connected to full time employment and the labour
supply available for firms. Thiswill be influenced by social circumstances
(e.g. opening times of child-care facilities) and the way work is organised
(Le. the ease with which part time work can be implemented in the existing
work organisation). Thiswill be further discussed with particular reference to
functional flexibility in Part III.
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The resultsobtained from the data analysis do not support the flexible
firm model. The reasons for using part time and fixed term employment vary
largely between the eight countries investigated in the survey, singularly in
the case of fixed term employment. A sizeable fraction of this variation is
probably caused by varying legal requirements for dismissal and for
entering into fixed term contracts. In the case of part time work the legal
requirements are more alike across Europe and the logic behind the
discrepancies here must lay in the differences in work organisation.
All these shows that part time work and fixed term employment are
influenced by economic, social, and legal factors, thus indicating the
importance of the national production systems. Further research into these
aspects based on empirical data will be presented in chapter 7, looking in
particular into the reason for the use of those atypical forms of work.
100
7. Explanatory Model
7.1. Introduction
The previous chapter was concerned with the description of the
labour market; the aim of the present one is to try to find an explanatory
model for the differences in the use of atypical forms of work in firms, and
from there to derive a predictive model for the different usage patterns
across the countries. Resultsfrom multivariate analysiswill be presented and
the implications of the models drawn discussed. Especial attention will be
paid to the applicability of the model to the different countries, and
contingent country specific differences will be highlighted.
7.2. Main alms
I intend to explain the variance in the use of part time employment in
firms throughout Europe and in specific countries, ascertaining the rate of
part time employment a firm uses, its possible relation to skill and to
company size,as well as interpreting gender and sectoral differences. The
Models defined in the next section will determine which variable has a
bigger influence in variance patterns. I will establish the explanatory power
of each model and give reasons for low and high values, should they
occur.
Later, I will divide the data according to reason, between those that
reflect the introduction of part time employment for economic or
organisational reasons and those which reflect response to employee
wishes.Thisdivision will be made in order to establish the impact of this form
of atypical employment as to competitiveness and women's work
opportunities.
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Another point to be investigated is the fixed-term employment rate
with reference to independent variables such as gender, skill, sector and
size. A particular point at issue will be the association between the
qualification structure of the workforce and the fixed term employment
rate.
Again, I will first perform the analysis for all establishments, reducing
later the data set to only those establishments offering fixed-term
employment, so that I am able to base the analysis more on experience
than on notional assumptions. As for part time, I will try to interpret the fixed-
term use variance according to reason, as this isconsidered highly relevant
for future policy proposals.
7.3. Part-Time Employment
The object of this section is to explain the variance in the use of part
time employment in firms throughout Europe, and in firms in specific
countries. The first step towards that end is to select and define those
independent variables which might bear relation to the dependent
variable (Le. the rate of part time employment). Having done this,
regression models containing the variables will be formulated and applied
to the data. The analysis will first be based on the most general data
available, before more information isbrought in and subsetsof the data-set
put to use. The analysis will be followed by a discussion and an
interpretation of the results.
7.3.1. Independent variables
In this section I will carry out the selection of (independent) variables
taken from the data set, which are thought to have an association with the
(dependent) variable: the rate of part time employment a firm uses. Every
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variable selection is followed by a brief justification for the favoured
alternative.
One variable which is generally expected to have a strong
association with part time work is the rate of female employment. (cf.
chapter 6). Reasons for this (supposed) association are discussed next.
Women generally bear a major part in family responsibilities,for that reason
it is mainly women who have to try to reconcile work with family/other
activities. In order to keep women as part of their workforce, or to increase
the amount of labour supply, firms can respond to the resulting
circumstances by offering part time employment. Dependent on child care
facilities and the general attitude in a society (presumed role of women,
male breadwinner model with additional female income etc.) the
association between the female employment rate and the part time rate
might have different strength. Another reason, lesssupply side oriented, is
that due to the weaker bargaining power of women (lower unionisation)
women might be more likely to accept part time positions than men. But
again, the degree of association might depend on the 'environment',
meaning primarily the existing unemployment rate and the prevailing
attitude towards part time employment. There are basically two different
ways to define the female employment rate in an establishment or in an
economy. The commonest (used for example in the European Labour
Force Survey) is to divide the total number of female employees (full or part
time) by the total number of employees (full or part time) on the payroll of
an establishment. The variable calculated through this formula will from
now on be denoted by the term 'gender'. Another way of defining female
employment is by hours worked, i.e. how many hours of work are done by
women divided by the total number of hours worked in a given
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establishment. Since the data set did not contain detailed information on
the duration of each job, but indicated solely that most part-time jobs are
roughly part-time, I decided to assume that approximately each part time
job would be a half time job, i.e. each part-time job was weighted by 0.5
before entering the computation. The results yielded by this calculation
were stored in the variable gender_hrs.
The difference in meaning between gender and gender_hrs can
best be explained by an example. Suppose a firm has 10 female and 10
male employees, all working full time, in this case gender and gender_hrs
have the same value 0.5. If the firm now splitsall female held jobs into two
part-time jobs, and fill all new positions with women, gender will increase to
0.66 while gender_hrs remains at 0.5. On the one hand the firm now
employs more women, hence the increase in gender, on the other hand
the firm does not have more work (measured by hours) done by women,
hence the same gender_hrs value remains. If two of the newly offered part
time jobs would have been taken on by men, the firm would still have
increased its share of female employees (gender = 18/30 = 0.6), but the
working hours completed by women for the firm would have been
reduced (gender_hrs = 9/20 = 0.45). Clearly this gives rise to some
implications for the interpretation of the results from the regression analysis,
that COUld,because of that, be misconstrued.
The skill structure of the workforce is the variable this study is most
interested in. The skill level a competitive economy should strive to reach is
an outstanding element of labour market controversies. Policy makers have
made the coveted skill level and the ways to achieve it a cardinal point of
their discourses. As I concluded previously in the case of the female
employment rate, here two different perspectives for the skill structure
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(share of employees which possesslow and high skills)in a firm can similarly
be taken. The variable skill denotes the results of the computation when all
jobs (full and part time) have been allotted the same weight. When part
time jobs are weighted with 0.5 resultsare stored in skill_hrs.The difference in
meaning between skill and skill_hrsisequivalent to that determined for the
case of gender and gender_hrs.
Another factor which might be expected to influence the usage
pattern of part time employment is the size of an establishment. A firm
which needs an employee with special skills,but does not have enough
work for a full time position, might decide to hire an employee on a part
time basis. The occurrence of that might be dependent on the size of an
establishment. Also the ease with which part time employment can be
implemented in the organisational structure of an establishment might be
dependent on its size.The actual number of employees in an establishment
had no significant correlation with the part time employment rate, but the
use of dummy variables showed such a significant correlation.
The variables were defined as follows:
size_s= 1 if number of employees < 50; 0 otherwise
and size_m= 1 if 49 < number of employees < 500, else 0
Due to the differences in organisational structure in the various sectors
of activity, like changes in the workload throughout a day etc., it seems
reasonable to assume a correlation between the sector of activity and the
part time rate. Preliminary tests showed that the use of all 9 different sectors
of main activity did not deliver significant results, hence it was decided to
use solely the more illustrative distinction between service sector and
industry. The variable sector was set to equal one, if the firm had its main
sector of activity in industry, 0 otherwise.
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Table 7.1. Variables used In the RegressionModel
Variable Name Variable denotes
part-time Percentage of part time employees in the
workforce
gender Female share of the workforce
gender_hrs Female share of the hours worked in an
establishment
skill Share of low qualified employees
sklll_hrs Share of hours worked by low qualified people
slze_s, size_m Indicates whether firm is of a certain size or not
sector Indicates whether firm is in industry or service
sector
7.3.2. TheModel
The models used for the regression analysis in this section had the
following form:
(M.1) part-time = PO+ P1*gender + P2*skill+ p3*size_s+ p4*size_m+p5*sector
(M.2) part-time = PO+ P1*gender_hrs + P2*skill_hrs+ p3*size_s+ p4*size_m
+p5*sector
No interaction terms have been admitted to the model with respect
to the structural variables (size and sector). Thismeans that a constant is
only added when a firm is in industry, and is a small or a medium sized
establishment. The relationship of the independent variables and the part
time rate isdifferent in each category of firms; however, the interrelations
are sufficientlysimilarfor resultsto be pooled. The extra terms containing the
structural variables in models M.1 and M.2 are used to control differences in
the categories, the model isformulated to obtain a single general measure.
Thissummarising of results has the advantage of keeping the number of
terms in the model small, while on the other hand some degree of precision
will be lost. However, since the interest here was to establish an overall
average relation between skill,gender and part-time working, and given
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that the relation isof a similar nature for all categories of establishments, the
resultsare considered to be sufficiently precise for the purpose of the study.
No model including variables from the 'employee perspective'
(gender or skill) as variable from the 'hours perspective' (gender_hrs or
skill_hrs)had been formulated since it was felt that either one or the other
perspective should be taken, as a mixture of both of them could lead to
misinterpretations.
7.3.3. Analysis of Variance In Part-nme Employment
7.3.3.1.AII Establishments
Models M.l and M.2 were used to explain the variance in the usage
pattern of part time employment amongst all establishments in Europe as a
whole, and in the individual States. Firstof all, I present the results from the
regression analysis using model M.l, starting with the explained total
variance by model M.l, and the explanatory power of skill and gender
taken together, when keeping the controlling structural variables (sizeand
sector) constant.
Table 7.2. Explained Variance In the Part-nme Employment Rate
(all establishments) (M.l)
EUI8 I D Dk E I IlL NL UK
total explained variance by model 27 21 36 33 1 10 7 44 26
explained variance by gender and 20 14 27 24 1 6 7 44 24
.klll
M.l explains about 27%of the total variance in Europe as a whole,
but this value varies strongly for the individual countries, reaching from just
1% in Spain, to more than 40% in the Netherlands. The model has low
explanatory power in countries with low incidence rates for part time
employment (Spain, Italy and Ireland). Thismatter will be discussed after I
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have analysed the resultsfrom models M.1 and M.2. The explanatory power
of gender and skill taken together follows the general trend of the
explanatory power of the whole model. Detailed information on the
explanatory power of skill and gender, when used to control each other
are given in the next table.
Table 7030 Explained Variance by skill and gender
(all establishments) (Mol)
EUR8 B 0 Ok E I IRL NL UK
variance explained by 15 10 21 17 1 6 5 43 18
gender
variance explained by skill 3 2 1 3 - - 3 2 4
Gender is by far the most important variable as far as explaining the
variance in the part time employment rate is concerned. In Europe as a
whole, gender explains 15%of the variance in part-time employment rates,
with values reaching from 1% in Spain to more than 40%in the Netherlands.
Skillhas only a comparatively low explanatory value. Skillhas no association
whatsoever with the part time rate in Spain and Italy, while in the other
countries, it explains between 1and 4%of the variance. Now I will drop the
explanatory values of the variables, and focus analytic efforts on the
association the independent variables have with the dependent variable,
Le. what effect would a standardised change in an independent variable
have on the dependent (part time rate) variable.
The standardised effects of a one unit change in gender or skill,while
controlling for each other, and the structural variables are given in Table
7.4.
Table 7040 UnitChange In Part·nme Rate caused by a one unit change In the
Independent variables (all establishments) (Mol)
EUR8 B 0 Ok E I IRL NL UK
unit change In gender 22 16 26 25 3 6 11 51 26
unit change In .klll 8 6 6 9 - - 8 9 10
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In accordance with their dissimilarexplanatory power, the effects a
change in gender would have on the part time rate are much stronger
than those a change in skillwould have. An increase of one per cent in the
female employment rate, would mean an increase of 0.22% in the part
time rate in Europe as a whole. Thiseffect turns out to be weakest in Spain,
where the part time rate is only expected to change by 0.03% and
strongest in The Netherlands, where the predicted effect would be more
than 0.5%. Shifting now to ski//' the estimated effect of a one per cent
change in skill, Le. an increase (decrease) in the rate of low skilled
employees by 1%, would be expected to cause a 0.08% increase
(decrease) in the part time employment rate in Europe as a whole. This
values are similar in all countries, bar Italy and Spain, where no effect is
anticipated. Both skill and gender, when associated with part-time
employment, are positively associated with the part time employment rate,
Le. the higher the female employment rate in an establishment, or the
higher the proportion of low skilled employees, the higher the (expected)
proportion of part-time employees.
Having carried out thisanalysiswith M.l, I repeated it using model M.2
taking the hours perspective, rather than the employee perspective. Table
7.5. gives the resultsof thisanalysis.
Table 7.5. Explained Variance In the Part-nme Employment Rate
(all establishments) (M.2)
EURI I D Dk E I IRL NL UK
total explained variance by model 23 18 32 27 1 9 / 39 22
explained variance by gende,_hrs and Iklll_hrs
16 10 23 19 1 5 / 33 18
The explanatory power of model M.2 is slightly weaker than that of
model M.l (cf. Table 7.2), this holds for Europe as a whole, as well as for the
109
individual countries. Nevertheless, the variations in explanatory power of the
model in the different countries are similar to that of model M.l. The main
difference is the loss of significance for explaining the variance in Ireland.
The same holds for gender_hrs and skill_hrstaken together.
Table 7.6. Explained Variance by sklll_hrs and gender_hrs
(all establishments) (M.2)
EUR8 a D Dk E I IRL NL UK
variance explained by 12 8 19 14 1 5 I 32 13
gender_hrs
variance explained by skill_hr. 2 1 1 3 - - I 2 3
Table 7.6. contains information on the explanatory power of
gender_hrs and skill_hrs, when used to control each other as well as
controlling for the structural variables. As above, the values are lower than
those for gender and skill (in model M.l), but the correlation between the
two variables and the different countries in comparison to model M.1 is,
rounding off its values, preserved.
Table 7.7. Unit Change In Part-nme Rate caused by a one unit change In the
Independent variables (all establishments) (M.2)
EUR8 a D Dk E I IRL NL UK
unit change In gender_hrs 20 15 26 22 3 5 I 46 22
unit change In sklll_hrs 7 5 5 8 - - I 8 9
In the same way it occurred regarding explanatory power, the
effects of a one unit change in gender_hrs or skill_hrsare weaker than that
of gender or skill.The magnitude of the effect is summarised in Table 7.7. All
associations, if significant, remain positive. Comparing the results of model
M.1 and M.2 with each other, it can be said that the association of variables
in M.1 is stronger than the association of variables in M.2, however the
general pattern in the relations isthe same.
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Coming back to the rather low explanatory power in countries which
had low incidences of part time employment, I came to the conclusion
that thismight be due to the fact that I am trying to predict the outcome of
a rather rare event (firm has part time employee), and the occurrence of
the event might only be weakly related to the variable used. The next
section will confront this problem by composing a new selection of data to
enter the analysis and complete it.
7.3.4. Establishments Offering Part nme Employment
For the following analysis, only data from those establishments were
entered into the equations, which described firms engaging in part time
employment.
The decision to proceed like that was based on the following
considerations. Among the firms not offering any part time employment at
all, the large majority claim it would be unfeasible to do so. Many firms do
not specify that statement any further, but claim at the same time that part
time employment would have advantages either to make the
establishment more competitive or to improve service and quality to
customers. A big number of firms claims that part time work is not
practicable because of the kind of working patterns they are operating on
(e.g. shift work). Nevertheless, there are firms using shift work and offering
part time employment. Therefore, it seems that the statement of the firms
without any part time employees is rather based on a particular notion of
which work issuitable for part time workers, rather than on experience with
part time employment. Especially in large establishments (more than 500
employees) It sounds rather more like an ideological statement than an
organisational rationale, that there is no suitable position for only one part
time employee. There might also be a degree of uncertainty, 'Unwissen',
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about organisational and legal requirements needed to introduce part
time employment. The latter point may well constitute a restraining decision
boundary between no part time worker at all and at least one.
To reduce the impact these disturbances generate, and to base the
analysis exclusively on experience with part time employment, thus cutting
out parts of the impact of certain ideologies, those establishments that did
not have any part time employee were eliminated from the analysis. The
dark side of this decision is that there will be firms whose decision not to
employ any part-timer was based on some (bad) experience, or on
perfectly well informed managerial consideration, and they will be
excluded from the analysis. There was no possibility of tracking down these
cases and including them in the analysis. However, it is thought that the
error engendered by this exclusion is smaller than the error that would be
caused by the inclusion of all firms. In like manner, Delsen (1995), working
with the same data set, but using different models, only entered data from
firms practising part time work in hisregression analysis. Regretfully, he fails to
give hisrationale.
The information from firms which had at least one part time
employee on the payroll was used in the regression analysis, applying both
model M.1 and model M.2. Since the results from both models have again
delineated a similar trend, the output of both of them will be described at
the same time. The following two tables present the total explained
variance by the models.
Table 7.8. Explained Variance In the Part·nme Employment Rate
(all establishments with Part·nme Employees), M.l
EURI • D Dk E I IRL NL UK
total explained variance by model 38 25 43 39 5 23 8 51 37
explained variance by gender and skill 25 14 28 26 5 11 8 42 26
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Table 7.9. Explained Variance In the Part·Time Employment Rate
(all establishments with Part·Time employees), M. 2
EUR8 B D Dk E I IRl Nl UK
total explained variance by model 35 22 40 35 7 23 5 45 33
explained variance by gender_hrs and sklll_hrs 21 11 25 20 7 8 5 35 22
In both cases, more than a third of the total variance observed in
Europe as a whole can be explained through the models. For all countries,
a bigger variance than in the case when all establishments were included
(see Table 7.8 and Table 7.9) could be explained. With the exception of
Spain, model M.1 usually explains more variance than model M.2. In Spain
model M.2 explains slightly more. The same is true for the explanatory
power of skill and gender taken together, compared with skill_hrsand
gender _hrstaken together.
The explanatory power of the individual variables are given in Table 7.10
and table 7.11. Once more, the variables gender and skill have higher
values than their counterparts in model M.2. Furthermore, the variable
gender (and gender_hrs) ismost significant when explaining the variance in
part time employment rates.
Table 7.10. Explained Variance by skill and gender
(all establishments with Part·nme Employees) M.l
EUR8 I D Dk E I IRl Nl UK
variance explained by gender 18 8 20 16 - 11 - 38 18
variance explained by .klll 4 4 3 6 5 - 9 4 5
Table 7.11. Explained Variance by skilChrs and gender_hrs
(all establishments with Part-Time employees) M.2
EUR8 B D Dk E I IRl Nl UK
variance explained by gende,_hn 15 7 19 12 - 8 - 32 15
variance explained by sklll_hrs 3 2 2 6 7 - 6 3 4
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When comparing the above tables with the corresponding tables in
the analysis where all establishments had been included, it is helpful to
make the following comments. The variable gender (gender_hrs) loses in
most cases part of its importance when concentrating solely on
establishments with part time employees, while skill (skill_hrs) gains
explanatory power, this trend becomes particularly evident in Spain. This
suggests that gender (gender_hrs) is related to the fact of whether a firm
has any part time employee or has not, while skill (skill_hrs)is lessrelated to
thisdecision. I will get back to this point in the later analysis.
The standardised effects of a one unit change in the independent
variables on the part time rate are given in Table 7.12 and Table 7.13, the
relationship between the variables and models is as above, only in Spain
and Ireland, where a change in the gender (gender_hrs) combination
would not have an effect on the part time employment rate, skill (skill_hrs)
has a stronger effect than gender (gender_hrs). Generally, the variables
related to the female employment in a firm have a stronger effect on the
part time rate than those relating to the skillcomposition.
Table 7.12. Unit Change In Part-nme Rate caused by a one unit change In
Independent variable (all establishments with Part-nme Employees) M.l
EUR8 • D Dk E I IRL NL UK
unit chang. In g.nd.r 27 17 28 27 - 12 - 49 28
unit chang. In skill 11 10 9 14 11 - 21 14 13
Table 7.13. Unit Change In Part-nme Rate caused by a one unit change In
Independent variable (all establishments with Part-nme employees) M.2
EUR8 • D Dk E I IRL NL UK
unit chang. In g.nd.r_hn 25 16 27 23 - 10 - 47 26
unit chang. In sklll_hra 10 8 8 12 13 - 16 12 12
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Comparing the results from the analysis using the restrained data set,
with the analysis performed before, it can be said that the effects of a one
unit change in any of the variables on the part time employment rate now
are stronger than before (with the exception of gender and gender_hrs in
Spain and Ireland). All other associations remain non negative.
7.3.5. Part-Time Employment by Reason
To carry out further analysis the data set was split into two parts,
according to the primary reason given for the introduction of part time
employment. One sub sample contained all firms which had stated
economic or organisational reasons for the introduction of part time
employment, the other set contained establishments which are using part
time work mainly because of employee wishes. Thiswas done with respect
to some questions the analysis tries to answer, like the impact part time work
has on the competitiveness of an establishment, and the impact it might
have on the creation of more opportunities for women to participate in the
labour market. The first one is highly likely the aim of firms using part time
employment for organisational reasons, and the other is probably the goal
of employees asking to work part time. It should however be noted that this
division isa very crude one, and therefore no information could be gained
on the targeted item: to wit, for how many part time employees was one or
the other reason applicable.
7.3.5.1.Part- nme Employment for Economic Reasons
Once again, I will state the results from model M.l and M.2 at the
same time. The explanatory power of the models, when restricting the data
entered to those from firms which had introduced part time employment
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mainly due to organisational and economic reasons, is higher than before.
Table 7.14.and Table 7.15.summarise the results.
Table 7.14. Explained Variance In the Part·Time Employment Rate
(Part· Time used mainly for Organisational Reasons) M.l
EUR8 • 0 Ok E I IRl Nl UK
total explained variance by model 45 28 44 47 8 22 12 64 43
explained variance by gender and skill 34 18 34 35 8 22 12 41 34
Table 7.15. Explained Variance In the Part·Time Employment Rate
(Part·Tlme used mainly for Organisational Reasons) M.2
EUR8 • 0 Ok E I IRl Nl UK
total explained variance by model 41 24 41 39 13 / / 55 39
explained variance by gender_hrs and sklll_hrs 29 12 30 27 13 / / 41 29
Using the models for the restrained set of data, reveals a total
explained variance of more than 40% on the European average. In the
individual countries the amount of explained variance of M.1 develops from
8% in Spain and 12% in Ireland to more than 60% in the Netherlands. All
countries where the model had below average explanatory power, had
relatively low incidences of part time employment and all share the quality
of being considered 'catholic' countries, probably related with traditional
family roles. Model M.2 reveals, with the reiterated exception of Spain,
lower explanatory values, in Ireland and Italy the Model did not have any
significant explanatory power. Taking out these two countries, the range of
explained variance is from 13%in Spain, to 55% in the Netherlands. All the
above made statements are also germane when concentrating on the
explanatory power of gender and skill (gender_hrs and skill_hrs) taken
together, in that way the difference between the countries now becomes
smaller, with explanatory power ranging from 8% in Spain to 41% in the
Netherlands (M.1) and 12% in Belgium and 13% in Spain to 41% in the
116
Netherlands (M.2). These values are divided between the different
explanatory values of the single variables in the following tables.
Table 7.16.Explained Variance by skill and gender
(Part-Time used mainly for Organisational Reasons)M.l
EUR8 8 0 Ok E I IRL NL UK
variance explained by gender 22 11 21 21 - 22 - 32 25
variance explained by .klll 6 4 5 6 8 - 12 10 4
Table 7.17. Explained Variance by sklll_hrsand gender_hrs
(Part-Time used mainly for Organisational Reasons)M.2
EUR8 8 0 Ok E I IRL NL UK
variance explained by gender_hr. 19 12 20 15 - / / 34 22
variance explained by .klll_hr. 5 - 5 6 13 / / 11 3
Likethe total explained variance, the variance by the single variables
has increased by confining the analysis to a sub-set of establishments, and
explanatory values for the rate measured by working hours remain lower
than those measured by employees. The variables relating to female
employment remain as the more important explanatory factors, and the
general pattern between the countries stands.
Table 7.18. Unit Change In Part-TimeRate caused by a one unit change In
Independent variable (Part-Time used mainly for Organisational Reasons)
M.l
EURI 8 0 Ok E I IRL NL UK
unit change In g.nd.r 34 25 28 41 - 23 - 51 36
unit change In .klll 15 13 12 17 18 - 31 32 13
Table 7.19. Unit Change In Part-Time Rate caused by a one unit change In
Independent variable (Part-Time used mainly for Organisational Reasons)
M.2
EURI 8 0 Ok E I IRL NL UK
unit chang. In gender_hrs 32 27 28 33 - / / 57 34
unit change In .klll_hrs 14 - 11 15 24 / / 32 11
117
The effects on the dependent variable of a standardised one unit
change in the independent variables are given in Table 7.18 and Table
7.19. The same picture as the one given for the explanatory power of the
variables arises. In general, the effect of a change in an independent
variable has increased when moving to the sub set of firms, in some cases
substantially, as in the Netherlands, where the effect of a change in skill
(skill_hrs)has more than doubled compared to the resultswhen taking all
establishments with part time employment. Furthermore, the effect of a
change in skill_hrsor gender_hrs gets closer to the effects of a change in
skillor gender, and the latter two do not have stronger effects for all cases
anymore.
7.3.S.2.Part- nme Employment because of Employee wishes
Switching now to the other sub-set, containing data from
establishments which are using part-time mainly because of employee
wishes; and comparing the explanatory power of M.1 and M.2 for this sub-
sample with the other one, one can see that generally the explanatory
power for the variance in part time employment for this type of
establishments issmaller. The same is true when comparing the values with
those reached when all data from firms using part time employees were
entered (see Table 7.12 and Table 7.13) However, given that the model
was formulated to describe establishments, and that the reason for using
part time work was related rather to employees than to the establishment
(employee wishes) this result seemsexplicable.
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Table 7.20 Explained Variance in the Part-Time Employment Rate
(Part- Time used mainly for Employee Wishes) M.l
EUR8 8 0 Ok E I IRL NL UK
total explained variance by model 'Z1 15 37 37 40* 24 / 42 23
explained variance by gender and .klll 17 5 31 'Z1 10* 8 / 42 16
"Bosed on a small sample
Table 7.21 Explained Variance in the Part-Time Employment Rate
(Part-Time used mainly for employee wishes) M.2
EUR8 8 0 Ok E I IRL NL UK
total explained variance by model 27 16 34 34 51· 23 / 41 19
explained variance by gender_hr. and .klll_hr. 15 5 'Z1 26 13· 7 / 41 12
·Based on a small sample
We can likewise note that the models have low explanatory powers
in the same country as in the sub-sample (organisational reasons) before,
and besides, the explanatory power in the United Kingdom has gone
down. Thisdevelopment will be discussed later when further analysis has
been presented.
Table 7.22 Explained Variance by skill and gender
(Part- Time used mainly tor Employee Wishes) M.l
EURI 8 0 Ok E I IlL NL UK
variance explained by gender 15 5 31 'Z1 -• 8 / 42 9
variance explained by skill 2 - - 10'" - / - 6
·Based on a sma" sample
Table 7.23 Explained Variance by sklll_hrs and gender_hrs
(Part- Time used mainly tor employee wishes) M.2
EURI 8 0 Dk E I IlL NL UK
variance explaIned by gender_hrs 13 5 'Z1 26 13· 7 / 41 6
variance explained by skll'-hrs 1 - - - - - / - 5
·Based on a sma" sample
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The explanatory power of gender and skill (gender_hrs and skill_hrs)is
given in Table 7.22 and Table 7.23, now a complete different picture than
that ensuing from the results presented before emerges. Skill (skill_hrs)has
lost nearly all its explanatory power. Thisvariable has only in the United
Kingdom and in the European average a significant role in explaining the
variance in part time employment (excluding Spain due to its small sample
size).The explanatory value of gender (gender_hrs) is,in Europe as a whole,
weaker than in the previous sub-sample, but has higher values in Germany,
Denmark and the Netherlands.
The effects of a change in the independent variable on the
dependent variable mirror the same trend, even though now only in
Germany the value is bigger, compared with the sub-sample before. Table
7.24 and Table 7.25 give the effects a change in an independent variable
would have on the part time employment rate.
Table 7.24 Unit Change In Part·Time Rate caused by a one unit change In
Independent variable (Part· Time used mainly for Employee Wishes) M.l
EUR8 • D Dk E I IRL NL UK
unit change In gender 19 9 31 27 -• 8 / 44 13
unit change In .klll 6 - - - 4· - / - 10
·Based on a small sample
Table 7.25 Unit Change In Part·Tlme Rate caused by a one unit change In
Independent variable (Part· Time used mainly for employee wishes) M.2
EUR8 • D Dk E I IRL NL UK
unit change In gender_hn 18 9 31 26 7· 9 / 45 11
unit change In .klll_hn 5 - - - - - / - 9
·Based on a small sample
7.3.5.3.Establlshments with a high share of Part Time Employees
When plotting skill against the part time rate and skill_hrsagainst the
part time rate, it could be observed that in both subsets of data while no
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pattern emerged for part time rates of below ca. 7%, for higher part time
rates a pattern could be seen. Reasonsfor a threshold of this magnitude to
exist could simply be that there are always some jobs which can be carried
out outside the standard way of work organisation, without acutely
affecting one's work organisation. Once this amount of 'atypical' jobs
increases, effects become more likely. For gender and gender_hrs a
pattern emerged earlier. Given this thresholds, the regression model is next
used only for firms with a part time rate equivalent to, or higher than 7%.
Additional tests of the remaining firms showed that the variables skill_hours
and skillhardly had any impact on the part-time rate.
7.3.5.3. J .Part-Tlme Work for Economic Reasons
Model M1 and M2 were used to explain the variance in the usage of
part time employment in establishments which had introduced part time
work mainly for economic and organisational reasons. Table 7.26 gives the
total explained variance in the rate of part time work in Europe and the
individual countries. The explanatory power of gender and skill taken
together, when controlling for sector of activity and size of the
establishments are also shown (Resultsfor M2 are shown for completeness,
but since they are similar to those of M1, I do not comment on them).
Table 7.26 Explained Variance In the Part-nme Employment Rate
(economic reason, rate ~ 7%) M.l
EUR8 I D E/I/IRL • UK NL DK
total explained variance by model M 1 42 20 44 25 39 54 50
explained variance by gender and skill 37 20 38 25 37 34 39
• no analysis was possible for the individual countries, due to the small number of cases, results here are based on
the analysis when the cases in the three countries were combined
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Table 7.27 Explained Variance In the Part-Time Employment Rate
(economic reason, rate ~ 7%) M.2
EUR8 B 0 Ok E/I/IRL· NL UK
total explained variance by model M2 39 15 43 43 19 42 34
explained variance by gender_hrs and sklll_hrs 33 15 37 31 19 42 26
In Europe as a whole more than 40% of the variance in part time
employment rates on the establishments is explained by the Model. The
explanatory power of the Model varies from just 20% in Belgium, to more
than 50% in the Netherlands. When focusing on the explanatory power of
gender and ski", while controlling for the structural variables of size and
sector of activity, a similar motif emerges. The explanatory power of the two
variables taken together is in Europe as a whole 37%, but the variations
between the countries are smaller than before. Belgium has with 20% of
explained variance by those variables, the sma"est amount of variance
explained by them, while almost 40% is explained in Germany and
Denmark. The implications of those considerable differences, in particular
for the question of whether it is meaningful to use a common European
explanatory model, wi" be discussed later, after having introduced more
detailed results.
The following table shows the explanatory power of gender and skill,when
controlling for the other and the structural variables. It can be observed
that the values do not add up to the total explanatory value of gender
and ski" taken together (see also Table 7.28), this isdue to interaction
effects between the two voricbles.'
1 If the model ismodified to contain terms for interaction. the explanatory power is slightly
increased. However. since I am only interested in the main effects. results will only be
presented from the model were no terms for interaction were fitted
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Table 7.28 Explained Variance by skill and gender
(Part- Time used mainly for Organisational Reasons, Rate ~ 7%) M.l
EUR8 8 0 E/I/IRL • UK NL OK
variance explained by gender 18 - 16 - 23 17 18
variance explained by skill 10 20 13 25 5 10 9
• no analysis was possible for the individual countries due to the small number of cases, results here are based on
the analysis when the cases in the three countries were combined
- effect of variable was not significant
Table 7.29 Explained Variance by sklll_hrs and gender_hrs
(Part- Time used mainly for Organisational Reasons, Rate ~ 7%) M.2
EUR8 8 0 Ok E/I/IIL· NL UK
variance explained by gender_hrs 17 - 16 14 - 26 26
variance explained by skll'_hrs 9 15 12 9 22 12 -
In Europe as a whole the gender composition of the workforce is a
more important factor than the skill composition one for explaining
differences in the part time employment rate. The explanatory power of
gender, is with 18%nearly twice as high as the explanatory power of skill
(10%).However the values vary strongly between the countries. In Belgium
and in Spain, Italy and Ireland taken together, gender did not have a
significant association with the part time rate, but skillhad with 20%and 25%
respectively, a clearly above average rate of explanatory power. Skillhas
also in Germany a slightly above average explanatory power, while
gender has a slightly below average importance in explaining variations.
Comparing the two variables with each other, gender is of bigger
importance in Germany, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and
Denmark. In the later two gender and skill have about the same
explanatory power than in Europe as a whole. In the United Kingdom
gender has the highest, and skill the lowest, explanatory value from all
countries.
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Before tackling the interpretation of the results, Table 7.30 presents
some more information. Next to the explanatory value of a variable in the
model, the effects a change in a variable would have on the dependent
variable are also of some importance. The standardised effects of a one
unit change in gender or skill composition on the part time employment
rate, while controlling for the structural and the other variable are listed
below.
Table 7.30 Unit change In part time rate for a one unit change In
Independent varlable(Part- Time used mainly for Organisational Reasons,
Rate ~ 7%)M.l
EUR8 la 0 E/I/IRL • UK NL OK
unit change In gender 34 - 28 - 39 41 41
unit change In skill 23 35 21 38 17 32 23
• no analysis was possible in the individual countries, due to the small number of cases, results here are based on
the analysis when the cases in the three countries were combined
- effect of variable was not significant
Table 7.31 Unit Change In Part-nme Rate caused by a one unit change In
Independent variable (Part-nme used mainly for Organisational Reasons,
Rate ~ 7%) M.2
EUR8 la 0 Ok E/I/IRL· NL UK
unit change In gender_hrs 32 - 28 34 - 54 40
unit change In sklll_hrs 21 31 20 20 37 34 -
In Europe as a whole, a one per cent increase (decrease) in the
female employment rate, keeping everything else unchanged, would
cause about 113 of a per cent increase (decrease) in the part time
employment rate of a firm. The effect of a one per cent increase
(decrease) in low qualified personnel would cause around 1/5th of a per
cent increase (decrease) in the part time employment rate. Consequently,
the association between gender and part time rate is stronger than the
association between skilland part time rate for a given firm. As before, the
variations between the countries are considerable. In the countries were
gender was a significant variable, the effect of a one unit change in
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gender was only in Germany lessthan a 1/3rd of a unit change in part time
employment (0.28), in the other countries, that change would cause about
0.4 of a unit change in part time employment. In all these countries, the
effect of gender on the part time rate was mightier than the effect of skill
on the same rate, but the effect of skillon the part time rate is in any case
considerable. This effect is weakest in the United Kingdom (0.17 unit
change), and reaches over about 1/3rd of a unit change in the Benelux
countries, to 0.38 in Spain, Italy and Ireland (taken together).
The results of the regression model in firms using part time
employment mainly because of employee wisheswill be presented, before
resultsfrom both groups are compared and interpreted.
7.3.S.3.2.Parf-Wm. worlc due fo .mp/oy •• w/sh.s
As above, models M.1 and M.2 were used to explain the variance in part
time employment rates, but this time data was taken from firms which
stated that they use part time employment mainly for employee wishes.This
section will be structured as the previous one. In Table 7.32 the total share
of variance explained by the model, and by gender and skill taken
together, when controlling for sector of activity and size of the
establishments.
Table 7.32 Explained Variance In the Part-nme Employment Rate
(Part- Time used mainly for employee wishes, Rate ~ 7%) M.l
EUI8 • D E/I/IIL • UK NL DK
total .xplaln.d varlanc. by mod.1(M.l) 33 21 36 50 I 43 32
.xplaln.d varlanu by ".nd.r and .klll 30 10 36 50 / 43 32
• no analysis was possible for the individual countries, due to the small number of cases, results here are based on
the analysis when the cases in the three countries were combined
/ Model was not significant
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Table 7.33 Explained Variance In the Part-nme Employment Rate
(Part-nme used mainly for employee wishes, Rate ~ 7%) M.2
EUR8 8 0 Ok E/I/IRL- NL UK
total explained variance by model 30 14 34 29 43 44 /
explained variance by gender_hr. and .klll_hr. 27 14 34 29 43 44 /
Approximately a third of the variance in part time employment rates
in Europe as a whole isexplained by the model executed. The explanatory
power of the model still varies strongly in the individual member states.
While it remains insignificant to explain the variations in the United Kingdom,
it explains 50%of variance in Spain, Italy and Ireland (taken together for the
same reasons as above). The next row of the table gives the values for
gender and skill taken together. Only in Belgium and in the European
average, the structural variance had any significance for explaining the
variance in the usage pattern of part time work, hence the small variations
between the first and second row of Table 7.33. In Belgium the difference
between the two rows is considerable (10% opposed to 21%), while the
variation between the two rows in Europe as a whole issmall.
Table 7.34 shows more detailed information on the explanatory
power of gender and skill,when taken separately, and controlling for the
other variable and the structural variables. The difference between the sum
of both rows and the second row of Table 7.35 can again be explained by
the interaction between the two variables.
Table 7.34 Explained Variance by skill and gender
(Part- nme used mainly for employee wishes, Rate ~ 7%) M.l
EURI 8 0 EIl/IRL- UK NL DK
variance explained by gender 23 10 36 27 / 43 22
variance explained by skill 5 - - 22 / - 7
no analysis was possible for the individual countries due to the small number of cases, results here are based on the
analysis when the cases in the three countries were combined
/ Model was not significant
- effect of variable was not significant
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Table 7.35Explained Variance by sklll_hrsand gender_hrs
(Part-Time used mainly for employee wishes, Rate~ 7%)M.2
EUR8 8 0 Ok E/l/lRl • Nl UK
variance explained by gender_hrs 21 14 34 20 25 44 /
variance explained by skill_hr. 4 - - 7 19 - /
In all cases the explanatory power of gender is bigger than the
explanatory power of skill. That is to say, in all cases except one, this
difference is considerable. Only in the three country cluster of Spain, Italy
and Ireland, both variables have a similar explanatory value. In Belgium,
Germany and the Netherlands skilldid not reveal a significant association
with the part time employment rate in firms where part time work was
mainly used for employee wishes. Gender composition of the workforce is
by far the more important factor when explaining the difference in part
time employment rates, this difference is especially pronounced in
Germany and in the Netherlands.
Table 7.36 Unit change In part time rate for a one unit change In
Independent varlable(Part- Time used mainly for employee wishes, Rate ~
7%) M.l
EUR8 a 0 E/l/lRl • UK Nl OK
unit change In gender 33 20 45 38 / 62 26
unit change In skill 13 - - 28 I - 12
• no analysis was possible in the individual countries, due to the small number of cases, results here are based on
the analysis when the cases in the three countries were combined
/ Modei was not significant
- effect of variable was not significant
Table 7.37 Unit Change In Part-Time Rate caused by a one unit change In
Independent variable (Part-Time used mainly for employee wishes, Rate ~
7%) M.2
EUR8 a 0 Ok E/I/IRl· Nl UK
unit change In gender_hr. 32 26 43 25 36 62 /
unit change In sklll_hrs 12 - - 11 26 - /
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Table 7.37 shows the impact a one unit change in skill or gender,
while controlling for the other variables, has on the part time employment
rate. A change in the gender composition will affect the part time rate in
an establishment much more powerfully than a change in the skillstructure.
In Europe as a whole the effect of a change in gender composition is
similar to the one in the previous groups of firms. In Belgium an increase of
one per cent in female employees would cause around 1/5th of a per cent
point increase in the part time employment rate, a similar value (0.26) can
be found in Denmark. In the other countries this value is much higher, and
reaches 0.62 in the Netherlands. These values are much more modest for
the variable skill,only in Spain, Italy and Ireland taken together the effect is
bigger than 115th, in Europe as a whole and Denmark the effect is in the
area of 1/8th.
Having presented the resultsfor the two groups of data, the following
section will be concerned with the interpretation of these results.What do
this results mean for the flexibility debate, how can differences and
similarities between the two sets, and between the countries be
explained? Isit feasible to use one model throughout Europe?, or are there
different factors which have to be considered when studying different
countries?
7.3.6. Interpretation and Discussion of Results
The results of the regression analysis using model M.1 and model M.2
are very similar for all regressions executed. Variables tend to have slightly
less explanatory power and weaker effects on the dependent variable
when the hourly perspective is chosen. The association between the
dependent variable and gender/gender_hrs or skili/skill_hrsis generally of
the same nature, Le. positive. This means that firms with more part time
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employees do not only tend to have more women on the payroll
(employee perspective), but actually also offer more work (hour
perspective) to women. So the amount is less than the number of female
employees would suggest, and mirror the fact that there are more women
working part time than men. In that sense, one could say that employment
opportunities for women are created. This point will be taken up again
under section Gender 7.3.6.1 .
A similar conclusion can be drawn when comparing skill and skill_hrs.
That means a firm does not only have more 'less skilledI employees on the
payroll, but also makes use of more work requiring only low skills.So firms
using more low qualified workers, possibly competing on a low skill, low pay,
low quality base, are expected to have higher part time employment rates.
Please cf. section 7.3.7Skill.
One conclusion which can be arrived at when comparing the
outcomes for the two sets of data analysed, is that the underlying factors
for the decision to offer more (or less)part time employment opportunities,
in the two different groups of firms are distinct. Hence a simple comparison
between part time rates, regardless of the reason for their introduction, and
an estimation of possible effects on the labour market is problematic. A
mixing of both groups might explain the confusion in the flexibility debate,
when theoretical effects expected in one group are extended to the other.
Furthermore, given the starkly differing degrees of association
between the independent variables and the part time employment rate, in
particular when part time work is used mainly because of employee
demands, the results from the regression analysis indicate that at the time of
the survey, the various labour markets in the countries were distinct. At the
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same time, the model used has in most cases explained more than one
third of the total variance, and the further interpretation can be based on
the relationships highlighted by the regression analysis. The finding of no
association between the independent variable and the part time rate can
be used as a starting point for discussion.
It can further be noted that the explanatory value of the structural
variables sizeand sector of main activity of the establishment are of rather
limited importance for explaining the total variance. This is in line with
findings from Bruegel and Hegewisch (1992)who conclude that differences
in the part time employment rates between the countries cannot be
explained statistically by the differences in importance of the various
sectors.
7.3.6.1.Gender
For both sets of firms, the variable gender in Europe as a whole has
the bigger explanatory power, and the most effective impact on the part
time employment rate. In the individual countries gender is, with few
exceptions, the stronger of both variables. Therelationship between gender
and part time employment, where it exists, is positive, Le. in a firm with
higher rates of female employees one can expect more part time
employees. Whether this should be interpreted as an increase in
employment opportunities for women will be discussed, only in shallow
depth, next.
On the one hand, part-time jobs are often the only feasible forms of
work for women, given the other responsibilitiesallocated to them. In this
sense one could speak of an improvement of job opportunities/ equal
opportunities for women, by offering/promoting more part time work (as
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opposed to economic inactivity). On the other hand, part-time work might
actually cement the role women hold in society, rather than moving into
the direction of shared responsibilities. It has been argued that, since part
time work seems to make it possible to reconcile work and other activities
the traditional female responsibilities will stay female responsibilities.
Improvements of child care facilities are postponed due to the 'family'
expectations on women. Hence part time work might support the
underlying social perceptions of gender roles, and confine women even
more to certain roles. Which interpretation one favours depends on one's
perception of the world. I think both arguments are well worth considering,
but given that traditions normally change slowly, part time work might well
be a start for greater female participation. Though one should avoid seeing
part time work as a full time job with lesshours, so equal opportunities can
only be reached if both men and women have the opportunity (regulated
by social perceptions, education, etc.) to get the same sort of jobs.
For the other group of firms, offering part time jobs mainly for
organisational and economic reasons, the legitimate suspicion stands that
the higher degree of female employment is very much due to the fact of
lower bargaining power on the side of women. So the less popular jobs
(part time jobs) are filled by the group of employees, which have the least
choice. Thisisclearly not the way towards equal opportunities.
Taking up the point made earlier -the need to distinguish between
the reason behind the use of part time employment- it has to be said, that
making firms more competitive, and offering more employment
opportunities for women, both seem possible, alas not always in the same
firm.
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7.3.7. Skill
The variable skill -which indicates the rate of low skilled employees in
the workforce- was, when associated, positively so, with the part time
employment rate, Le. the lower the skill level of the workforce, the higher
one would expect the part time employment rate to be. The impact of this
variable is of particular importance where part time work had been
introduced mainly for economic and organisational reasons. In those cases,
one might assume that the need for part time work is bigger in
establishments having a lower qualified workforce, than in those with better
qualified employees. Thiswould uphold the theory that assumes that there
exist certain compensation effects between functional and numerical
flexibility. In the case of part time work which had been introduced due to
employee wishes, the variable skill isof lower importance, the association it
has might be due to the fact that employees in lower qualified jobs are
more likely to ask to go part time, eventually due to a stronger impact of
national cultures and value systems (i.e. mother role), and firms might be
more likely to react to this wishes of employees for lower qualified workers
(Le.managerial positions can't be split). The data does not support the idea
of intensified training for the core workforce, which would compensate for
the diminished training provisions for flexible workers, once the core
workforce iscushioned by a periphery of part time workers.
7.4. Fixed Term Employment
In chapter 5 it became already evident, that in contrast to the
situation for part time employment relationships, the regulation of fixed term
contracts varies iargely between the eight countries under consideration.
Additionally, also the regulations concerning dismissals for 'typical'
empioyees, a factor related to employment on certain fixed term
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contracts, are very dissimilar in the various countries. For that reason an
analysis of variance for Europe as a whole makes little sense, and hence will
not be carried out. Thissection isorganised in a similarway to the section on
part time employment: beginning with the selection of variables and the
formulation of regression models, before executing the regression analysis
and subsequently discussing and interpreting the results.
7.4.1. Independent variables
The female employment rate in an establishment might, as in the
case of part time work, have an influence on the dependent variable -
fixed term employment. One reason to assume such an association is that
fixed term employment is relatively more frequent among women. Fixed
term contracts are regularly used to replace staff on leave, one reason for
leave being a maternity break. However, this might be compensated by
other 'male' reasons for longer absence from one's working place, like the
military/national service in some countries. Also seasonal work has a
relatively larger share amongst women. All in all it seems to be worthwhile
to investigate the relationship between the female employment rate and
the fixed term employment rate in an establishment. The variables gender
and gender_hrs are defined as in section 7.3.6.1.
The skill composition of the workforce might also have an impact on
the fixed term employment rate in an establishment. Fixed term contracts
are commoner amongst low qualified workers, establishments might be
more likely to secure access to skills in demand by offering permanent
employment. On the other hand, employees with very high skillsmight opt
for fixed term contracts to maintain flexibility and secure themselves better
deals, as appears to be the case in several published incidents In the United
Kingdom. It is not clear which type of association the qualification structure
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of the workforce might have with the fixed term employment rate, but it
remains worthwhile to investigate it. In order to do so, the variables skilland
skill_hrsare defined as in section 7.3.7.
The occurrence of seasonal fluctuations in the workload, a reason for
fixed term employment, is dependent on the sector of main activity. As
before, the variable sector will be defined as 1 if the firm operates mainly in
industry, and 0 otherwise.
Finally the size (number of employees) of an establishment might be
correlated with the fixed term employment rate. Small firms are often used
by bigger establishments to cover peaks in workloads, and hence are more
exposed to changes in labour demand. The variables containing
information on the size of an establishment are again size_sand size_m, for
their definition please refer to section 7.3.1.
Table 7.38 Variables used In the RegressionModel
Variable Name Variable denote.
ftxed_term Percentage of fixed term employees In the workforce
gender Female share of the workforce
gender_hr • Female share of the hours worked in an establishment
•klll Share of low qualified employees
.klll_hrs Share of hours worked by low qualified people
.Ize_., Ilze_m Indicates whether firm Isof a certain size or not
lector Indicates whether firm is in industry or service sector
7.4.2. The Model
The structure for the models used in the regression analysis to explain
variance in the fixed term employment rate in establishments follows the
structure of the models used for the analysis of part time employment rates.
Once more not permitting interaction between terms, keeping variables
with an hourly and employee perspective separately, and aiming to arrive
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at a single summarising measure (see section 7.3.2). The Models had the
following form:
(M.3) fixed_term = pO + Pl *gender + P2*skill + p3*size_s + p4*size_m
+p5*sector
(M.4) fixed_term = pO + Pl *gender_hrs + P2*skill_hrs+ p3*size_s + p4*size_m
+p5*sector
7.4.3. Analysis of Variance In Fixed- Term Employment
Models M.3 and MA were used in the regression analysis to explain
the variance in the Fixed Term Employment rates of establishments in the
various countries. Since the results from using Model M.3 and MA were
virtually ldentlcols. only one set of results will be presented. To simplify
notation I will only refer to gender and skill, however results will
automatically also apply to gender_hrs and skill_hrs.
7.4.4. All Establishments
First of all, the data from all establishments were analysed and the
results are summarised in Table 7.39. The Models only explain a very small
proportion of variance.
Table 7.39 Explained Variance In the Fixed- Term Employment Rate
(all establishments)
I D Dk E I IRl Nl UK
total explained variance by model 1 2 1 4 2 / 6 1
explained variance by gender (hrs) and skill (hrs) 1 1 - 2 2 / 3 1
The highest rate of explained variance, 6%, can be found in the
Netherlands, while the model is not significant in Ireland. Skill and gender,
2 A reason for this might be that firms using high shares of part time workers tend to use
lower shares of fixed term employees (see Delsen. 1995). so that he correction for part
time hours does not have a strong weight here.
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taken together while controlling for the structural variables, explain a
maximum of 3%in the Netherlands, and are of no significance in Denmark.
Those values can be further broken down in the part explained by
gender and the part explained by skill,this isdone in Table 7.40.
Table 7.40 Explained Variance by skill (hrs) and gender (hrs)
(all establishments)
8 D Dk E I IRl Nl UK
variance explained by gender (hrs) 1 - - - 1 / 3 -
variance explained by skill (hrs) - 1 - 2 2 / - 1
Only in Italy both variables possess explanatory power, in Belgium
and the Netherlands only gender has a significant association with the fixed
term employment rate, while in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom
only skill is associated. The effects of a standardised one unit change in
gender or skillon the dependent variable are summarised in the next Table.
Table 7.41 Unit Change In Fixed Term Rate caused by a one unit change In
Independent variable (all establishments)
8 D Dk E I IRl Nl UK
unit change In gender (hrs) 4 - - - 4 / 9 -
unit chang. In skill (hrs) - 2 - 8 5 / - -1
The effects of a one unit change in one of the independent variables
on the dependent variables are very limited. All values are below 1/10. In
the United Kingdom skill has a slightly negative effect (1/100) on the fixed
term employment rate, Le. for one percent more low qualified employees
the fixed term employment rate is expected to drop by 0.01%. Having
concluded the analysis of the data from all establishments, I will carry out
another analysis for a reduced data-set next.
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7.4.4.1. All Establishments Offering Fixed- Term Employment
The decision to focus only on establishments actually practising fixed
term employment was based on the following rationale. A large proportion
of firms not using any fixed term contracts state that fixed term contracts
would be unfeasible to use. Only a small part of those (less than 1%) give
legal reasons for that unfeasibility; still,a large share of those firmsevaluates
fixed term contracts as potentially advantageous for the establishment.
Furthermore, a large number of firms state that they do not know
whether fixed term contracts would convey advantages or disadvantages
for them. Thissuggest that it might be better to analyse only firms practising
fixed term contracts, to base the analysis more on experience than notional
assumptions.
Another factor which points in this direction is that one can safely
assume that many firms are not sure about the legal framework governing
fixed term contracts. For example, after the Employment Promotion
legislation in Germany (Beschaftigungsforderungsgesetz) in 1984, the
amount of fixed term contracts increased rapidly. However, most of these
contracts would have been legal already under the old legislation, and the
effect can be accounted for by the publicity for fixed term contracts
brought about by the new laws. Therefore, it would seem to be appropriate
to run the regression analysis once more exclusively for those establishments
practising fixed term employment.
The output from the regression analysis, using only data from
establishments with at least one employee on a fixed term agreement, is
summarised in Table 7.42. The explanatory power of the models has
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increased markedly, reaching a maximum of 25% in Denmark and 18%in
the United Kingdom, while staying below 10% in Belgium, Spain and Italy.
Table 7.42 Explained Variance In the Fixed- Term Employment Rate
(all establishments with fixed term contracts)
B 0 Ok E I IRL NL UK
total explained variance by model 3 10 25 8 4 11 11 18
explained variance by gender (hrs) and skill (hrs) - 1 - 3 4 - 2 12
The share of the variance explained by gender and skill taken
together, remains small, now reaching a maximum of 12% in the United
Kingdom. In Belgium, Denmark and Ireland this variables have no role in
explaining the variance in fixed term employment among firmswith at least
one fixed term employee. In the remaining countries the explanatory
power varies between 1 and 4 per cent. In comparison with the
explanatory factors for part time employment, it has to be said that when
explaining fixed term employment structural variables (size,sector) seem to
playa more relevant role.
Table 7.43 Explained Variance by skill (hrs) and gender (hrs)
(all establishments with fixed term contracts)
• 0 Ok E I IRL NL UK
variance explained by gender (hrs) - - - 1 2 - - 5
variance explained by skill (hrs) - 1 - 3 1 - 2 6
Table 7.43 shows the explanatory power of skill and gender
separately. With the exception of Italy, skill has slightly higher values than
gender, but overall neither variable is of any high relevance when
explaining the variance in fixed term employment. Thiswill be further dealt
with, when discussingthe results.
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Table 7.44 Unit Change In Fixed Term Rate caused by a one unit change In
Independent variable (all establishments with fixed term contracts)
B 0 Ok E I IRL NL UK
unit change In gender (hrs) - - -9 8 - - -11
unit change In skill (hrs) - 3 - 11 5 - 6 -11
The effects of a one unit change in gender or skill have increased,
now that the analysis is confined to establishments with fixed term
contracts. The effects remain limited regardless, reaching a maximum only
slightly higher than 1/10. In Spain and the United Kingdom the relationship
between the female employment rate and the fixed term employment
rate is negative. In Italy this association is positive. In the United Kingdom
also the rate of low qualified workers is negatively related to the share of
fixed term employees, while in the remaining countries (which have an
association between these two variables) it is positive. Implications of those
differences, and how they might be explained, will be dealt with later.
7.4.4.2.Flxed Term Employment by Reason
A split of the data according to the main purposes for using fixed
term contracts, similarly to that done when analysing part time
employment, is felt to be important. Especially given the large diversity of
reasons for using fixed term contracts: from substituting absent employees,
to an extension of the probationary period (Le. an stage preceding
permanent employment) to being unsure about the future workload. This
reasons are so obviously distinct, that different underlying aims for using
them have to be assumed.
However, due to the big number of reasons establishments were
given to choose from, a reason identified as the main reason for using fixed
term contracts, does not have to apply for more than 15%of all fixed term
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employees. Thismeans that disturbances are so extensive, that indeed no
gain from a further subdivision would be made. Accordingly no further
analysiswas carried out.
As I have already established, the reason behind the use of a fixed
term contract is regarded as important, hence some information with
particular reference to the impact of possible strategies and to differences
between the countries will be given.
Fixed term contracts for temporary tasks, to replace absent staff and
as a preliminary contract to a permanent one, to prolong the probationary
period, are still in most countries the most important reasons (Bielenski,
1994a). It can be assumed that the later might be more important for more
highly qualified staff, and the first might affect staff with relatively lower
qualifications, so effects are likely to countermand each other. These types
of fixed term contract are also not a discussion element in the flexibility
debate, and have, more often than not, a relative high degree of
acceptance.
In Spain, where dismissalprotection isstrong and fixed term contracts
are relatively easy to enter into, the flexibility argument, i.e. the adaptability
to future workload variations becomes more important, and indeed Table
7.43 shows a slight association between the amount of low skilled workers
and the fixed term employment rate. At the same time, the association
between the female employment rate and fixed term contracts is
negative. Thisphenomenon might be due to the fact that long maternity
breaks are not common in Spain.
The situation in the United Kingdom amounts in many aspects to a
special case. The dismissal protection there starts only after a long job
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tenure, so that the incentive for fixed term contracts is reduced. Fixed term
employees are on average better qualified than 'typical' employees, and
fixed term contracts are relatively often concluded due to employee
wishes, fixed term contract staff often being hired for their special skills
when, for example, new technology is introduced on some kind of
consultancy basis.Thismight explain the negative relation between skilland
fixed term rate. Again, replacing absent staff is relatively unimportant in
Britain,and the female rate isnegatively related with the fixed term rate.
Due to the lack of sufficient data, it is impossible to base firm
conclusions on the statistical evidence. However, the information gathered,
plus the limited statistical resultsshould make clear, that the national labour
markets are clearly distinct with regard to fixed term contracts. I will return
to this point when discussing policy options for policy makers in the next
chapters.
7.4.5. Interpretation and Discussionof Results
The resultsobtained from the regression analysis using Model M.3 and
M.4 are rather poor, which might be considered as a result in itself. This is
most likely influenced by the fact that there are many different reasons and
aims behind the use of fixed term employment contracts.
When comparing this section with the section on part time
employment another difference becomes apparent. Part time
employment is used to cope with workload demands existing at the time of
hiring (when Introduced for organisational reasons), but the part of fixed
term contracts used for flexibility reasons (i.e. to adapt to unpredictable
changes in the future workload) is used to cope with an event, which might
or might not occur. Being used for an eventuality makes prediction even
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more difficult. Most commonly fixed term contracts are used when a job is
known to have only a certain duration, or to replace absent staff. Thistype
of contract isnot a relevant aspect for the flexibility debate.
However, when fixed term contracts are used for other than the
above stated reasons, an effect can be appreciated. In Spain firmswith a
lessqualified workforce tend to use more fixed term contracts, while in the
United Kingdom the reverse is the case. In the first case, fixed term
contracts are more likely to be used to give the firm some degree of
adaptability for changes in the future workload and circumvent strong
dismissalprotection, Le. for numerical flexibility reasons. So that the degree
of association between skill and fixed term employment rate becomes
apparent, as in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, countries which share
a rather strong dismissalprotection with Spain. In the United Kingdom a big
proportion of fixed term work is of a different nature than in the other
member states. Fixed term employment is often used to hire specifically
needed high skills. Employees with skills in high demand prefer to work
under this type of working time arrangement (Sengenberger, 1994),which
probably explains the high number of firms claiming employee wishes as
the chief reason for using part time employment in Britain. This turns the
theory of the flexible firm upside down, with the periphery more highly
qualified than the core (see table 6.8 and 6.28 in chapter 6). Further
implications of this situation on a firms' flexibility and skill provision will be
discussed in the following chapter.
7.S. Summary
In this chapter I have endeavoured to explain the variance in firms'
use of atypical forms of work, making use of information on why
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establishments make use of new forms of work. The analysis has shown that
it is wrong to treat either part time work of fixed term employment as
homogeneous groups. Both can be used for various reasons to meet
different ends, supporting divers organisational structures.
The variance of the usage pattern of part time and fixed term
employment among firms,when used to improve numerical flexibility, can,
among other reasons, be explained by the qualification structure of the
workforce. The model has been a static one, Le. the data described the
employment structure at a certain time. However, in this study I am
interested in the dynamic side, Le. which impacts an increased use of
atypical labour might have on the training efforts, and qualification
structure of the workforce over time. The data set allows only to cast a
quick glance at this question. Firmswith high degrees of part time work
have less apprentices than their non part-time hiring counterparts. They
nevertheless also need only a smaller number of qualified staff, which
means that a prediction about future skilldevelopment, or skill shortage, is
not possible on this grounds. However, the concept of an increased
investment into their workforce by firms using the periphery to cushion their
core workforce from workload fluctuations, had to be discarded.
In terms of functional and numerical flexibility, the data set suggest
that firms opt either for one or the other, Le. firms with lower qualified
workforces are making up for the drawbacks of such a policy, by a higher
degree of numerical flexibility. The response on two evaluative questions
concerning atypical forms of work shows that firmswith a lower qualified
workforce experience the biggest advantages from atypical forms of work.
If a promotion of atypical employment relationships goes ahead, in
particular if financial incentives are used, this might mean a change of the
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competitive situation between the firms towards the ones with low skilled
workforces, using many atypical workers. To investigate the possible impact
of atypical forms of work on the overall skill level of the workforce over time,
the past developments of the skill structure in their workforces will be
analysed for three sample countries in the following chapters.
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ONE FLEXIBLE FUTURE FOR EUROPE? THE CASE OF EUROPEAN CONVERGENCE AND / OR DIVERGENCE
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FLEXIBILITY DEBATE
PART III:
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEMS
8. SPAIN
9. UNITEDKINGDOM
10. GERMANY
8. Spain
8.1. General
In Spain the debate on labour market flexibility arose relatively early
in the 1980's. Labour laws changed considerably during this period.
Although a series of important labour policy actions (Palomeque, 1985)
were implemented during the consolidation stage of political democracy in
Spain (1976-1982),and the 1982decrees can be considered as a change in
labour market politics (Sagardoy 1990, p. 270) it was the 1984 changes to
labour legislation which introduced a new era for employment- in particular
the incidence of fixed-term contracts (Casas and Valdes 1989; Kravaritou-
Manitakis 1988). The 1984 reform left regulations for eXisting contracts
untouched, but allowed the wider use of fixed term contracts, which
became the norm for new entrants into the labour market. As in many
other European countries the debate lost intensity due to the economic
upturn in the late 1980's: however, with a return to recession in 1991, new
discussions on a labour market reform began. At the end of 1993, after
negotiations on a 'pact for employment' with unions and employers failed,
the government passed a number of laws of labour market reform.
Flexibility was a central element of these reforms. More responsibility was
passed on to collective bargaining, new apprenticeship contracts were
introduced, some attempts at promoting part time employment were
made and control over some forms of fixed term contracts, mainly for new
labour market entrants, was also introduced. Furthermore, procedures for
economically related dismissals,aimed at reducing costs and severance
pay disbursements, were introduced.
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The developments and current situation in Spain have to be seen in
the light of recent Spanish history: the big changes the country was subject
to since the end of the Franco dictatorship in 1975.from which the country
inherited a very rigid employment protection law. Subsequently. many
policies were aimed at defending the young and weak democracy. During
the political transition to democracy in the late 1970s, in which labour
mobilisation was a fundamental part of the political pressure placed on the
political system for its reform, many workers' 'rights' (especially regarding the
issueof redundancy) were enhanced and or formalised, reflecting a need
to contain any potential for growing conflict and hence the political
destabilisation (through military intervention, in case they considered the
unrest excessive) of the newly emerging democratic system. Thus,what are
considered by some to be 'rigidities' now were a form of vital protection
before. Indeed they were also functional to the dictatorship, and the later
political transition, as they guaranteed an element of labour quiescence
and stability in the embryonic system of industrial relations. The outcome of
this, however, is that subsequent changes in public policy since the 1980s
have had to deal with the residue of such political rationales and pacifying
functions. Reforms via state intervention are problem-ridden because
counter references are made by social actors, when they do not take part
in the shaping of the changes. Both governments and employers in Spain
have attempted in recent years to develop a greater degree of numerical
and functional flexibility within work, but have been confronted by
previously developed forms of state intervention used by unions in their
defence of worker rights. The resulting brake on policy reform has been due
to: (i) the sensitivity of undermining such rights in a newly democratic
context; (ii) the way unions have mobilised locally and nationally against
employment restructuring since the late 1970s;and (iii) the way that these
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rights have been considered by some to be a minimum amount of
compensation in a context of increasing unemployment and uneven social
welfare provision (Martinez Lucio and Blyton, 1995).
As stressed by Saint-Paul (1993), radical changes in legal
arrangements limiting firmsfreedom of choice over employment tend to be
politically difficult to introduce, since they clash with the interest of those
with permanent contracts, who are still a majority. Nonetheless, lack of
consensus and social opposition was not an insurmountable impediment to
introducing legislation in Spain, mainly due to a long period of time when
the Government enjoyed large majorities in Congress (1982-1993). The
severe economic crisis has probably had a modifying effect on the Trade
Unions' demands so that they have agreed to policies of wage restraint
and have also, grudgingly, accepted reforms in employment law on the
basis that a precarious job, with minimum legal protection, isbetter than no
job at all (Cousins, 1994).
At the time of Franco's decease, in 1975, Spain had a scarcely
developed system of industrial relations. Wage bargaining has slowly
evolved towards European patterns, while labour regulations have
changed in what may be considered a very peculiar way (Bentolila and
Dolado, 1994). In Spain, collective bargaining agreements last for a year
and stipulate wages and hours of work, but hardly ever employment levels
(Jimeno and Toharia, 1994).
The political and historical legacy isvital to understanding Spain. The
direct yet contradictory form of state intervention, the political character of
union identity and employer discourses, and the formalistic but limited
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structure of bargaining processes need to be understood in the context of
historical legacies (Martinez Lucio and Blyton, 1995). The dominant projects
within the state, whether liberal or mildly social democratic in character,
have been obsessed with ensuring that the state would not be at the
centre of economic and welfare agendas and expectations whilst at the
same time not explicitly, until recently, confronting traditional IFordist'
regulations within the labour market. The use of industrial conflict by Trade
Unions to halt deregulation, along with the antagonistic character of
employers and their organisations to what they consider to be over-
regulated internal and external labour markets, are central to any
consideration of Spanish industrial relations (Martinez Lucio, 1995). Such
confrontational views bring about a low willingness for consensus. Lack of
social consensus has made the government turn to different policies to
achieve wage moderation such as public sector wage control,
determination of a target wage increase each year to put pressure on
collective bargaining, and a restrictive monetary policy to act as a
dissuasive influence on pay bargaining. Over recent years this policy has
faced problems of legitimisation because of its effects on income
redistribution and because of the evidence that other elements, distinct
from wages, have played an important role in causing inflationary
problems. The direct effect of wage moderation policy has been a shift in
the distribution of income towards a decrease in the wage share and an
increase in inequality (Aguilar and Roca, 1990;Albarracin and Artola, 1990).
Wage moderation and other restrictive labour policies have several effects
on labour markets: they influence income distribution, both wages and
welfare benefits, but they also influence the climate of labour relations,
causing it to turn more bitter. This latter effect is an important factor in
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understanding the relationships between unions, government and firms
(Recio, 1992).
The Spanish labour market has experienced other important changes
in recent years, notably an increasing female presence, which has been
taking place much quicker than in the other countries. Most of this
increased participation has been amongst married women (Espina, 1989).
There also appears to be a generational effect as younger cohorts of
women with children under 4 have higher rates of activity than women
working with children aged 5-9 (European Commission, 1990). This may
reflect better publicly-funded childcare provision and/or greater family
support because of the low level of integration of older women in the
workforce (Cousins, 1994). Rates of female activity are very dependent on
levels of educational qualification, for those with university or professional
qualifications, activity rates are almost equal to men, but are half that rate
for those with low levels of education (Moran, 1991). Regardless of this
growth, women's participation rate is still low in comparison with other
European countries. Thiscan be attributed to several factors. First,the fact
that industrialisation in Spain occurred at a late stage, beginning in the
1960s.Since then there has been rapid economic growth (el Idesarrollo'
1964-1974), followed by a period of economic crisis (la IcrisisI 1976-1984)
and a period of economic growth (la 'recuperoclon'. 1985-1990)at twice
the average increase for OECD total or OECD Europe (OECDSpain 1991/2).
Secondly, legal and social changes towards equality which have taken
many decades elsewhere but in Spain have occurred within a very brief
period of time from the end of the dictatorship and have been imposed on
a traditional social structure which was artificially 'frozen in time' (Cousins,
1994). The traditional concept of women's labour partiCipation has been
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radically altered; influenced, among other factors, by transformations within
the family institution. The adjournment of marriage, the decrease in the
birth-rate in conjunction with tardy maternity, have brought about changes
in the Spanish home circles. Young women tend to remain employed in
spite of the added pressure of rearing children. Today, the official level of
female participation in the labour market is understated as it is the irregular
work of women in the informal economy which is hidden from official
statistics (Cousins, 1994). Women have joined the workforce in their own
right, shedding, in a certain way, the status of 'added workers'.
8.2. Part·tlme Employment
The Spanish part time employment rate is at 6.9% (in 1994) amongst
the lowest in the European Union, which might partly be explained by the
low female participation rate of only 25,7%(in 1994,Employment in Europe).
Thisreflects the tradition of women staying at home, which was reinforced
by law during the Franco era, which can explain a relatively low demand
for this type of employment (given the gendered dimension of this form of
work as shown in other European countries, and as we will see later for the
United Kingdom and Germany). The whole situation has to be appreciated
in the light of two further factors: one is the relative novelty of part time
employment, which has formally been recognised by Spanish law only
since 1980; and secondly the incentive structure for fixed term contracts,
which could mean that full time fixed term undertakings are cheaper than
part time contracts, and hence reduce the demand for part time work on
the side of the employer (Bielenskl,1994a).
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The low-level of part time working appears thus to be partly due to
the lack of tradition for such work. Thiscan be traced back to restrictions
placed on such contracts prior to the Workers' Charter 1976 in which the
worker and employer were required to pay social security contributions as if
the job were full-time (Perez Amor6s and Rojo, 1991). The Labour laws of
1980 and 1984 asserted the principle of equality and proportionality
between full-time and part time work in rights conferred by the social
security system and the existence of a written 'contrato de trabajo a
tiempo parcial' (Kravaritou-Manitakis, 1988). However this did not have a
strong impact on the part-time employment rate. Thisis probably the result
of the negative perception Spanish managers have about part time work.
Together with their Italian colleagues the managers of Spanish firms
perceive the least advantages of part time employment, as it brings no
cost advantages and isnot demanded by the workforce. If they practise it,
they do it in a way which at least does not bring any organisational or
economic disadvantages with it, with employee wishesonly playing a minor
roletlslelenskl, 1994a). The Spanish employee representatives in turn
evaluate part time employment rather negatively, as employee wishes are
often neglected. Among the Spanish part time workforce only a very small
percentage of employees isactually working part time because they want
to do so, the incidence of involuntary part time work is highest among the
European Union countries in Spain (NFWA, 1994). In contrast to other
European countries where many employees choose to work part time, in
Spain there isa tendency for workers to accept part time work only if there
is no possibility of finding full-time employment. According to the EPA
(Encuesta de Poblaci6n Activa: Economically Active Population Research
or Labour Force Survey, 1994) employment census estimates, only 25,000
out of approximately 700,000part time workers said they chose to work part
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time in preference to full-time. That the employees anyway take this type
of employment finds its explanation, according to experience, in the
extremely high unemployment rate, which makes job seekers take about
any job they can, regardless of whether they actually wanted (or needed)
a full time position or not.
Pressed by the current and unremitting unemployment crisis, the
Spanish government introduced some measures to promote part time
employment, by excluding employees working under a certain hourly
threshold (twelve hours a week or 48 a month), for the first time in recent
Spanish practise, from the protection of the Social Security System and
contributions to it (EIRRno 242, p. 21, December 3rd Decree Law). Thus,
under the labour market reforms that came into force on 1 January 1994,
an increase in the level of part-time work isexpected, as part time workers
have been excluded from certain forms of social security protection and
will be cheaper to employ as a result (EIRR242, p.21). The past three years
(August, 1996 IDS)have seen a rapid increase in part time employment. In
1993 there was only a 5,7% increase over 1992; in 1994 and 1995 growth
was 12,2%and ca. 18%.The 1994reforms redefined part time work as partial
time contracts, with employees available for fewer than normal hours per
day, week, month or year; meaning that part-time jobs were not deemed
to be a kind of sub-employment but a normal position carried out for fewer
hours than considered normal. Thiseffectively makes part time workers a
form of temporary workers, useful for seasonally fluctuating demand,
satisfying the criteria for numerical flexibility.
Women make up the majority of part timers (69%), with 14,5% of
women employed part time compared to 2,8% of men. Part time work
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tends to be in low-skill, low-pay jobs, although there has also been some
expansion in management posts being filled on a part-time basis (IDS,Issue
416, August 1996). Part time work is difficult to introduce so that it satisfies
both employer and employee wishes, particularly in a setting where, like in
Spain, it isintroduced mainly for organisational and economic reasons.
8.3. Fixed term Employment
The most prominent feature of labour flexibility in Spain over the last
10years has been the increase in the use of fixed-term contracts. Levels of
use of such contracts are now far higher than elsewhere in Europe. By 1993
around 32% of the working population in employment were employed on
fixed-term contracts, in comparison to an EUaverage of approximately 9%.
Thisreliance on one form of employment poses two important questions:
what isthe reason that has made the use of fixed-term contracts in Spain so
important?, and what are the factors which have inhibited the growth of
other forms of flexibility? To answer these questions it seems appropriate to
locate the flexibility issue within the context of Spanish labour regulation
(EIRR,252, p.15).
As mentioned above, under the Franco dictatorship, a series of
measures were introduced which regulated and restricted employers'
scope to terminate employees' contracts of employment. These measures
represented an important aspect of the policy of the dictatorship to
appease labour and deny a focus for any growth of collective labour
representation (MartInez Lucio and Blyton, 1995). Collective redundancy
became subject to an extensive array of bureaucratic procedures
(although this was tempered by the fact that individual dismissals,
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particularly for Trade Union activities, were much easier to achieve,
(Cousins, 1994), with state authorities reserving the right to refuse
authorisation of redundancies if a range of conditions were not met. With
regards to workers on 'permanent contracts' these conditions are still in
operation. Even if a termination of contract is authorised (which it normally
is), the levels of compensation which the employer is required to pay to
redundant employees is relatively high (amounting to a minimum of 20
days' wages per year of service, up to a ceiling of 12 years, in case of
economic duress, otherwise it can go up to 45 days per year in case of
unfair dismissal)(EIRR,no 252, Jan 1995).Theseconditions have continued to
operate following the return to democracy in 1977,as changes might have
endangered the young democracy (see above). These limitations of
employers' ability to make permanent workers redundant, coupled with
very high levels of unemployment in Spain, have created pressureson the
Government to reform this aspect of labour market regulation (EIRRno. 158
p. 15). Essentially this has been achieved on the basis of the legislation
introduced in 1984which not only greatly extends the circumstances under
which employers can offer fixed-term contracts, but has also increased the
number of variants of these contracts to no fewer than 14.These contracts
are not subject to the same redundancy and compensation regulations
which apply to permanent contracts.
The high degree of insecurity the weighty rate of fixed-term
employment entails, has been criticised and a reduction of the rate seems
to be necessary (IDS,November 1994) if the constitutional requirements of
equitable income distribution and social promotion are to be met. Recio
(1991) argues that temporary work introduces a new model of the
organisation of work, it nullifies the capacity for resistance, it is cheaper,
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precarious, little protected, the workforce ismore docile and it results in the
inadequate use of workers' capacities. The restructuring of the labour
market in the late 1980shas therefore resulted in new lines of segmentation
in the Spanish economy. Temporary work is one part of the secondary
labour market; the other concerns 'la externalizaci6n', homeworking and
subcontracted work which merge into the informal economy. Employers
are very much in favour of fixed term contracts, emphasising the
employment potential of these forms of employment and making use of
them wherever they can. They prefer to lose trained workers rather than risk
having one day to pay high redundancy payments (OECD Spain 1991/1).
However, the resulting job insecurity which now affects more than a third of
the workforce, and particularly women and young people, has led to
concerns about the training and pay implications for future employment
(Cousins, 1994). Research shows that there is a possibility that this type of
atypical employment could be, within the next few years, as high as 40%
and that employers may ignore the training and skill requirements and use
the new work as a means for lowering wages (Perez Amor6s and Rojo,
1991)
Unions, though not opposing temporary contracts in general,
maintain a rather sceptical attitude towards fixed term contracts. In their
view, the basis for worthwhile employment relationships would still be a
permanent contract (Bielenski,1994a). Unionsseek to protect the interest of
their members, the vast majority of those being in permanent positions, and
at the same time try to stop the spread in temporary work. However, high
dismissalscosts might be a major contributor to the levels of temporary work
(through fixed-term and temporary contracts for a specific task or service),
which still accounts for over 30% of work contracts. According to figures
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from the National Employment Institute (INEM), some 80% of all new
contracts registered in 1995were temporary or fixed-term: almost 60%were
for periods of less than three months. Fixed term employment relationships
seems to have become the rule for new entrants into the labour market, as
well as for workers re-entering it after a period of unemployment (Bielenski,
1994a).
The Socialist Spanish government was very much in favour of fixed
term contracts (called 'job creation contracts'), due to the very high
unemployment rate, they accepted that they might partly be precarious,
however also stated that there are at least more jobs than there have
been before, and that is what in this situation really counts (El Pais,
Weekend review, 8.11.1987, p.32). The present government seems very
receptive to employers' demand of further flexibility and isconsidering the
introduction of legal changes to the effect of abolishing 'unfair dismissal'
regulations, so that no dismissal is legally unfair. Thisis an old aspiration of
the employers and would berth the trade unions at their Stygian shore: lei
despido libre': freedom to fire. However, the dismissals costs reduction
intended under the 1994reforms, which permitted dismissalsfor production
and economic reasons has not been so far reaching as it was intended.
According to employers, many such dismissalsare challenged in court and
found to be 'unfair' thereby attracting higher severance payments (45
days' pay per year of service instead of 20 days' for objective
grounds)(IDS, Issue 416, August 1996). In January of 1996 the social
interlocutors reached an agreement on a new labour reform directed
towards changing dismissalregulations and reducing the number of types
of contracts. The result was a further segmentation, there would be a new
kind of 'permcnent' contract that could be severed after two years and
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would be subject to lower dismissalcosts. The resultsof these measures are
yet to be seen.
Due to the structure of very safe permanent full time employment on
the one hand, and a big group of insecure fixed term employment on the
other, some authors have argued that this construction might make the
Spanish labour market more rigid towards change. In bargaining
agreements the members of the first do not have to compromise, since
their employment is safe. Indicative of this is the lowest rate of pay
moderation in times of high unemployment among OECD countries (OECD,
1994).Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992)show that in large manufacturing firms
labour demand became more responsive to output fluctuations during
1985-1988due to the introduction of fixed term contracts (Le. numerical
flexibility has increased). The higher labour turnover, however, may have
also had a negative impact on long-term productivity. While more
employment volatility may have reduced the cyclicality of labour
productivity (the ratio of output to employment), productivity growth has
actually fallen. With sectoral data, Jimeno and Toharia (1992) found, for
1988, that once workers' characteristics are controlled for, an increase in
the proportion of fixed term employment of one percentage point is
associated with a fall of 9/10 of one percent of the sector's productivity
growth.
8.4. Other Formsof Flexible Working
Numerical flexibility might have been advanced by the last reform in
1994,as shown by the statistics of contract modes used by the temporary
employment agencies that were as follows: (1) motives relating to
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unforeseen market circumstances, accumulation of work and excess orders
were the reason behind 53%of such contracts; (2) recruitment for specific,
limited tasks and services accounted for 37,7%; (3) the remaining 8,9%
involved filling in for absent workers with a right of return to their positions, or
temporarily filling vacancies during selection or promotion procedures
(Employment Observatory, Policies, no 51, Autumn 1995). Temporary
employment agencies, legalised in 1993, have rapidly expanded since.
They placed some 150,000 workers in 1995. Between 20% and 30% of
agency employees are offered permanent employment at the end of their
temporary stint (IDS,416, August 96). The other 80%,on the other hand have
to remain content with the relatively meagre salaries the agencies pay,
once they have subtracted their agency fees.
Some degree of flexibility can be achieved due to a large hidden
economy (Miguelez Lobo, 1988),with workers with no contract at all or with
contracts entered into to obtain a sort of 'legal' cover for thoroughly illegal
situations. Anecdotal experience shows that this kind of illegal cover can
take the form of using 12 hours a week part time contracts for a person
actually working full time; or hiring a person who has already finished the
two year period of his/her practice work contract and would therefore
have to be hired permanently, through a temporary employment agency,
using consecutive contracts. Thiskind of tailor-made flexibility allows a high
rate of numerical flexibility and labour costs savings. The practice does
however place employers in a dangerous position if employees decide to
sue, with a high likelihood of being awarded damages (back payment of
social security and tax quotes, as well as some sort of indemnity and fines),
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In Spain, potential sources of flexibility such as teamworking and
similar ideas are being increasingly discussed, not least as a result of the
emphasis on work organisation reform by certain multinationals with
operations in the country (EIRRno. 252, p. 15).Todate, however, the actual
development of these new working arrangements has been limited. The
reasons for this, again, lie mainly in the legacy of the legal framework
governing employment, together with the general political nature of
industrial relations in Spain.
8.5. Functional Flexibility
The Workers Statute (1980) sets out that the only restrictions on
changes in the job performed by a worker, at the employer's discretion, are
the academic or vocational qualification required for engaging in the
occupation and membership of an occupational group. Thisprovision is
reproduced word for word in the new bill on amendments to the Workers'
Statute (1994).However, the bill also makes the following exemptions from
these restrictions:
• in the absence of an agreement on occupational groups,
employees may be moved between "equivalent occupational
categories" .
• workers may be moved between occupational groups or
non-equivalent occupational categories if this isjustified by 'technical
and organisational reasons' and if the time spent on such moves is
limited to the minimum required to carry out the tasks concerned.
Moves of workers to a lower occupational category or group may
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only be justified by 'urgent and unforeseeable necessities of
production',
• workers must receive the corresponding payment for the job
they are moved to, unlessthe job is of a lower grade, in which case
they will continue to draw their previous earnings (EIRR,242, 1994).
In recent years the government has become increasingly interested
in relations within the workplace, and has begun to address the issueof the
Labour Ordinances and the detailed regulation of internal labour market
structures by allowing employers and unions to negotiate sectoral level
agreements that can replace these and thereby facilitate a greater
amount of functional flexibility, Some sectors, such as the chemical one,
have replaced many of the Labour Ordinances since the 1980swith less
rigid and complex job classifications. The objective isgreater task, functional
and even geographic mobility. Of particular interest here is the way the
government has in this case pushed the onus for reform and flexibility on
the shoulders of the 'social interlocutors' (albeit with a diverse set of
outcomes especially given the weak role of sectorally-based collective
bargaining in Spain) (Recio, 1992). In this case labour market reform was
proposed not just by establishing countervailing mechanisms that by-
passed established worker rights. Instead, the weak and uneven
characteristics of collective bargaining structures were articulated by the
government in this strategy (Martfnez Lucio, 1995). Plant and company
bargaining has been increasingly complemented by the growing presence
of sectoral bargaining (Ruesga Benito, 1991) - a convenient site of
negotiation for replacing and modernising the Labour Ordinances for each
individual sector along more flexible lines. Here though, a problem
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emerges. In terms of its content. thematic coverage and overall role,
sectoral bargaining, bar one or two exceptions such as the Chemicals
agreement, is undeveloped, severely limited in terms of the scope of the
issuesit deals with and rarely accounted for at lower levels of bargaining,
especially at the regional-sectoral level (Ruesga Benito, 1991). Hence, the
emerging prospect of deregulating internal labour market rights through
the strategic and implicit use by the government of what are already de-
centralised collective bargaining relations and traditions; thus allowing for a
by-passing of any effective Trade Union role. In addition, employers have
been impeding and complicating sectoral bargaining, especially with
relation to the replacing of the labour ordinances (El Pais, 13 May 1994),
with the undeclared objective of allowing themselves a greater hand in
unilaterally determining the content of internal labour market structures
(sic).
In Spain, university education has been customarily highly valued and
it is nowadays often said in the media that the present generation is the
best educated one in the History of Spain -and the one with the least
chances to get full-time well-paid employment. Vocational training has
also always been considered rather lessvaluable, and those who followed
this course were considered non gifted. However, efforts are being made to
revalidate this kind of education (since at least 20 years)(CIS, Centre for
Sociological Investigations, 1991).Traditionally, there has been a low level
of on-the-job training, with only 3%of the active workforce involved in 1992.
Thiswas addressed by new apprenticeship contracts and a three-year
training agreement signed by the social partners in 1993.Provisionhas been
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radically reshaped and in 1995 1,5 million employees received some form
of training, three times as many as in 1993(IDS,issue416, August 1996).
The 1994 Labour Market Reform aimed to facilitate entry into the
labour market of young people with a lack either of work experience or of
specific training (Decree-Law, 3rd December 1993). With this objective,
'practical work contracts and 'apprenticeship contracts' were enforced.
These types of contract soon got the name of 'contratos basura' which
means 'rubbish contracts', which clearly indicates the attitude the
employees and Trade Unionstake towards this type of employment, mainly
because of the extremely low salaries they bring in tow. Employers also
refer to them in these terms and are happy to hire people with that cover
for low skilled work. The changes to practical work contracts, that may be
concluded between an enterprise and employees in possession of
professional qualifications who wish to combine (low) paid employment
with obtaining practical on-the-spot experience, are as follows: the
maximum period is reduced from three to two years, though the minimum
remains unchanged at sixmonths; remuneration for employees on practical
work contracts may not fall below 60% or 70% of levels established by
collectively agreed rates for the first and second year of the contract
respectively. Thiscompares (rather unfavourably for employees) with the
previous situation in which pay for employees on such contracts could not
fall below the full collectively agreed rates (EIRR242,March 1994).
With regard to apprenticeship contracts the 1993, 3rd December
Decree established that they may be concluded with young workers of
between 16 and 25 years of age, who do not possessthe qualifications
needed for a practical work contract. Theirminimum duration is sixmonths
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and may not exceed three years. They must be concluded in writing and
registered with the employment services (INEM).The maximum number of
workers that may be engaged on this type of contract must be under a
certain limit according to the sizeof the workforce employed by the firm. At
least 15%of the term of the apprenticeship contract must consist of formal
instruction. Remuneration isestablished by agreement and may not be less
than 70% (1st year), 80% (2nd year) and 90% (3rd year) of the national
minimum wage. Social security costs only cover industrial accidents and
work-related illnesses, pensions and guaranteed payment of wages.
Apprentices are not eligible to draw unemployment benefit. In 1994208,975
apprentices were hired on this basis,while in 1995only 179,036entered into
such a contract. The result of more apprenticeship contracts would be
positive from the viewpoint of broadening the skillsof the active population
as most entrants had only completed primary education (Employment
Observatory, Policies, no 54).
Given the low costs for companies there has been a high number of
this type of contracts registered. The contributions to the Social Security
system paid by companies are under this contract reduced to 50% (for
under 18s)or 60% (for apprentices over 18). Every contract, however, costs
the state about 127,000 PTAs per month, including theoretical (in both
senses of the word) training expenses. As to this last, some studies have
shown that in some cases the apprentice receives no theoretical training
(Employment Observatory, Policies, no 54), which indicates that in practice
these contracts might be used to obtain very cheap labour within the
boundaries of the law. It remains to be seen whether these young people
will remain employed after their training period has ended. However, at first
sight, we cannot say that this kind of contract is likely to promote functional
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flexibility, given the low level of training given to apprentices on this kind of
contract.
It isimportant to note that within the framework of the restructuring of
the Spanish Vocational Training system the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security and the Ministry of Education and Science have, on an
interministerial basis, embarked on the establishment of a National
Qualifications System. The aim of this system is to ensure the mutual
recognition of certificates from the regular and the practical occupational
training schemes. To this end the relevant catalogues, the Catalogue of
Occupational Titles and the National Register of Professional Certificates,
are to be overhauled (Employment Observatory, Policies,no. 51, 1995).
8.6. Summary and Discussion
Since the early 1970s,Spain has had the worst unemployment record
in Europe. And in 1975 it inherited from Franco's regime a very rigid labour
market, and most important of all an extremely closed economy, in a world
context of progressive internationalisation. Besides, the Spanish labour
market is characterised by a rapid growth of the (potentially) active
population. This is partially due to the high birth rates which were, afore,
clearly above the level of the northern member states of the EC. On the
other hand migration also plays a certain role: Until 1974 some 800,000
persons left Spain in order to work abroad; approximately 250,000 of them
returned to Spain in the meantime (Chronik 31, January 1988, p. 11). From
1985 on the labour market effects of the economic growth were partially
compensated by a continuous growth of the (potentially) active
population due to demographic effects and a steady increase in female
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participation rates (Bielenski,1994a).The question of gender iscrucial for this
debate. In the increases in non-standard work, overall it isnot the registered
unemployed who have taken these new jobs, but the hidden labour supply
of married women. At an aggregate level, these new female workers do
not appear to form a 'flexible buffer' acting as a reserve army but rather
show a more continuous attachment to the labour market. In Spain,
regardless of the use of formal temporary contracts, much of women's
work is 'illegal or irregular' (in contrast to the United Kingdom, where low-
paid part time, yet legally regulated, work has predominated) (Cousins,
1994p. 62).
In Spain, the state's reinvention of its role (in trying to reduce the
expectations that workers have from it as to protection) in the labour
market has occurred at the level of both temporary work and dismissals
(Toharia, 1988). The guiding principle has been the individualising of the
dismissal/redundancy process developed initially in 1977and elaborated in
later pieces of legislation. But this has been done without explicitly
reworking the body of rights that have formally constituted the basis of
labour market behaviour (Martinez Lucio, 1995). This is pointed out as a
reason for an increasingly more segmented society and for a lack on
interest on the part of the employers to develop internal flexibility through
training (Rhodes, 1993),as they seem to considered the numerical flexibility
obtained in one segment of the market sufficient to their needs.
The conventional explanation for the high unemployment rate is the
existence of market rigidities. Thisstandard explanation has occasioned an
obsession with exit considerations (Fina, 1987;Martinez Lucio, 1991) as well
as with quantitative considerations as opposed to qualitative ones (Castillo,
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1994) in terms of involvement, working conditions and training strategies.
Fina (1987) argues that labour market rigidities and excessive wage
increases are not necessarily at the root of Spanish unemployment: the
obsession with labour market exit has been a mere rupturing factor for the
academic and political debate in Spain. Instead he points to the limits of
economic development in the 1960sand 1970s in terms of the labour-
intensive nature of industry, low technological and human resource
investment, inward-looking markets, and the strategic weakness and
fragmented character of indigenous capital. Thus,taking the exit issueout
of context denies this complexity whereby 'you cannot modify one
institution in an isolated manner without taking into account the effects that
it can have on the rest and the overall functioning of the whole' (system)
(Fina, 1991).With regard to the need for some type of new labour market
flexibility, such as cheapening dismissals,virtually all authors (Martinez Lucio,
1995)emphasise that without some kind of proactive economic policy and
firmer investments in training the outcomes of any labour market reform will
be detrimental for overall employment levels and the economy (Segura et
at, 1991 p. 117). Martinez Lucio (1995) points out the way in which the
problematic experience of training in Spain and the wage-cost obsession
are similar to those of Britain: something which would confirm Boyer's
classification of Britain and Spain in his category of 'defensive', low-
investment labour market strategies (Boyer, 1988).
The rise of the informal economy is a key characteristic of new
employment trends in Spain, having serious effects for the body of worker
rights, especially for women and younger workers (S6ez Lara, 1994). If one
adds to this labour market structure a very uneven social welfare context,
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then the social repercussions of deregulation can be seen to be
considerable (Rodriguez Cabrero, 1989).
The substitution of indefinite-duration jobs by temporary ones has only
achieved numerical flexibility at the margin, Le. flexibility that especially
affects certain groups of workers, but not the core of permanent ones. This
has occasioned a dual labour market. Changes on the margin do not
seem to increase overall flexibility and they might even have undesired
effects through larger wage growth. At the outset, the increase of
temporary employment with its associated lower wages and firing costs will
reduce average labour costs. That is why, unit labour costs tend to
decrease, helping employment creation (even if temporary workers are less
efficient). But once the proportion of temporary workers stabilises,the buffer
and bargaining effects will work at full strength on the other segment of the
market, and unit labour costs will rise (Martinez Lucio and Blyton, 1995). If
aggregate demand suffers a decrease, higher unit labour costs imply that
the tough side of the adjustment will be borne by temporary workers, so
that the composition effect of lower wages and firing costs brought about
by temporary employment will work in reverse. Bentolila and Dolado (1994)
argue that it might therefore be more advisable to reduce directly the
rigidity affecting core workers, reducing job protection. The amendments to
the labour market situation by introducing further promotion of fixed-term
employment has only increased flexibility at the margins. Thisoccasions a
reduced willingness or need by core workers to accept change.
Nonetheless, as Saint-Paul (1993) points out, the creation of a two-tier
labour market may facilitate the introduction of flexibility measures
affecting core workers, as a coalition of temporary workers and the
unemployed (=outsiders) grows in size. This kind of development is not
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unlikely in Spain where the system is not in equilibrium and is thus
malfunctioning, as regards the achievement of flexibility and
competitiveness and reducing the high levels of unemployment. Moreover,
'peripheral workers' seem to resent the 'privileged status' of core ones, thus
public workers and public companies' workers strikes do not raise much
sympathy.
The coherence and integration of management are highly relevant
for the development of industrial relations and flexibility at the workplace. In
Spain, the presence of a range of multinational companies has led to
attempts to develop human resource management techniques (informed
by the contemporary obsession with Toyotism and Japanisation) (Recio,
1991). Linked to an increasing concern within much of the labour
movement, many studies are beginning to emphasise the initial
characteristics of such changes in Spain (CC.OO., 1994; Alonso and
Blanco). The introduction of teamworking is limited and extremely
problematic given the low-trust relations within the workplace and the
traditional nature of line managers. In many respects Spanishmanagers are
apprehensive about opening up new areas of participation in what may be
highly politicised or low-trust workplace environments. Smaller workplaces
that are the basis of the subcontract economy rely on external points of
regulation in the form of provincial bargaining agreements and Labour
Laws which do not effectively influence their experience of work and
employment.
The Spanish experience of industrial relations raises some interesting
problems regarding the role of joint regulation. The internationalisation of
the economy, its fragmentation in production terms, the search for external
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models to create a more effective management-worker relationship, and
the constant reference to deregulation create a difficult context. The
political environment and the political character of the social actors in turn
frame the responses to these developments (Martinez Lucio, 1995). It has
become clear that regulations once seen as stabilising can turn into
rigidities, measures taken to enhance flexibility, can also turn against their
objective, by prohibiting other forms of flexibility, or creating a climate
which opposes change.
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9. United Kingdom
9.1. General
Asmentioned earlier, the Britishlabour market isarguably the closest
to a free market in Europe. The spirit is to have the market regulate itself by
demand and supply, so that comparatively little restrictions concerning
working time and dismissal are in place. This allows firms to adapt their
workforce relatively easily to changes in demand, i.e. the labour market is
(relatively) numerically flexible (Bielenski,1994a). The notion of competitive
advantage based on productivity and skillmay be an ideal-type model to
which no individual country conforms, let alone the EU as a whole.
Nevertheless, so Rubery (1994),most European governments at least aspire
to these goals, accepting that Europe can compete effectively in world
markets only if it refrains from the temptation of trying to undercut other
European countries by disowning this objective. The United Kingdom is
content to compete for jobs and for trade on the basisof low wage levels,
even at the expense of productivity (Rubery, 1994).Moreover in the early
1980sthe United Kingdom government even subscribed to the view that
future jobs in the United Kingdom would not even be 'low tech' but in fact
'no tech' (Lawson, 1984).
The British production system has been described as a low skill
'equilibrium'. The lack of a skilled labour force is argued not to be a
problem from the perspective of individual Britishemployers as they have in
fact adjusted their systems of work organisation and production to make
minimum demands on the workforce, other than the acceptance of low
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wages and working-time patterns determined by management (short-time
work where necessary; long and flexible working hours where necessary)
(Marsh, 1991). Firmsin Britain minimise their requirements for skilled staff by
using a detailed division of labour and by compensating for lack of skillon
the production side by the use of supervisorsand quality control inspectors.
Thisalternative may be argued to be potentially just as cost effective as a
high-skill. mass-training system, particularly given the risk of poaching.
However, studies also show that the skill deficiencies are not fully
compensated for: productivity is markedly lower per person employed,
such that differences in pay between skilled and unskilled are unlikely to
offset these productivity differences (Rubery, 1994).Analyses of this low-skill
balancing trick have held that the low-skill labour force is a consequence
of the long-term policy adopted towards training and education in the
United Kingdom, reinforced by cultural attitudes and practices. Some
researchers have also opened up the discussion to include the industrial
relations system and particularly the absence of high trust relations (Best,
1990).Other aspects of the United Kingdom production pattern identified as
contributing to relative failure as regards skill provision include a lack of
managerial expertise inhibiting moves towards a higher value added or
higher skilled and more flexible production system, the historically limited
role of the state and the influence of the finance system (Lane 1988, 1992;
Williams et ot. 1990).
Another factor that Rubery (1994) attaches relevance to, for the
societally specific Britishproduction regime, isthe idiosyncratic form of social
reproduction. First,the high levels of low-skill part-time work among women
are related to: (1) the continuing tendency for women in Britain to quit the
labour market at childbirth, which results in a large supply of female
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returnees who are often unable to re-enter at a level equivalent to their
qualifications; (2) the absence of child-care support, either from the state or
from extended family arrangements; (3) the prevalence of the social norm
that it isappropriate for women with children to work part time but not full-
time. Thissocial norm may have even greater influence than the presence
or absence of child care (Alwin et ot. 1992). The second instance is the
tendency for men to work long hours in Britain (Marsh, 1991)Thisisnot only a
consequence of employer policy in the absence of regulation. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that Britishmen are willing to work long hours and often
deliberately seek jobs with overtime opportunities. Thispreference may at
least in part be related to family organisation and family budgets (Marsh,
1991). A third layer of this societal specificity as to social reproduction might
be found in the substance of a family system geared to young people
making contributions to their upkeep at an earlier age than in many
countries. Thislack of a tradition of family-based support for education and
training places an additional obstacle in the way of policies designed to
increase the scale of further and higher education and training in Britain
(Rubery, 1994).
Once we have outlined the societal framework, the developments
towards a more 'flexible' labour market in Britain have to be seen against
the background of a number of changes in the labour market and a shift in
the prevailing political values in the United Kingdom. At the end of the 70's
and the beginning of the 80's Britain witnessed a severe recession with big
losses in employment. The tertiary sector was gaining on importance (see
also chapter 5), while industry was constantly reducinq its magnitude in
total employment. This triggered calls for more 'flexibility' in the labour
market, to cope with new demands in new growing sectors, and to
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abandon unprofitable industries.The government beliefs in the free play of
market forces to guarantee the best possible adoption of new structures,
giving at the same time, at least nominally, a wider variety of choice to
employers and employees. In order to enable the labour market to
regulate itself, deregulation and the reduction of Trade Union strength
through various measures, was carried out. The Conservative Administration
since 1979 pursued an explanation of unemployment in terms of 'labour
market rigidities' and 'barriers to growth'. These were identified as Trade
Union power, centralised forms of collective bargaining and pay
determination, high wages, generous social security benefits, employment
protection legislation, high rates of income tax and an oversized public
sector. All of these were held to produce malfunctions and distortions in the
market place (McLaughlin, 1994).
Government labour market policy since 1979 has had three main
thrusts of which changes to unemployment benefits were only one arm.
The other were promotion of low-paid work and deregulation of the
employment contract (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1992). Just to mention in
passing some of the major initiatives of deregulation, the following
examples will be ample. The FairWages Resolution,which demanded that
public contractors would fulfil the terms and conditions of collective
agreements, or the general terms and conditions of employment in the
trade, was cancelled in 1983.A similar, but more wide ranging instrument,
Section 11of the 1975Employment Protection Act, was made void in 1980.
Industrial Training Boards (except in agriculture and construction sectors)
have been abolished. The Wage Council System (except in agriculture),
responsible for setting minimum rates of pay and other terms and conditions
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of employment in vulnerable sectors of industry was radically reformed by
the 1986Wage Act, and abolished in 1993.
Promotion of low-paid work has involved reductions of national
insurance contributions for the low-paid and subsidies towards the
employment of young people, together with an extension of in-work
benefits targeted at the low-paid to counteract the 'poverty trap'.
Deregulation of the contract of employment has occurred through
withdrawal of employment protection from part-time and temporary
workers, exclusion of many young workers from unfair dismissal and
redundancy rights, abolition of fair wages legislation, curtailment of the
powers of wages councils, outlawing closed shops and reducing the legal
scope for strike action (McLaughlin, 1994)(to be reduced further by means
of making it legal to award damages to companies as a result of strikes).
The pursuit of these labour market supply side policies resulted in a
widening dispersal of pay and incomes in the 1980s.However the growth in
low pay and low incomes did not succeed in 'pricing' all the unemployed
into work. How much further low wages and low incomes would have to fall
before unemployment is 'cured' israrely speculated upon by policy-makers
(McLaughlin, 1994).
9.2. Part·Hme Employment
Some similarity can be found in the development of part time
employment in Germany and the United Kingdom. In both countries part
time work has a relatively long tradition and was first introduced for supply
side reasons, Le. to keep women in the labour market, or to attract them
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back to the labour market. Bruegel & Hegewisch (1992)start by recognising
that the nature of Part Time work and the flexibility it can advance varies
with the gender and domestic circumstances of the Part Time worker and
with the history and system of labour market regulation of different
countries. The first question to address is how Part Time work can justifiably
be described as flexible labour. It can be argued that Part Time work was
originally designed to tap a labour force constrained by domestic duties,
such that women, rather than employers, gained the flexibility needed to
fulfil their 'double burden'. Traditionally any flexibility that Part Time work
offered employers was of a very specific kind. The constraints operating on
women who seek Part Time work leave employers with no more than the
flexibility to cover regular and anticipated variations in demand through the
day or the week (Robinson and Wallace, 1984),given that the variability in
hours of most Part Time workers is restricted (Dale and Bamford 1988). Part
time work is considered to have advantages to offer for both the
employees and the employers, both employee representatives and
managers in the NWFA survey relatively often report positive experience
with part time employment (1994). Given the growing number of middle-
aged women (with grown-up children), a group which particularly favours
part time employment, there will be a high labour supply for part time jobs.
The United Kingdom already has one of the lowest incidences of
involuntary part time work in the European Union, which indicates that part
time work might, in some cases, offer advantages for both employers and
employers. Some authors (Maier, 1991a) have discussed the concept of
voluntariness, particularly in the case of women, as this perception is
influenced by a whole set of factors. The high share of women who work
part time in the United Kingdom is explained through analYSing the full set
of reinforcing factors that have led to this outcome: favourable social
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security systems, the dominance of large firms in the service sector which
have developed sophisticated working-time planning systems, the lack of
childcare facilities and the establishment of standards of living based on a
norm of a male bread-winner on long hours and a female part time worker
(Gregory, 1991;O'Reilly, 1992c; Marsh, 1991;Rubery, 1989).
In Britain part time jobs are commonly associated with low qualified
work, i.e. 75%of all part time jobs require only little skills(based on the NFWA
survey). Opportunities to change in a firms' internal labour market from part
time work to full time work or vice versa are very limited. Non-existent
legislative requirements for equal treatment between part time workers and
standard employees and non-existent collective agreements result in the
fact that part time workers are typically in a worse situation than their
homologous full time colleagues (McRae, 1995). It is not unknown for part-
timers to be paid a lower hourly rate than full-timers doing the same job in
the same workplace, but often the work done by part-timers is done only
by part-timers and isnot evaluated in comparison with work undertaken by
full time employees (Dickens, 1992). Part time work tends to be
concentrated in jobs which are low graded and thus low paid and women
in this kind of work also often lack the opportunities available to full-time
workers to supplement their basic pay. Unlike full-time workers, part timers
rarely receive premium pay for working beyond their contracted hours or
for unsocial hours working (Dickens, 1992).Part timers are also found to have
less training opportunities than full-timers. The Women and Employment
Survey in the early 80s found 54% of full-time women workers had
opportunities for training compared with 31% of those working part time
(Martin and Roberts, 1984),and Beatson (1995) confirms the lack of training
for part time women workers. Moreover, research details the downward
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occupational mobility of women who have given birth and shows how
women who find new part time work after childbirth move into secondary
sectors of the labour market and are vulnerable to downward mobility
(Brannen, 1989)
The Britishgovernment has constantly worked on reducing obstacles
to employers free choice of their labour use,which has over the years more
and more led to a use of part time work for economic reasons. The growth
of part time employment is also seen as a move towards equal
opportunities for men and women, since part time work offers work
particularly for women (though some are worried about the quality of jobs
offered, as discussed above) (Blelenskl, 19940). Part-time workers are
predominantly women. In 1994, 78%of part time jobs were held by them.
However, the corresponding percentage in 1978 was 82%, so male part
time employment has increased faster. Changes in the industrial
composition of employment account for a good deal of the growth in part
time work. Shift-share analyses using Census of Employment data showed
that less than half (44 percent) of the growth in part time employees
between 1971 and 1981 was due to changes in industrial composition.
Between 1981 and 1991, however, nearly three quarters (72%) of the
growth in part time employment could be accounted for by shifts in
industrial structure. Thus,while still significant, the extent of the shift towards
part time work within individual industries may not be as substantial as the
overall growth in the number of part time jobs suggests (Beatson, 1995).
Trade Unionshave over the years changed their attitude to part time
work completely. Firstthey generally opposed part time jobs as not being
real jobs, and only reluctantly recruited part time workers into the unions:
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accepting unequal treatment for part time workers, using them as a buffer
in case of redundancies - part timers first (NFWA, 1994). However this has
changed and Unions are now allowing membership of Part time
employees, working for equal opportunities and trying to win back power in
the workplace.
There is no agreed number of hours constituting full-time work
(though that can sometimes be determined in collective agreements) in
Britain and the number of hours worked by part-timers varies widely. For
statistical purposes, a part time job is defined as one involving 30 hours or
lesswork each week (Beatson, 1995).There is also great variety in the time
distribution of part time work. There may also be unpredictability in hours
worked with part time staff being asked, often at short notice, to provide
extra hours above those contracted for. Thisflexibility is taken to extremes
where 'on call' or 'zero hours' contracts are used requiring employees to
provide, often at very short notice, whatever hours are required when
required (EDC, 1988).Such workers may have no fixed contractual hours, no
guarantee of a specific number of hours per week or hours (and
consequently earnings) in any year.
A study by NEDO (EDC, 1988)in distributive trades found a substantial
proportion of part time workers were interested in promotion but between
78%and 95%said it was not available to them. The lack of opportunities to
work fewer than full-time hours at higher levels within organisations results in
part time workers often being over-skilled for the work they do. In a
research comparing the qualifications held by individuals compared to the
qualifications required for entry into their current jobs, Horrel et 01. (1989)
found that women in part time jobs are much more likely to be
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overqualified for their current job than are full-timers (40% of part timers
were over qualified compared to 28%of female full-timers and 27%of male
full-timers) with the subsequent lossof human capital.
The deregulation strategies pursued in the United Kingdom have not
created jobs for the unemployed: rather, the vast majority of part time jobs
are taken up by women married to men who are employed: dependants
of the unemployed, or the unemployed themselves, are effectively
prevented from doing this kind of work by loss of benefit or the 'poverty
trap' (Deakin and Wilkinson 1991).
The fact that ageing part time workers allow more flexible time use
(since other responsibilities, such as family ones are for them quite reduced),
makes it possible to think that they will allow part time work to become a
form of real flexibility as the working times' realisable range will not be
curtailed by, for example family responsibilities. Thus,I think it possible that in
future part time work will move for the overriding form of some hours work in
the mornings to a wider range of timings.
I have found that in the United Kingdom skill isan important factor in
explaining variances in the use of part time work. Employee wishes and
economic reasons enjoy also a similar relevance when hiring part-timers.
(See Chapter 7). In sum, I can conclude that part time work isoften offered
if it fits into the pattern employers have developed for it: women with family
responsibilities in the low skillrange, so that part time remains to be thought
of as low quality work. The fact that the women have family responsibilities
accounts for 'employees wishes' appearing as an important reason for
hiring these workers. As a consequence of the tailoring of part time jobs for
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women with family responsibilities, there is a strong segmentation of the
labour market as regards part time and full time jobs. Thissegmentation is
normally gender based, due to societal conceptions of women's work
(Rubery, 1994)asI have already explained above.
The Britishapproach to human resource management seems to point
to improving cost structures rather than productivity (Steedman and
Wagner, 1987).I have found that in the United Kingdom the core, periphery
model fits rather well to describe the situation as to part time employment.
However as we have already had occasion to appreciate, the so-called
periphery, even within the part time segment of the market is quite
differentiated, serving different needs and providing within its segments a
continuum which offers a range of choice to the employer - and in some
cases to the employee, whose preferences could be important (Hunter et
al. 1993),but not necessarily coincidental.
9.3. Fixed Term Employment
In the United Kingdom temporary work, defined as seasonal, casual,
fixed-term or interim work, has remained a small proportion of all
employment. Thisis probably due to the circumstance that In a markedly
different way from many other countries, where dismissalprotection was left
in large extents untouched when fixed term contracts were introduced, the
United Kingdom went another way, by generally lifting the necessary
qualification period to be covered by the dismissal protection to at least
two years of full time service (5 years for part time employees that work
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under 16 hours per week) (Kravaritou-Manitakis, 1988), so that this atypical
form of work isnot necessary to achieve numerical flexibility.
Temporary employment constitutes around 6%of total employment.
Much of the apparent growth in the 1980s occurred through special
government employment and training schemes. There is no legal definition
of a temporary worker and the term is used loosely. It generally covers
casual work, undertaken on an hourly, daily, weekly, monthly or seasonal
basis; fixed-term contract work, and agency work, where workers are
supplied by an employment agency to a user firm on a temporary basis.
Such forms of work are atypical because of their declared or
acknowledged impermanence. Temporary work may be done on a self-
employed or dependent employee basis. Among women working on a
temporary basis, two thirds also work part time, an example of overlapping
atypical characteristics (Dickens, 1992).
A fixed-term contract may be terminated by the completion of a
particular piece of work or, more usually, by the expiry of a specified period.
A new temporary contract may be issued at the expiry of the first, and a
third after the second and so on. There are no statutory restrictions in Britain
on an employer's ability to offer employment in this form rather than on a
'permanent' basis, nor any requirement that the decision be justified. There
is no restriction on the length of contract, and such a contract may be
extended. Thisgives rise to the possibility of 'disguised permanence', that is,
the repeated renewal of fixed-term contracts.
Aswith part time working, the service sector has a higher proportion
of temporary working than does manufacturing. Temporary working is used
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particularly in distribution, hotels and catering and other services. The
majority of temporary workers (58%) are female and the proportion of
married women in temporary jobs is higher than the proportion in the
permanent workforce (Casey, 1988;King, 1988).
Studies of temporary working (Casey, 1988;King 1988) find that most
temporary workers are in lower level and less skilled occupations, often
doing seasonal work. However, there isalso a higher than average level of
temporary working (usually on fixed-term contracts) among teachers and
nurses and those with other skills (such as computing) which tend to be
occupational skillsrather than company based. As I have concluded in
Chapter 7 fixed-term is often used to hire in skills.Thisuse has not been
detected in other countries and might cause rigidity since firms are in this
way dependent on outside skills.Thisdevelopment does not fit with the
core periphery model characteristics, as in this case fixed-term is important
for skill, but it constitutes a form of external flexibility. Formal fixed-term
contracts in the United Kingdom are more likely to be found in professional
jobs, more likely to be in the public sector, more likely to be held by males in
somewhat older groups, and more likely to be found in larger employer
organisations (Bielenski,1994a).They thus amount to hiring in of knowledge,
rather than seeking cost advantages related to severance payments, as in
Spain. In this point, the characteristics of temporary employment in Britain
do not match the flexible firm model.
'Traditional' rationales for using temporary workers (providing short
term cover, labour or particular skills for one-off projects etc.) still
predominate, and new flexibility rationales (whereby uncertainty and
volatility in markets leads employers to avoid commitment to permanent
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staff), need to be viewed in this light (Meager, 1986). They do however,
seem to operate in some sectors, such as engineering, and it is feared by
Trade Unions that typical jobs lost during recession have been replaced, if
at all, by far more casualised employment in such areas, including greater
use of sub-contracting and outworking.
9.4. Other Formsof Flexible Working
Other forms of flexible working are attained through flexibility in
working time, so that firms change their effective use of labour on the
intensive margin, without recourse to the external labour market. There are
also supply-side considerations. Employees may value a degree of choice
over their working arrangements. There is evidence that employees value
diversity in working time arrangements. The range of alternative working
patterns available may therefore enhance the flexibility of labour supply
(Beatson, 1995).Nearly two thirds of employees said they were happy with
the hours they worked, and did not wish to change them.
The United Kingdom is the only Member State where there are no
mandatory limits on the length of the working day or week. However, this is
about to change following a ruling of the European Court of Justice that
make it compulsory for Britain to introduce a mandated limit as well as rest
periods, implementing thus the European Working TImeDirective. Given that
the United Kingdom has relatively high proportions (Beatson, 1995) of
people working both long (over 48 hours per week) and short hours (under
16 hours per week) this might affect profoundly the flexibility achieved in
the United Kingdom through working time arrangements. The November
decision by the European Court might put an end to the situation wherein
the Britishhave become •the hardest working people in Europe averaging
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43,8 hours per week'. Thisphenomenon 'which has boosted productivity,
exports and overall economic growth, has been accompanied by reports
of heavy personal cost.' 'In all, 4,5 m people in Britain work more than 48
hours a week, a rise of nearly 600,000 since 1992. Thishas resulted partly
from a decline of union power and partly from the downsizing undertaken
during the last recession, when thousands of redundancies left fewer
people sharing the work' (The Sunday Times, Focus p 15, 10 November
1996). However, given the fact that the rules can be overridden if there is
specific agreement between workers and their bosses to do so, it is highly
likely that it will not have such a momentous effect.
9.5. Functional Flexibility
Unlike some of its European counterparts, the Britishgovernment has
not actively pursued a policy of encouraging employers to invest in the skills
of their work forces (Trends,no. 22, 1995).Besides,the structure of incentives
and controls which existed under the system of the Industrial Training Boards
has been dismantled since 1981.At the same time, state intervention in the
training decisions of firms has been removed. The lack of structure makes it
probably wise not to attempt to train staff in the absence of an effective
industrial strategy. That is likely to lead to a waste of resources and to
frustration on all involved at the under-utilisation of skills (Steedman and
Wagner, 1989).Thisapproach is consistent with the historical development
of the system of industrial relations as well as of that of training. The
regulation of employment by craft unions has contributed both to the
informality of collective bargaining and the existence of highly segmented
internal labour markets. The failure of British employers to train their
work forces is a long-standing problem. Given the relative failure of the
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market model to improve the supply of skills in the economy, education
and training policy has become a major electoral issue. As was to be
expected, there is as yet little evidence in Britain of the superseding of
Taylorist production methods by more skill-intensive and flexible forms of
work organisation (Ramsay, Pollert and Rainbird, 1990). Claims that
functional flexibility has increased are substantiated by changes in working
practices, though many of these concern peripheral areas of craft skillsand
rarely cross the divide between maintenance and production jobs
(Rainbird, 1990). In sum, training for most workers is conspicuous by its
absence and tends to be concentrated in the first few years of
employment (Rainbird, 1991). There has been no noticeable process of
upskilling in recent years and very little evidence has emerged to date to
indicate that Taylorist forms of work organisation have been superseded by
patterns requiring a greater reliance on workers' skillsand their ability to act
autonomously. In the same way, although some attempts have been
made to introduce mechanisms for consultation and incorporation at plant
level. these coexist alongside practices and attitudes characterised by the
traditional antagonistic relationships between unions and management.
Therefore Britainremains to have a low trust relationship at company level.
Explanations of the lack of emphasis on skilland training in the British
labour market have stressed the nature of the education and training
system. One of the reasons for the low skillequilibrium has been said to be
the voluntarist approach to training in the United Kingdom which, apart
from a brief interlude from 1964 to 1981, has historically been left to the
market and to training within firms independently of the education system
(Streeck, 1989).An other relevant factor has been said to be the negative
attitude towards vocational education within the United Kingdom cultural
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system (Rubery, 1994). The new vocational Qualifications NVQs place
emphasis on competences alone and there is no attempt to combine
basic education in core subjects with vocational training, but instead an
emphasis on narrow job-related competence testing unconnected to
abstract knowledge and understanding (Streeck, 1989). In Britain,
moreover, the relationship between training and career opportunities has
been at best indeterminate and at worst negative (Rubery, 1994). As an
example, we can say that evidence suggests that members of the same
cohort who succeed in obtaining a job at 16 fare better than those who
seek to advance their education or training past the age of 18 (except for
higher education) (Clarke, 1991).
In Britain Trade Union organisation is based on occupational
categories and multi-unionism is the norm in most manufacturing
establishments. It is thus clear that developments which increase flexibility
between occupations will raise issuesof spheres of union influence and can
place a strain on inter-union relations. Some of the developments under the
general rubric of flexibility largely involve changes in the peripheral areas of
craft skillsand are already widespread. As such, they do not pose any
major problems for union organisation. In contrast, the changes involved in
the concept of multi-skilling are more far-reaching and have greater
consequences for Trade Union organisation. At surface level, multi-skilling
appears to be about training and acquiring new skills,but at a practical
level it isabout the changing organisation of work and shiftsin the balance
of power between unions and employers, on the one hand, and between
unions, on the other. The exclusion of unions from decision-making in
training policy has emphasised the conflictual rather than the consensual
aspects of training. Besides, occupational unionism creates a built-in
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conservatism to change in occupational boundaries, which is particularly
noticeable when attempts are made to increase flexibility between trades.
Rainbird suggests (1991) that the education of Unions in the benefits of
training, alongside the acquisition of the skillsrequired to make an effective
input into decision-making processes in the workplace, will be a prerequisite
for the active pursuit of a skill-oriented modernisation policy.
Daniel (1987) found that 43 per cent of the establishments
interviewed had taken specific steps to increase the flexibility of their
workforce, such as the relaxation of job demarcations, or the creation of
new multi-skilled grades. Changes of this kind were most often associated
with the introduction of organisational change and advance technical
change. Marsden and Thompson (1990) studying the contents of industrial
agreements found that the most common changes introduced were more
flexible deployment rules, relaxation of job demarcation rules and changes
to grading structures. Dunn and Wright (1994) found that by 1990,a third of
the sample had flexibility agreements, and a number of others had
adopted specific measures consistent with greater functional flexibility, such
as simplifying grade structures and removing job demarcations, reducing, it
would appear, the excessive job demarcation that has always been seen
as a problem in Britain.
A notice in Employment Observatory, policies (no. 50, Summer 1995),
says that the Government believes that small companies are central to the
economic competitiveness of the country, but their survival cannot be
assured by attempting to compete on labour costs alone. Deviating from
the tendency to compete on labour costs would be the right way to move
away from the low skill low cost economy, but whether further steps will be
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taken remains to be seen. The government has estimated that whilst many
large organisations can deal with upgrading their workforce skillsthrough in-
house programmes. smaller organisations are vulnerable as they tend not
to have the facilities. expertise or funds to meet changing skill needs. The
Employment Department has identified that while many small firms
appreciate the need for improved skills.only 23%said they had undertaken
any training during the first three years of business. It is for this reason that
the Skillsfor Small Businessesprogramme was launched in April 1995.Now of
course is too soon to make any estimation of its success but it might be a
beginning for a new approach to employment policy.
Full-blown functional flexibility including high skill and high trust.
appears to be something of a rarity in Britain. perhaps because it involves
costs as well as benefits for the employer. In part this may be due to the
scope for flexibility on the extensive margin (Beatson. 1995).
The traditional way in which skill acquisition has been left to its own
devices in the United Kingdom. and the acknowledged low-skill structure of
its workforce pose a dilemma which is very difficult to solve. as has been
pointed out by Streeck (1989): "While the individual employer may well
recognise the importance of skilled workers for hisenterprise. he also knows
that if he incurs the expenses for their training. his competitors can easily
'poach' his trained workers by offering them a higher wage. with their
overall labour cost still remaining below his. Since the rewards of his
investment can so easily be 'socialised' whereas the costs remain his own.
Thus.an employer in a competitive labour market will therefore be tempted
not to train. or to train as little as possible. and 'buy in' needed skillsfrom his
competition. As these are likely to perceive their pay-off matrix in much the
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same way as he, they will probably prefer no to train either. As a result,
there will be a chronic undersupply of skilled labour". I think this scenario fits
perfectly with the situation in Britain.
9.6. Summary and Discussion
Workers in Britain have suffered under the deregulationary thrust of
government policy in the 1980s,when workers' protection was viewed as
labour market rigidity, distorting voluntary exchange between individuals,
thus preventing free contracting. In a period when the European
Commission has been attempting to provide a basic floor of rights for all
workers in the Community and to improve specifically the position of
atypical workers through a series of draft directives, the United Kingdom
government has been reducing or removing existing protections: increasing
the qualifying thresholds for employment protection rights, reducing the
scope of the minimum wage setting machinery, removing restrictions on
hours of work and protection for women and young people, and also
reducing the social protection available through collective bargaining by
weakening the Trade Unions (Dickens, 1992).
Treating atypical workers inequitably and offering only poorly paid,
low level jobs on a part time basis also incurs costs for society in terms of
wasted skillsand talents and untapped human resources in the form of
women out of the labour market (Metcalf and Leighton 1989).The current
situation also allows employers to attempt to compete on labour cost
cutting through casualisation and exploitation rather than through product
improvement and quality service provision. Proper protections for atypical
workers would help encourage Britishfirms to compete with countries in the
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European Community and outside on dimensions such as quality rather
than attempt to compete on low labour costs with the developing world
who will always win in that particular race. The ability to rely on cheap
unprotected labour, as with home workers in the clothing industry, isa drag
on investment in new machinery and the development of better
production methods. The lack of training for atypical workers helps
perpetuate a low productivity, low skilleconomy (Dickens, 1992).
As a number of large employers have discovered, improving the
position of atypical workers (particularly part time workers) serves the
employers' interests in terms of recruitment and retention of workers, in
meeting labour and skill shortages and in securing commitment from
workers. Treating atypical workers as second class citizens is not conductive
to creating the high trust work environment and committed workforce that
many employers now seek and which is often seem as key to competitive
success. Employers can also gain through having a better trained, better
motivated atypical workforce with lessturnover. There isa tendency to view
atypical workers as marginal or 'peripheral' to an organisation yet atypical
workers may in fact be core to the success of the enterprise (Dickens, 1992;
see also Chapter 7). At the moment the cost savings achieved through
inferior treatment of atypical workers comes as a windfall on top of the
considerable savings via efficient labour utilisation. Indeed, removing the
'windfall' might encourage more strategic thinking about labour utilisation.
At present, much use of atypicals is far from strategic and often represents
little more than short-term cost cutting (Hakim, 1990; Deakin and Wilkinson
1991). The empirical evidence strongly suggests than an extension of legal
protection and occupational benefits to part time and temporary workers
would not have an adverse effect on the level of part time jobs and
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recruitment of these atypical workers (NFWA, 1994). This conclusion is
supported both by econometric analysis of the impact of employment
protection legislation (e.g. Disney and Szyszczak,1984) and by the views
expressed by major employers of atypical workers like Sainsburys,and B&Q.
(Houseof Commons, 1990).
In moving from 'jobs at any price' to 'jobs at a fair price' through
setting minimum acceptable employment conditions for all workers there
may be a reduction of 'opportunities' in some areas. But even then such
consequences are not inevitable, in part they depend on how any change
isactually managed and longer term gains in terms of employment levels
and standards may outweigh the short-term employment costs of the least
efficient, lowest paying firms going out of business (Dickens, 1992). Thiswill
be further discussedwhen looking into policy options in the last chapter.
The advantages of the Britishsystem are identified in its supposed
flexibility and in its ability to compete on the basis of labour costs (Rubery,
1994). However, this different mode of competition does not procure
competitive success when measured in terms, for example, of the balance
of trade. It is in this relative failure that the tensions and conflicts arise. The
imbalance of trade arises from consumption and production patterns, that
often do not match. The imbalances on the foreign exchange markets are
kept in check by monetary and fiscal policy which restricts the level of
employment, thereby causing tensions between the employed and the
unemployed. Nonetheless, unlike competition between firms, competition
between Nations States will not lead to the disappearance of those under
competitive pressures, they will survive even under conditions of great
indebtedness, given the intertwining of international finance and foreign
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debt. Long-term relative failure is a possible outcome of the production
regime in Britain, even if it provokes internal tensions and conflict (Rubery,
1994). At the micro-level, deregulation and individualisation of pay has
provided the opportunity for some cutbacks in wages for the low paid but
the rapid risesin managerial salariesand performance-related pay may be
a long term problem for public sector expenditure, and for the wage bill of
private sector organisations. The combination of unemployment, industrial
relations legislation and a weakened Trade Union movement may have
acted to reduce the level of overt conflict over salaries. However, this does
not mean that there is no underlying tension and conflict over the
distribution of both income and employment and that the BritishLabour
Force has finally and forever accepted its role as the low-wage ground of
Europe. Asproof of the inherent disagreement of Britishworkers towards the
low-skill equilibrium, lately we have seen that there are more and more
strikes to achieve better working conditions, [BBC1 l o'clock news
22.08.1996)and that many employees seek other employment to improve
conditions at work (LFS).The model of the male bread-winner might also be
changing and more women might return to full-time work, changing the
assumption that they take low-paid part time jobs, and leaving those to
students (now on loans), changing thus the possibility of undertaking higher
education. Thus,adjustment can take place in the sources of labour supply
for particular types of jobs. The Britishproductive system has not evolved in
isolation from the international community. The need to trade and
compete within the international community helps to expose the
deficiencies of the system, but the adaptations that are in demand to
overcome these failures, including increased flexibility of the labour market
as well as lessgovernment expenditure and intervention, are often justified
in the name of practices and policies found in other States. These
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adaptations may postpone the fundamental attunement required by the
system to move onto a virtuous path of upskilling and growth. Thisissuewill
be further dealt with when discussing policy options to create a European
Systemof work organisation.
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10. Germany
10.1. General
Germany has been reminded by the World Bank in its economic
outlook (1995)that it should take further measures to achieve labour market
flexibility. Non neo-liberal economists can certainly argue, that this warning
undervalues the value of adaptability created by the functional flexibility
the German labour market possesses, and that this existinq functional
flexibility reduces the need for more numerical flexibility (as indicated by the
regression models on chapter 7). However if we refer to the distinction
between the types of flexibility, it is most likely that the World Bank
statement refers to the labour market regulations in place in Germany,
which reduce the degree of numerical flexibility. Far-reaching deregulation
and decentralisation may not be a desirable option in the context of an
industrial relation systems characterised by co-operative and consensual
high trust / low conflict labour relations, such as that in place in Germany
(Sesselmeier,1994)
The increased international competition and the possibility to
manufacture products in various locations, with Germany's outward
investment bigger than the inflow of investment into Germany, and the
announcement, or actual relocation, of production sites from Germany
abroad, often in the European Union, have led, amongst other factors, to
the so called Standortdebatte (the debate on whether Germany isa good
location for production, service provision, investment and research). One
issueof this debate isthe question of flexibility, or better the assumed rigidity
of the German labour market compared with its foreign counterparts. The
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Government and Employers are often stressing the limited scope for
flexibility in staffing and working time arrangements, due to the distinctive
industrial relations system, legislation and labour market regulations agreed
upon in collective bargaining agreements (Bundesministerium fUrWirtschaft,
1993; Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, 1992). The system is based on free
collective bargaining, (Statutory) participation rights of Work Councils and
detailed legislation on industrial conflict. Bargaining is performed on a
regional basis for various sectors. Collective Labour Legislation has led to an
extensive formalisation of the system (Jakobi et of, 1992; Lane, 1994).
Recently, some decentralisation of this process has taken place, in
particular in the area of working time arrangements, and a shift towards
decision making on the company level has supervened. (MOiler and
Purcell, 1992; Rosner, 1994). Thishas been accompanied by a shift away
from classical topics such as wage settings (which remains centralised) and
reductions of working time, towards employment security, working time
flexibility and technological change.
The Government has tried to react to employers demands for more
'flexibility' through a number of recent reforms, like the
Beschaftigungsf6rderungsgesetz (Employment Promotion Act) of 1985 and
1994,the KOndigungsschufzgesefz (DismissalProtection Act: that introduced
changes to the notice period) of 1993 or the Arbeifszeifgesefz (Working
Time Law) of 1994, which will be dealt with in the appropriate sections.
However, it is also agreed upon, that in systems characterised by high
degrees of labour market regulations, an extensive vocational education
and training provision and a relatively co-operative culture (Germany is
proud of its social peace (Sozialfrieden)) firms can reach a high degree of
functional flexibility, while other forms of flexibility are limited (Lane, 1990:
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Soskice. 1994;Steedman et cl. 1991).Mosley and Kruppe (1993) refer to co-
operative industrial relations and the willingness to accept change as
'social efficiency', which in their opinion isan often neglected dimension in
mainstream economic analysis. That West German companies can achieve
relatively high degrees of functional flexibility is also commonly agreed
(TOsselmann,1996a). Since a high degree of functional flexibility allows firms
to develop an internally flexible labour market, the need for high degrees
of numerical flexibility is reduced; however some companies are trying to
increase numerical flexibility on the margins, by using an increased number
of atypical employees (Trinczek,1995).
The aim of the following sections is to describe the progress towards
more flexibility in the German labour market, in connection with the higher
use of atypical forms of labour, and its effects on the traditional production
system, especially on the system of skillreproduction.
10.2. Part-time Employment
The growth in part time employment in Western Germany has partly
been influenced by sectoral shifts and the increasing participation of
women in the labour force. Employment in manufacturing has decreased
from 35 % in 1988 to 31 % in 1994,while employment in the service sector
rose from 55% to 59% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1988 to 1994). Female
participation in the workforce increased from 56% in 1988 to 60% in 1994,
raising the social demand for part time employment. Females increased
their share of all employees from 39%to 42%and accounted for 86%of the
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overall growth in part time employment during the 1988/1994 period
(Iuselrnonn. 1996a).
The aims pursued with the introduction/promotion/extension of part
time employment in the Federal Republic of Germany have changed
substantially during the last decades, as a result of the changing economic
conditions in the labour market, with a shortage in labour supply in the
1960s to a situation of a labour surplus starting roughly with the oil-crisis and
the recession in 1974 (with a sudden rise in unemployment numbers to
1.000.000 in 1974, reaching levels of around 2.000.000 unemployed in the
middle of the 1980's; in 1994 nearly 3.500.000 people were unemployed in
the unified Germany) (Employment in Europe, 1994).
In the 1960s part time employment was mainly seen as a means to
increase the labour supply and reduce the shortage of manpower, by
attracting currently (economically) non-active parts of the population into
the labour market (Blelenskl, 1994a). The main target group was women, to
whom part time work offered the opportunity to combine the traditional
motherly role with paid employment. The schooling system in Germany was
and is based on tutoring in the mornings only, this is reflected by the
overwhelming majority of part time jobs being tailored to this structure, Le.
being half time jobs, with the working time in the morning. The aim of
increasing employment by the use of part time work was the prevailing one
till the recession in 1974.
With the economic decline and rising unemployment levels, another
aspect of part time work moved into focus in the interest of policy makers.
By redistributing the available amount of work, part time work was seen as a
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way to reduce the unemployment problem. That means, that no longer the
(economically) non-active population was the target group for part time
employment, but full time employees (employed or unemployed). From the
beginning of the 1980's the flexibility argument started also to win
momentum. With the use of part time work it was hoped to allow better
service provisions, and a better match of labour supply to the labour
demand over the day, and hence to sharpen Germany's competitive
edge and to create employment. However, the biggest growth rates for
part time employment have been during the 1960's with a total growth
rate of more than 150%,while the growth rates in years associated with
demand side orientation have been considerably lesswith growth rates of
around 30%in the 70's and 80's (Bielenski,1994a).
Part-time work was promoted as a means to reduce the
unemployment problem from the mid 1970's onwards by the German
Government mainly by information campaigns. In some cases legislative
changes have been used to grant, for example, civil servants the right to
go part time for other reasons than family responsibilities in 1980 (Dittrich et
ot., 1989, p. 283). In the Employment Promotion Act (1985:
Beschaftigungsforderungsgesetz) an attempt was made to make part time
work more attractive by setting certain minimum standards, entitling part
timers to the same company benefits as full timers. As a reaction nearly all
parts of collective agreements which discriminated against part timers have
been removed since then. In the Employment Promotion Act 1994 the
calculation of unemployment benefits were altered, so that in the event of
unemployment former full time employment wages would be taken as a
base for the calculation. The former situation had been seen as a main
barrier for people to take up part time employment. However the law
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makes exception for certain types of part time employees
(Geringfugigbesch6ftigtej, excluding those employees and their employers
from social security payments, the employees being consequently not
covered by those benefits. Part timers working lessthan 18 hours per week
are excluded from the unemployment insurance, and part timers earning
below a certain monthly threshold (610 OM in 1996)are excluded from the
health insurance and compulsory pension system. The Ministry for
employment estimates for 1995 that about 20%of all part time employees
fall under this regulations. In 1989 the Act on Part Time on Grounds of Age
came into force, but seems to have had only little practical importance
(Bielenski,19940).
Employers favoured the use of "flexible" working time arrangements,
i.e. the use of individually reduced working times, to a general collective
reduction of working times as favoured and demanded by the Trade Unions
(BOA, 1983, pp 12-14). The employers' association offered help to solve
organisational problems in member businessesto adapt the organisation to
an increased use of part time employment (Bittelmeyer, Hegner, Kramer
1987).
The Trade Unions have considerably changed their attitude towards
part time employment in the last few years (Bielenski,19940).The position of
ignoring or being generally opposed to part time work has been given up,
realising the possible advantages part time work might offer some groups of
employees, stressingnonetheless the need for regulation of part time work
in collective agreements.
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The origins of part time work in Germany, and its relatively long
tradition, with the biggest rise due to supply side reasons might explain the
positive picture of part time employment arising from the assessments of
managers and employee representatives (Bielenski, 19940). This is also
reflected by the small number of part time workers who are working part
time because they could not find another job.(LFS6.8%in 1993,9% in 1994),
and only a below average number of employee representatives in the
NFWA survey stating as one reason for part time work the inability of
employees to find a full time job. Thispicture issupported by another survey
from 1989 (GroB, Thoben and Bauer), which shows that only 11% of part
timers would prefer to work full-time, however there are variations in the
group of part timers. Employees who work less than 15 hours wish to work
more hours, even though still in the part time range, while employees who
work more than 18 hours are rather content with their working time. A study
from the European Commission from around the same time, comes to a
similar conclusion, only 8% of part timers would prefer full time work, only in
Denmark was this value lower than in Germany (European Economy,
Supplement B, 1989;European Economy 1991).
Given the high number of part time contracts with working times
limited to the morning (71% in the NFWA survey), the question of whether
part time work in Germany can justifiably be called a flexible form of work
arises. Many part time workers have, due to their other responsibilities, a
restricted amount of time when they can work overtime, so that some
writers even see part time work as a more rigid form of work than full time
work (BOchtemann, 1989). Both the NWFA survey and the survey by GroB,
Thoben and Bauer give care responsibilities as the main reasons for
employees to choose part time work. Work also has to be arranged so that
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it can be carried out during those specific and reduced hours of the day.
So the same family reasons also cause a partly bigger amount of work to
be carried out at this time of the day, for example in shops, given that
people have then time to do their shopping or carry out banking
operations while their children are at school.
From chapter 7 it is known that the relationship between the skill
structure and the part time rate of firms is negative (NFWA,1994).However,
firms using part time work for organisational reasons possess different
characteristics from those using part time work mainly to satisfy employee
demands. For the first the skill structure of the workforce is negatively
related to the part time rate, Le. the lower the skill level of the workforce
the higher the part time rate, for the latter these two variables are not
associated with each other (Bielenski,1994a).Thus,there would seem to be
a contradiction between numerical and functional flexibility for firms
introducing part time work for organisational reasons, but not for those
where the main factor was employee wishes.
From this it can be seen that firmsrelying on a low qualified workforce
seem to have a bigger need for part time employment, and seem to
experience bigger advantages from part time employment than the other
firms. Firmswith highly qualified employees have lessdemand for part time
employees, at least for part time employees used for organisational
reasons. By promoting part time work, with firms' competitive advantage in
mind, it seems to be reasonable to assume that the first type of firm will be
able to utilise the bigger advantages and can gain more from changes
towards this end.
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From the differences in firms using part time work for economic or
organisational reasons and those using it due to employee wishes, it can
also be concluded that the idea of part time work as a panacea to serve
establishment needs as well as employee needs has to be dropped. In
some cases the fulfilment of both needs might be possible at the same
time, and indeed the situation in Germany, with the relatively high number
of employee representatives and managers stating that both reasons are
equally important (BielenskL19940), looks comparatively rather favourable,
but the general equation of part time work serving both ends is also here
wrong. The various forms of part time work needed to fulfil establishment
needs and employee needs, or either, can explain why Trade Unions as
well as Employer Organisations generally stress the social as well as the
economical importance of part time work. However they have rather
conflicting attitudes when details of regulations have to be agreed upon. A
study conducted by McKinsey (1994) claims that it is possible to convert up
to 60%of all full time jobs in Western Germany into part time jobs, however
only in about 25%of these cases are employers and employees in favour of
such a development.
10.3. Fixed Term Employment
Even before the employment promotion act of 1985 fixed term
contracts had been legally possible, but jurisprudence on acceptable
reasons for the conclusion of such a contract had been rather restrictive.
The courts only accepted fixed term contracts if a valid reason for not
concluding a permanent contract could be presented. A catalogue of
reasons soon became established. The most important have been:
seasonal work; workload peaks, a special task that would only need a
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certain time, replacement of temporarily absent staff, and fixed term
contracts for the period of professional training. With the
Beschaftigungsf6rderungsgesetz from 1985 fixed term contracts became
generally allowed, however the length of a fixed term contract (not
covered by one of the reasons above) was limited to 18month, but only in
relation to new appointments. Thiscontract can be followed by another
fixed-term contract if objective reasons exist (TOselmann,1996a).
The law has to be seen in the light of the concomitant steadily rising
numbers of the unemployed, with at the same time a relatively positive
overall economic development. It was thought that the existinq law made
it difficult and expensive for employers to layoff staff during the next
economic downturn, and that hence employers would rather have
additional overtime worked than taking on new permanent staff. The new
law would make it easy to make fixed term contracts and limit the effects
of a new economic downturn for the employers. Changes to the unfair
dismissalprotection of permanent employees have not been made (as for
example in the United Kingdom). The new law was first limited to a number
of years, but has been extended since then. It has been shown that the
new law did not have any significant effect on firms utilisation of overtime
work, or short time work (TOsselmann, 1996a), or other employment
adjustment patterns (BOchtemann, 1989).
To specify reasons for employment for a fixed-time period in labour
contracts was practice in West Germany until the Employment Promotion
Act was introduced in 1985. Between the years 1985 and 1991 in West
Germany the tendency to apply fixed-term contracts to younger workers
increased. In East Germany this kind of age picking into fixed-term
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employment was even more pronounced (Sch6mann and Kruppe, 1993).
From a theoretical point of view this supports the view that fixed-term
contracts are considered as some sort of 'prolonged probationary period'
or screening process for young labour market entrants (NFWA,1994).Young
labour market entrants are most likely to be employed in the first instance
on a fixed-term basis and the probability of fixed-term employment
decreases with age or general labour force experience. Research by
Sch6mann and Kruppe, (1993) points in the same direction. According to
their work, there are no differences between men and women in the
likelihood of being a fixed-term employee. Women are no more likely than
men to be hired on a fixed-term contract, which indicates that facilitating
fixed-term employment apparently did not enhance (or reduce) other
discriminatory factors in the hiring of women. Separate estimation of models
for men and women only showed that higher skilled women were more
likely than higher skilled men to be employed on a fixed-term basis.
Unions strongly opposed the Beschaftigungsf6rderungsgesetz,
arguing that now 'permanent' jobs would be given to employees with fixed
term contracts, and hence undermine the KOndigungsschutzgesetz and
lead to precarious forms of employment (Bielenski, 1994a; TOselmann,
1996a).
BOchtemann and H61and (1989) came in their evaluation of the
Employment Promotion Act to the following conclusions:
- Even though fixed term contracts stayed a rather small
proportion of all contracts (7%),it became a relatively common form
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of recruiting new employees, with one out of three newly hired
employees being on a fixed term contract.
- Only 7%of fixed term contracts would not have been possible
before the Employment Promotion Act of 1985.
- Fixed term contracts are common for University graduates
(mainly due to the hiring practise of the public sector) and also
overrepresented among employees with low qualifications.
The 1994 Act extended the provisionsfor fixed-term contracts until the
year 2000. Since there is a close correlation between dismissal protection
and fixed-term employment, one might have expected that the
liberalisation measures on fixed-term contracts would have given an
impetus to companies to conclude an increasing number of such
contracts. However, their share of all employment contracts has remained
relatively stable over the 1988/1994 period with an average of 6,3%,
osclllotinq within a band of 0.7 percentage points, allowing for business
cycle fluctuations (TOsselmann,19960). On the other hand, the share of
permanent employees has grown steadily from 86.1% to 89.0% over the
same period. This can probably be due to the fact that high skills are
difficult to hire as needed on a temporary basis, even given the fact that
Germany stands in a 'high skill equilibrium '. So that Trade Union fears of a
substitution of permanent workers for temporary ones after the 1985 EPA
seem not to have materialised.
In comparison with other European countries, 'Germany shows the
least movement in the area of deregulation of dismissalprotection, reform
206
efforts having been largely confined to a liberalisation of fixed term
employment contracts' (Mosley and Kruppe, 1993,p. 119).
In Germany the main consequence of the higher flexibility associated
with temporary work was an improved screening of newly hired workers by
firms (Franz 1993).Moreover, unskilled and semi-skilled workers are normally
overrepresented among those with temporary jobs (BOchtemann and
Quack, 1989). This position confirms the fact that Germany places more
reliance in the functional side of flexibility to counteract rigidities and shows,
that whether or not the strategy is meant the core-periphery model does
not seem to suit reality.
10.4. Other Formsof Flexible Working
More flexible scheduling of working time has been another demand
by German employers, allowing for example longer plant operating times,
or flexible scheduling of working times, to reduce the need for quantitative
adjustment of the workforce. Thismeans that qualified staff can be kept
and the problem of skill shortage and finding skilled people at an
economic upturn are reduced considerably. Moreover, it is less
controversial than numerical flexibility and more compatible with functional
flexibility through the methods just mentioned.
Although in practice working hours in Germany are overwhelmingly
set by collective bargaining, this is constrained by a statutory framework.
The adoption of the EUWorking Time Directive in 1993,combined with the
need to respond to a judgement of the European Court of Justice which
found that statutory bans on women's nightwork breached European
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equality provisions,gave both impetus and a final shape to the 1994 low'.
Relevant to the understanding of the German Government's position on a
number of European Directives, the law is intended as a contribution to
safeguarding employee health as well as facilitating working time flexibility.
In common with some other EUmember states, but in contrast to British
practice, exemptions to the law are permitted by collective agreement
(IDSEuropean Report 393, September 1994).
The standard working time, regulated in collective agreements, has
been reduced in Western Germany from 40.5 hours in the beginning of the
1980sto less than 38 hours in 1994, in manufacturing even to 36.5 hours,
amongst the lowest in the industrialised world (Institut der deutschen
Wirtschaft, 1995),a 35 hours is targeted for the next years. Asa response to
this development, firmsare trying to detach operating times from individual
working times, using more flexible working patterns. Plant operating times
are increasingly exceeding individual working times in Germany, however
still to a lower extend than in the European average. While most of
Germany's companies operate a two shift system, their European
counterparts were using three shift systems, and that despite the general
capital intensive German production sites.
However as the above mentioned study from Iuselrncnn (19960) has
shown, until now no significant reductions in short time working or overtime
1 Gesetz zur Vereinheitlichung und Flexibilisierung des Arbeitszeitrechts
(Arbeitszeitsrechtsgesetz). 6 June 1994.
208
working can be found, which possibly indicates the need for more flexible
working time arrangements.
Although initially defensive, unions increasingly accepted the
principle of concession bargaining on worksharing issuesas a quid pro quo
for shorter working weeks (Rosner; 1994; Trinczek, 1995). Worksharing
agreements (Taritvertrage zur Beschaftigungssicherung), which were
concluded in a number of key sectors in western Germany in 1993 and
1994, gave an additional impetus for more working time flexibility.
Worksharing agreements have been concluded against the background of
the 1993 recession in western Germany, with a view to safeguarding
employment by redistributing working hours (for details on these
agreements see Clasen, 1995;Sachverstandigenrat, 1994;Seifert, 1994).By
the end of 1994, agreements existed in ten bargaining units in Western
Germany, covering six million employees, Le. 23 per cent of the total
number of employees. With the exception of the Volkswagen one, these
are all sectoral agreements. The agreements provide scope for varying the
working time between 6 per cent to 20 per cent below the collectively
agreed weekly working time, without compensation of lost earnings, with
only the metalworking and Volkswagen accords containing partial
compensation clauses. In addition, the agreed working time bands in the
chemical, paper and plastics industries allow for the variation of working
time above the collectively agreed ones without this being subject to
overtime premiums. The implementation of the sectoral accords isoptional,
leaving it up to the works council and management to negotiate whether
and to what extent the worksharing agreement is implemented. One half
of all accords provide for non-dismissal during the duration of the works
agreements. Sixaccords have extended the averaging-out period for the
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uneven distribution of the working time to 12 months, in effect annualising
working hours. It is fair to say that by the end of 1994 there had been a
marked trend, even if not uniform across all industries, of controlled
decentralisation towards the company level on issues of working time
flexibility (TOselmann,1996a).
The first worksharing agreement was reached at Volkswagen at the
end of 1993. Its basic form has been later incorporated, albeit in modified
forms, in several sectoral agreements. The agreement, which expired in
December 1995,reduces the weekly working time to 28.8 hours on the basis
of a four-day working week and a five-day plant operation time, with a
corresponding reduction in earnings. A non redundancy clause applied
while the agreement is in force. But, by summer 1994, demand in several
Volkswagen plants picked up considerably and the undifferentiated
reduction in working time used to provoke bottlenecks in production
(Sachverstandigenrat 1994, p. 106). A new agreement was reached in
September 1995,under which up to 38.8 hours per week can be worked on
the basis of a five-day working week, with an annual weekly average of
28.8 hours. Furthermore, employees may work on 12 Saturdays per year
(with overtime premiums) and the non-dismissalclause of the 1993accord
remains in force. Thus, compared to the 1993 agreement, the new
settlement has considerably broadened the scope for more differentiated
and flexible working-time arrangements.
There have been interesting developments as to other forms of
flexibility, such as BMW's pioneering personnel policy (EIRR,no 271, August
1996). The new work structure moves away from the classic division of
labour and introduces integrated activities. Employees are arranged into
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self-managing organisational units,with each group having clearly defined
tasks and the necessary expertise to carry these out. They have also
introduced a new pay structure and a working time credit account. In
return for greater employee flexibility, there isa high degree of job security.
The plan places emphasis on training and multi-skilling. It might be thus that
functional flexibility could be combined with numerical flexibility without
producing segmentation effects, allowing for societal differences.
10.5. Functional Flexibility
As mentioned before it is generally accepted that the German
labour market possessesrelatively high degrees of functional flexibility. Even
if this functional flexibility is particularly difficult to measure, the base of it is
the vocational training and education system. In the following section
recent developments of this skill reproduction system are assessed. At the
heart of the German vocational training system lies the Dualessystem,
which isbased on training on the job in companies, as well as on learning of
theory in schools. Successful candidates obtain after about 3.5 years a
Icertified job qualification I which isgenerally accepted in all firms.
The distribution of the costs and efforts of training amongst firms are
less and less evenly distributed. In September 1996 only every third
company in Germany was offering apprenticeship places, this is the lowest
rate of firms participating in the apprenticeship system ever (Tageschau,
18.09.1996).Many youth were left at that time without an apprenticeship
place, which brought this crisisinto the main German news, with nearly no
news show not referring to the situation. Also the action taken by the
government, and the calls for more apprenticeship places by Trade Unions
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and employer associations to its member firms, indicate the high value a
vocational training still possessesin Germany, and there was a general
social consensus, that everybody should be able to receive training. As
Streeck already pointed out in 1989, German experience has shown that
public exhortation iswell able to motivate small and large firms to increase
their training efforts beyond the immediate needs in an attempt to
accommodate a demographic surplusof school leavers.
Various efforts were made to fulfil the governments promise of an
apprenticeship place for every school-leaver in 1996.Small companies who
could not offer training on their own, due to lack of facilities like certain
types of machinery, were encouraged and supported to co-operate with
other small firms and associate with larger establishments to create extra
training positions.
There have been examples before, of more training offered than
thought to be necessary. When the crisisof the automobile industry broke
out in the 1970s,firms in all major Western producer countries reduced their
apprenticeship programs, in the same period in West Germany the number
of apprentices in the automobile industry increased in both relative and
absolute terms and that, because in Germany the decision of a firm as to
how many apprentices it takes in is to a large extent dependent on forces
other than its management, such as the government, 'public opinion', the
Chambers Of Commerce and industry the Trade Union and the Works
Council (Streeck, 1987).In the last recession employees were often not fired
but trained through special schemes, so that in the next economic upturn
the company did not suffer skillshortages.
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What is interesting in this context, is a result from the NFWAsurvey:
when managers were asked about the number of apprentices the firm was
training, clearly firms using part time work for organisational reasons were
more often than the other firms reporting not to have any apprentice, and
also had a lower average number of apprentices per establishment. In
total 3 out of 5 firms were offering apprenticeship places, which are in
comparison to the other countries in the survey good values.
Following Auer (1992),a reinforcement of a kind of thinking seems to
be taking root which sees training as an important part of sound labour
markets, thus challenging the simple idea of 'externalities' which is based
entirely on the price (cost) of training. However, it is important to remember
that Auer's sample of firms was not very representative, being formed by
large firms, while small ones could face different problems relating to
poaching. While poaching has not yet constituted a hindrance to training in
Germany, there is a special case: extensive poaching of East German
highly skilled workers by West German firms, even intra-company, limited
the development of EastGerman firms (Auer, 1992).
10.6. Summary and Discussion
The analysis of the data set has shown that firms with low qualified
workforces tend to use more atypical labour for flexibility purposes. Rather
than dividing the employees into a core and a periphery, along the lines of
atypical labour, it might be advisable to divide the firms into a core group,
those with highly trained employees, possibly competing on the high wage
high quality front, and those relying much more on numerical flexibility and
low qualified staff, competing more on the low quality, low cost end of the
market. The core and periphery follows the stated aims of European and
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German labour market policy, Le. it is generally agreed that in order to
maintain a certain European lifestyle (e.g. certain welfare provisions) it is
necessary to have a high wage economy and hence compete at the high
quality end of the market (Trends,no. 22, 1995).Therewill always be a need
for certain periphery firms, however the centre of the economy cannot lie
here, since it seems impossible to maintain certain European values and
compete on a low cost base with countries from for example the Asian
region, or the new States derived from the former Soviet Union.
With the support to periphery firmsgiven by extending the possibilities
for atypical labour, the process of changing towards more quality
production systems might be slowed down, or entirely stopped. A bigger
problem might be that at one point more and more firms might compete
on that level, since there are certain advantages connected to such
policy, and the skill level will remain high for a certain period of time. This
might bring with it a slow reduction of the general skill level, which might
affect the whole system in the long run, eventually leading to the
destruction of the system. Once a vicious circle of leaving education and
training to the others, pinching the needed workers etc. has started, a
reverse to the not without problems and shortcomings, but at least for the
time being still working system might be difficult if not impossible since the
main competitive advantage Germany has at the moment seems to be
the skill level.
Given the limited use firms in Germany make from atypical
employment relationships in order to achieve numerical flexibility, only a
small proportion of part time can justifiably be called flexible forms of work.
Similarly only a small proportion of fixed term contracts would not have
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been possible before the reform of 1985which was enacted to allow more
flexibility (see above). Taking into account the generally relatively high
degree of functional flexibility the German labour market possesses,and
the possible trade offs between those types of flexibility, it does seem as if
many firmsdo not need or cannot incorporate more atypical employment
in order to improve their flexibility or their mix of flexibilities. The use of more
flexible working time schedules, flexitime, annual averaging etc. to fine tune
those different elements seems necessary, and fits more to the traditional
way of work organisation, which can be seen on the relatively high interest
of as well employers as employees to implement those schemes.
The recent deregulation and decentralisation measures have
broadened the scope for the pursuit of flexible human resource
management approaches, especially in relation to atypical employment
and working time flexibility. However, the analysis of several flexibility
indicators revealed that German companies, in general, utilise the touched
up framework only to a limited extent. Given the configuration of the
German regulatory environment and the particularities of the industrial
relations system, the relatively high degree of functional flexibility in German
companies and the interdependencies and trade-offs between the several
types of labour flexibility, it is possible that many firms already operate with
an 'optimal' flexibility mix (TOselmann, 1996). On the evidence of the
relatively high degree of functional flexibility, the pay-offs from enhancing
other forms of flexibility may be considered to be low. This may partly
explain the limited impact of the Employment Promotion Acts on fixed-term
employment, the steady growth of permanent employment, despite the
strong regulations on dismissal, as well as the retention of the sectoral
system of pay bargaining, in spite of the resulting limited scope for the
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pursuit of downward financial flexibility (Rosner, 1994; Sesselmeier, 1994),
although in the latter case the issueof reforms has become the subject of
controversial discussions in Germany (Giersch, 1995; Schnellhaass, 1993).
Concerning temporal flexibility, which may be viewed as more
complementary to functional flexibility, deregulation and (controlled)
decentralisation has gone furthest. Several indicators, such as the growth of
part time and shift work, point to a higher degree of temporal flexibility
since the 1980s.However, the extent of this increase is somewhat limited,
especially when compared to other western European countries.
According to a study by McKinsey (1994), the full potential for part time
employment has not been utilised, the various forms of shift work have
grown faster in other EU countries, the sectoral worksharing agreements
have not been implemented on a widespread basis and overtime and
short-time working have not been reduced. It will be interesting to see
whether, in the future, these lead to more significant shifts in the flexibility
mix of German companies, or whether the limits of greater labour flexibility
within the current German context have been reached (Iuselmonn. 1996).
Moreover, Buchtemann (1989) have found that there might be a partial
congruence of lay-off and dismissal restraints on the one hand and
economic interests of the overwhelming majority of firms in avoiding lay-offs
and restricting dismissalsto certain categories of workers on the other. This
interpretation make give leave to doubt whether employment protection
regulations act as a genuine deterrent with respect to firms' hiring
behaviour. Survey data have shown that it isprimarily lack in demand which
has kept German manufacturing firms from taking on more workers during
the last economic upswing, while 'insufficient flexibility in hiring and firing'
seems to have at most a secondary part in firms' hiring decisions (Nerb 1986;
Koenig and Zimmermann 1985). Thus, as I mentioned above, firms might
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have reached their flexibility mix without further recourse to flexibility in the
extensive margin.
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ONE FLEXIBLE FUTURE FOR EUROPE? THE CASE OF EUROPEAN CONVERGENCE AND I OR DIVERGENCE
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FLEXIBILITY DEBATE
PART IV:
CONCLUSION
11. CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE IN EUROPE
11. Convergence or Divergence in Europe
11.1. Introduction
The discussionof theories regarding convergence and divergence in
Chapter 2 showed that the debate cannot be resolved on grounds of
theory alone, so that a closer examination of the different countries and
their reactions to the new economic realities and trends became
necessary. This investigation has been carried out in preceding chapters
and various aspects have been compared. The aim of the current chapter
is to interpret these results to find an answer to the question of whether
there can be talk of convergence in European ways of work organisation,
in particular regarding whether that convergence tends to forms of work
organisation considered to be able to form a high trust, high skill, high
quality equilibrium; and to provide the answer in the light of the policy
options open. Which of those options do decision makers have, and what
powers would be needed to influence the process of societal
development.
The statistical study as well as the recital of the labour market
conditions in our three chosen countries has shown that rigidities and
flexibilities in the individual national systems have evolved from
miscellaneous and mostly distinct factors. The progress of the different
labour markets indicate conspicuous differences; different ways of
organising work have been selected, which in turn have moulded their
industrial relations systems.Many of those differences could explain, as well
as be explained by, the varying degrees of numerical or functional flexibility
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possessed by the countries. The idea that a division into a core and
periphery in individual firms as advocated by the flexible firm model takes
place in reality, or that it alone would allow firms to achieve as well
numerical and functional flexibility can be put at rest. Grounded on these
observations, the answer to the question of whether current tendencies
point towards a convergence of European forms of work organisation is no.
However my study has clearly shown the dynamic nature of the systems.
Due to the increasingly unified European market, the competitive situation
of the various countries, and firms located in them, is undergoing changes.
It has become clear that the pressures towards more numerical flexibility
are increasing, the preferred choice here, even if to varying degree, and
with varying success have been 'atypical' forms of work. At the same time,
other measures suggested by the Commission in its White Paper, aimed at
increasing functional flexibility, have been echoed much less in current
policy making. It has also become clear that systemscan be changed so
that despite the differences highlighted above, which currently reinforce
each other, the position is not a static one. Yet, the over-reliance on
numerical flexibility does seem to run counter to the idea of establishing an
economy based on skillsand characterised by 'high trust, high ski", high
quality' .
The analysis presented up to now projects only a part of the picture,
as social actors and political wlll could sanction a new impetus and trigger
a transition process. However, this wlll also depend on the standing and
situation of those decision makers as demonstrated by previous routes
taken by actors and described both in the empirical study and in the
country analysis. The issue here wi" be to evaluate policy options open to
European policy-makers to foster the process of convergence.
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11.2. Convergence of National Systems?
The statistical analysis of part II has shown that the extent to which
firms seek to establish flexibility by using atypical forms of employment is
influenced by the degree of flexibility offered by standard employment
relationships. Atypical forms of employment like part time work and fixed
term employment are thus influenced by economic, social and legal
factors which have shaped and are configured by standard employment
relationships. One explanatory factor for the variance in usage patterns of
atypical forms of work such as fixed term and part time employment, when
used to improve numerical flexibility, is the qualification structure of the
workforce. New forms of work, particularly fixed term employment can be
associated with low skill, except for the case of the United Kingdom. Part
time work isalso in some way related to lack of apprenticeship places. Thus,
it would appear that firms with a lower qualified workforce find it more
advantageous to hire atypical workers. The general picture across all
countries is, that firms lacking functional flexibility try to compensate for this
lack by enhanced numerical flexibility. Meanwhile, the statistical study did
not show a tendency to further training of the "core" workforce.
However, the qualification structure of the workforce of the various
national labour markets shows marked differences. This indicates the
importance of the national production and reproduction systems in
determining firms' strategies, and makes a more in depth analysis of
national labour market regimes necessary.
The countries which have been studied in the qualitative part of this
thesis were selected because they seemed to present extreme poles from
the ideal 'flexible labour market', i.e. either lacking one or the other form, or
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both types of flexibility. Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany, had been
selected a priori, as they are often used as examples of possessingonly low
degrees of either type of flexibility, lacking functional flexibility or lacking
numerical flexibility (respectively). Part II and Part III have shown that this
disposition does hold at the current moment, even if changes are taking
place. Table 11.1summarisesthe most important characteristics of the three
labour markets.
Table 11.1 Comparison
General • Rigid labour low for • Highly de-regulated
'permanent' employees market
• Strong segmentation • 'free'market
of the labour market economy
• High unemployment • low-trust system
• Low Female • competing on cost
Participation
• Low trust system
Part TIme • Only recently • long tradition, • long tradition, still
Work recognised however change from often used due to
• Low part time rate supply side considerations employee wishes
• High share of to demand side • increased use of smaH
involuntary part time • part timers in worth part time jobs, to reduce
• Low share of female situation than full timers cost (social security
employment in part time • Often used to reduce contributions), often in low
rate cost skilled jobs
• Organisational • high share of female • high share of female
reasons main reason for part timers port timers
use • high degree of • In the majority of
• Increase with latest voluntariness cases not used to
reform, which reduces • high share of low enhance numericot
cost (social security skilled jobs flexlbiHty
contributions)
Fixed • High share of fixed • not very important to • often used for
Term term employment. 'norm' enhance flexlblllty, due to seasonot work
Work for new labour contracts weak dismissal protection • above average
• High labour turnover, • often used for importance for low and
as contracts can only be seasonal work high skilled employees
extended up to a • above average • often used for other
maximum period importance for low and reasons than numericot
• Reduced training high skilled employees flexibility, e.g. probationary
provision to fixed term • used to 'hire' in skills, period, substitutes
employees some dependence on
those outside skills
GermanyUnited KingdomSpain
• Highly regulated
market
• co-operative culture
• high trust system
• strong segmentation
between in- and outsiders
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Spain United Kingdom Germany
Other • Large hidden • No mandatory limit of • Various Worksharing
forms of economy the length of working day agreements. but normally
Flexibility • Temporary or week affect insiders only
employment agencies • choice of working • Working time
introduced in 1993 time arrangements accounts and self
• Teamworking poorly managing organisational
developed units gain importance
Function • Low degree of • low degree of • relatively high degree
al functional flexibility functional flexibility of functional flexibility
Flexibility • Low social value of • relatively big problem • Training system
vocational training. so of skill-shortage provides practical and
high value for University • weak relationship theoretical knowledge.
education between training and ending with a certified job
• Training contracts career qualification
otten used to cut cost. with • Low social value of • broad educated.
little training content vocational training multi-skilled workforce
• Due to structure of the • no general • Recently problems to
labour market. little apprenticeship system provide enough
willingness of 'permanent' apprenticeship places
workforce to accept • Education has high
change social value
• Job insecurity leads to
concern about training
Spain has the highest unemployment rate in the European Union. The
conventional explanation for this is the existence of marked market
rigidities,which seems to be the reason for the obsession with numerical
flexibility in many firms' manpower strategies. As we have shown in part II,
fixed term employment relationships have become the Inorm' for entry to
the labour market; meanwhile, part time work is mainly used for
organisational reasons to increase numerical flexibility.The reasons for those
rigidities can be found in the political transition to democracy in the late
1970s, in which many workers' 'rights' (especially regarding the issue of
redundancy) were enhanced and or formalised, in a bid to avoid political
instability through labour unrest, strongly reducing firms' numerical flexibility
opportunities. Traditionally, vocational training possessesonly little standing
in society. Additionally, and due to its isolation during the Franco time,
production techniques were not on a modern level, and skillsrequired for
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newer techniques relatively rare, hence the functional flexibility to employ
workers for new taskswas also strongly limited. Firmsexperienced rigidities in
adapting to new requirements and had difficulties in adjusting to the new
competitive situation. To improve the position, attempts were made to
enhance flexibility, even when at the same time stability in order to protect
the young democracy had to be preserved. This led to changes on the
margins, leaving regulations for existing contracts nearly untouched.
Evaluating these changes, it has to be said that the aim of increased
numerical flexibility could only be reached partly. Firms used the new
freedoms, and soon the 'new' standard form of employment for new
employees became fixed term relations. Thisstrengthened the position of
permanent employees even more, as now adaptations to fluctuations
could be carried out by increasing or decreasing the new periphery. Given
this strong position, the will of the permanent employees to accept
changes, or to make concessions in the bargaining rounds diminished. Due
to the implementation of the fixed term contracts, these could only be
prolonged for a certain period of time, before they would become
permanent contracts. The firms being interested in keeping their numerical
flexibility, this resulted in the recruitment of new inexperienced employees
instead of keeping employees and allowing the contract to become
permanent. Thisled not only to companies following this strategy having to
put up with inexperienced workers, but also to a decrease in the motivation
to train workers, as they would only be part of the company's workforce for
a relatively short period. Thisran counter to attempts to increase numerical
flexibility. The new generation of Spanishworkers can be seen as one of the
best educated in Spanish history. However, as a result of the lack of interest
in retraining those employees the skillsthey hold are not properly utilised
and soon become outdated. Hence, the changes to increase numerical
224
flexibility can be seen as a major obstacle to an increase in functional
flexibility, despite a rising level in education, given that an upturn in
functional flexibility would need longer job tenures. In that much Spain can
be used as a good example for the feet of clay of the advantages
acquired through changes on the margins only, in trying to adopt methods
from other systems, without respecting one's own position.
Unlike the situation in Spain, the statistical evidence presented shows,
that in the United Kingdom fixed term employment relationships are used
not so much to increase numerical but functional flexibility. This strategy
does seem to be a way for firms to cope with the relatively moderate
degree of skilled workers. This use of fixed term employment can be
explained by the high degree of numerical flexibility (and low degree of
functional flexibility) offered by standard employment relationships. In the
United Kingdom, the changes towards numerical flexibility have been the
most rigorous among our three sample countries, and in contrast to Spain,
have not only had impacts on the margins of the labour market. Firms can
adapt [numedcollv] relatively easily to workload fluctuations even under
standard employment relationships. Part time work is increasingly used to
augment this numerical flexibility. However, firms suffer intensely from a ski"
shortage, which is strongest in the United Kingdom among the sample
countries. Firms compete for skilled workers. The scarce skilled employees
often choose fixed term contracts to gain most from the scarcity of their
skills.Thisin turn can generate rigidities. Ski" poaching is a short term solution
as the scarcity of skills could also lead to higher difficulty to poach. It also
leads to no trust, as there is reluctance to train workers which wi" possibly be
poached. The breakdown of the former apprenticeship system has further
worsened the ski" provision situation. The United Kingdom system is a better
framework to achieve numerical flexibility, as changes did not only affect
225
the margins. However the way those changes can be implemented always
represents the power relations at the stage of development they appear. It
has also become clear that the changes towards numerical flexibility have
brought about a reduction in skilled labour. As a result, the competitive
advantage is based on cost, and could be seriously damaged by
regulations increasing the cost of labour, so that the main task of the
government has been identified in resisting regulations. However, to create
a system of vocational training that substitutes the one that disappeared, a
certain degree of regulation, to create an atmosphere of trust, seems to be
necessary, weakening for some time the competitive situation, while the
long term benefits have to be seen as unsure. Hence the high degree of
numerical flexibility can be seen as a hindrance to establish a higher
degree of functional flexibility.
Despite the relatively moderate degree of numerical flexibility in the
German labour market, the data analysis of part II indicates that the use of
atypical work to increase numerical flexibility has not gone very far in
Germany, As in other European countries it isalso true in Germany, that firms
using atypical forms of work to increase numerical flexibility, often lack
functional flexibility, however, functional flexibility seems to be easier to
achieve for German firms. Germany's Dual System is an arrangement for
vocational training which teaches theoretical background knowledge as
well as practical on the job experience. Thissystem generates multi-skilled
workers, which are the base for the relatively high degree of functional
flexibility of the German labour market. Not having obtained a certified
qualification has become a stigma. With only moderate payment during
the apprenticeship, taking up an apprenticeship place means postponing
one's income. Thisrequires trust, in the fact that one will be able to make
up the 'lost' income in later years. As dismissalsare relatively difficult and
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the approval of the "Betriebsrat" is needed in bigger firms, firms tend to,
based on the relatively broad education in the apprenticeship, try to retrain
staff, rather than dismissing them and hiring new workers. Thisorientation
towards the internal labour market has increased job tenure and led to a
high skill orientation. The downside of this orientation to the internal labour
market isstrong segmentation between insidersand outsiders to the labour
market. Once out of the labour market it is increasingly difficult to rejoin, in
particular as it is mainly firms responsibility to (re-)train, so that the
unemployed lose rapidly out on this point. Thismatter isdocumented in the
high share of long term unemployed and the difficulties women experience
in re-entering after a long absence from the labour market (e.g. after
childcare). Due to the high degree of functional flexibility, firms use atypical
employment relationships -which had been introduced to create
employment - less often in order to achieve flexibility, compared to their
counterparts in Spain and the United Kingdom, as those forms of
employment seem to be more difficult to implement within the framework
of the pre-existent form of work organisation. Thusfar, the real restrictions to
external flexibility seem to lie in the traditional way of work organisation. To
overcome short term adjustment problems firms rather turn to overtime or
annualisation of working hours,which again makes it difficult for outsiders to
rejoin. Atypical employment relationships were also introduced with the
objective of offering a stepping stone into employment. However as many
of those jobs are confined to the lowest hierarchy and offer little chance to
leave atypical employment, this aim has not been achieved. More
redistributive policies to bridge the (training) gap between in and outsiders,
e.g. by offering State financed training programs, are currently reduced, as
redistributive policies are seen to weaken the competitive situation in
comparison to international competitors. Regarding the advocated
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atypical employment relationships one can notice a recent trend towards
more and more atypical labour for flexibility reasons and to reduce the cost
of labour, as small part time jobs are excluded from social security
contributions (and benefits). Those employees are often excluded from
training and have hardly any chance of a career. It has also been possible
to ascertain that high usersof this form of work have a much smaller share
of apprentices. The number of firms offering apprenticeship places has
been reduced over the years. This can be seen as an indication of a
deviation from a skill towards a cost and numerical flexibility orientation, for
the time being only by a limited number of firms.Thiswill be discussed when
looking into the converging / diverging trends in the following paragraphs.
Conditions needed to establish functional flexibility seem to differ
substantially from those needed to (e.g. Industrial Relations)generate
numerical flexibility. Measures taken to foster one form, might run counter to
measures to foster the other, in the worse case rigidities increase on both
accounts. None of the countries has achieved the degree of numerical
and functional flexibility needed to form a high quality, high trust, high skill
equilibrium for all economic operators. To come to the wanted type of
society, redistributive policies, to pay for example for training, seem to be
necessary. To establish (and most important of all : maintain) an economy
based on high skills,high trust and high quality, constant investment into
training and retraining, in a framework of synergic industrial relations seems
necessary.
The various socio-economic systems in Europe have their competitive
advantage in different areas. Economies competing at the low cost end
would need to invest into training in order to be able to compete on the
other end of the competitive scale. This investment would of course, at
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least for some time, undermine the most important competitive advantage:
cost. Benefits would become noticeable, if at all, only in the long run. For
those economies competing on the high quality end of production, a
continuation of investment into training does not necessarily have to yield
the same return as it used to do. The skillsgenerated might not only be used
by the economy itself, as labour becomes more mobile, and the costs
would nonetheless be born out by a national economy. Other redistributive
policies like training the unemployed, financing outsiders etc. are likewise
more difficult to keep up, as this might increase costs for those 'inside' and
might attract recipients from other countries. Moreover, adjustment to the
economy through monetary policies is not possible through competitive
devaluation or exchange rate adjustments as that will cease to exist once
the EMUcomes into being.
In this way, the Nation States face the prisoner's dilemma, as actions
taken by them determine their possible competitive advantage or
disadvantage only in connection with the action of the other Member
States. And this, due to the de facto impossibility of controlling the flow of
(human) capital, as costs can be born in one state, while the return on
investment might be beneficial in another.
A simplified description of a dilemma the Nation States are in will be
given, the 'real' situation is much more complex, featuring struggles to
implement changes etc., but the simplified version seems to be sufficient for
the time being. The simplified balance sheet for an individual country,
regarding necessary investments and one's relative competitive situation
looks as follows:
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Invests into wanted Society
Invests into wanted Does not invest into
COUNTRY B Society wanted Society
win/win II gains for A
Does not invest into wanted Society Gains for B III no change IV
In Case I (III):These costs mean, if the competitors do not have those
costs, a loss (at least for some time) in one's competitive situation. Whether
this loss can be made up again, particularly given the fact that the return
on investment can also be beneficial for the other countries, is
questionable.
In Case II: If all countries go this route (and bear similar costs) this
change in one's relative competitive situation would not have to take
place and could lead to the desired society. Given the various starting up
positions of the Member States one has to assume different costs, which
would, if no side-payments are made, lead again to the lossof competitive
ground for some countries.
In Case IV: If none of the countries bears any costs, or even try to
reduce costs, the relative competitive situation might stay unchanged.
However this would not lead to the desired high trust, high skill, high quality
societal system of work organisation.
This balance sheet would reflect the relative positions of European
Union countries as to investment, but cannot prejudge the results achieved
in interaction with third-party countries. The fact that outside countries might
invest and benefit from the increase in competitiveness has also to be seen
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as a lossin relation to those outside countries.
For both (all) countries to win, Le. to get to the wanted form of
society, all of them would have to undertake investments (Case II),
however the countries cannot be sure of the others' action, and different
legal requirements and costs complicate the issue further. Thismeans that
countries will be cautious not to bear costs. In Case IV, countries can try to
influence their own competitive situation by reducing costs or at least by
trying not to increase them.
This might lead to a convergence on the lowest common
denominator or even competitive deregulation. To overcome this trend co-
ordination, through social dialogue, does seem to be necessary (European
Commission, White Paper; 1994) (as in the prisoner dilemma, knowing the
other's course of action in advance would solve the dilemma).
Member states are unable to enact effective regulations due to their
loss of influence because of globalisation. Moreover, the European Union
itself has not gained the influence lost by its Member States. Additionally,
given the big differences between the systems,and that Member States try
to keep their powers and have their own agendas, for the institutions of the
European Union to keep to a "no decision" strategy seems to be easier
than coming to a decision. In case the European Union should attempt
regulation voices from member countries will accuse the European Union
either of social dumping or of protectionism. Thismakes decision making in
this area on a European level prone to gridlock and hence the European
Union can not take over the co-ordinating role.
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11.3. European Social Policy: a system's merging?
The need for co-ordination arises from the fact that there are
differences among national social policy structures which make any
attempt at policies aimed at the integration of work organisation systems
very difficult. The question iswhether such a development can be based in
the existing systems,or these need to be radically altered. Moreover, social
actors are also nationally minded, and globalisation poses challenges to
which unions are especially ill-equipped to respond precisely because their
historic development has geared their strategies and structures to national
arenas, in which they deal with national governments and national
employers, typically organised along national sectoral lines (Martin, 1996).
AsStreeck (1995) has stressedwith respect to Europe, insofar as the strategic
domain of business is a single market that replaces formerly separated
national markets, this tends to erode the effectiveness of national rules
governing the conditions under which economic transactions generally
and labour market transactions in particular take place. The effectiveness
of such rules can only be restored if they can be shifted to transnational
institutions whose jurisdiction isco-extensive with the traditional scope of the
market. Because political institutions whose jurisdiction is co-extensive with
the market have been created in Europe, there are unique possibilities for
replacing national rules with common rules for Europe's single market,
however, they are unlikely to take place.
The scope of member-state activity in social policy not only limits the
room for European Union action, it also signals the considerable value that
member states place on continued control over policy, given the fact that
any decision in other areas such as macroeconomic policy have been
shattered by globalisation. Moreover the fragmentation of decision-making
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and the strong bargaining position of individual member states make the
European Union's multitiered system especially prone to lowest-common
denominator agreements. An escape route to achieve the needed co-
ordination could be offered by social dialogue on a European level. The
contemporary developments leading to a confrontation arising out of the
inherent conflict of interests in the employment relationship and the
indeterminate nature of labour effort, makes it clear that management will
constantly seek to exert control over the labour process in the interests of
the firm's owners (Turner and Morley, 1995). Nevertheless, Europe has a
tradition of collectivism and consensus building and trade unions have a
social legitimacy in Europe on a much grander scale than in the US.
Brewster and Hegewich (1994) argue that, despite many internally
distinctive features, Europe has a coherence of itsown and a distinctiveness
from other major blocs. Thisis particularly true in the HRMarea relating to
decentralisation and devolvement, pay flexibility, employee investment,
Industrial Relations, employee communications, flexible working patterns
and the development of European Union social policy, Hence, an
argument can be developed that in Europe at least the two concepts may
not be in opposition, they may be different perspectives on the same
process (Brewster, 1995).
It would appear that the European Union tries to foster convergence
through social dialogue. Formally, as the partners possessautonomy, and
can come to contractual agreements on a European level, the social
dialogue could be a point of departure for establishing a transnational way
of European work organisation. However, if the wanted European way of
work organisation can develop, it will depend on the interest of the social
partners to find new patterns of regulation, and on their ability to negotiate
and control those agreements. Some points regarding the interest and/or
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ability of the social partners to establish a European way of work
organisation will be highlighted in the remainder of this thesis.
Aimsdiffer between employees and employers as well as inside those
groups, considering the various national systemsthey are embedded in. On
a European level, the societal divergences serve to influence the position
of the decision makers, and outcomes are equally informed by the nature
and level of consensus in industrial relations and the social dialogue
process. Again, the nature and level of social dialogue differs and the
United Kingdom has, against the stream, move dramatically away from
consultation over the past 10 to 15 years. My other two chosen countries
have traditions of tripartite social dialogue, as have the Benelux and France
and in particular Sweden and Denmark (Trends,no. 22, 1995).Concerning
the inner group differences which result from the various national
circumstances, one can find similaritiesin the situation of the social partners
on the European level and in the European Union. Due to the differences a
co-ordinating effort seems to be especially important; however it is those
same differences which make it difficult to find common interests.
Between the two groups of employers and employees, interest in
regulation is influenced by the command or lack of command the various
groups have on their labour market position. In the current situation,
employers gain influence, which means a decrease in the interest in
regulation, while employees are more vulnerable and therefore more
interested in regulations. Given the increased mobility of capital which
poses a direct threat to any effort to deviate from the competitive
deregulatory path, the interest of Trade Unions must also be to cover the
whole area of mobility, and avoid being played against each other (which
isdifficult to achieve given the various traditions, see above).
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"While the globalisation process has indeed put pressure on trade
union wage negotiations in regions and sectors, very different and flexible
answers have been found or are being sought which respond no only to
the economic decentralisation trend in the globalisation process but also to
the complex needs of trade union members and enterprises as a result of
social modernisation processes in the EU member states. (Hoffmann &
Hoffmann, 1997). Despite similar problems, only the beginning of a
convergence Le. a unification of national labour relations, can be
observed. Respective national labour relations differ strongly from each
other and identical or similar problems are dealt with very differently
(Streeck, 1996). This divergence in labour relations has considerable
consequences for a future-oriented Europeanisation of industrial relations, in
which European works councils could playa pioneering role. (Hoffmann
&Hoffmann, 1997).The future of trade union success stands or falls on the
continuation of standards of solidarity in European society.
Interest for European regulations under certain conditions can also
be found among employers. Advantages for employers can be the
reduction in salary-based competition or the creation of a productivity
coalition for improving one's competitive situation. Examples of such
European agreements are for instance the European Works Councils.
Nevertheless those regulations and the corresponding advantages
generally operate on a company level, while the interest In regulation on a
higher level israther limited on the side of the employers.
Given these differences in interest in regulations, the bargaining
power, on the European level, in particular of the social partner interested
in an European agreement becomes an important element. However,
there are also strong inner group differences as regards European
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regulations. Neither the European Trade Union organisations nor the
Employers associations are currently authorised for negotiation, or have the
power to impose agreements on their member organisations. Given the
dilemma formed by the varying traditions and different power relations in
the various countries, together with the authority for decision making held
by the national member organisations, it can not be expected that those
powers will be given to the institutionswithout major struggles.
Nevertheless, even without those powers to find regulations on the
macro level, a Europeanisation of work organisation might evolve, as in a
multitiered system as the European one, the question is not only what to
regulate, but also on what level. In this context, a twofold debate has
opened up over the role for community policies particularly in the area of
labour standards. The firstquestion iswhether or not it isnecessary to impose
labour standards at the European level and the second relates to how such
standards should be fixed. There appears to be a generally positive
response within most of Europe to the principle of European labour
standards. On the one hand, the existence of labour standards appears to
be a precondition for establishing a common rate of growth within Europe.
Some degree of social coherence within Europe also appears necessary to
avoid the development of national or regional social dumping policies and
the consequent widening of cultural, political and macroeconomic
disparities. On the other hand, and perhaps more fundamentally, the
existence of basic standards could influence the technical and
organisational choices available to the European Community when
determining its strategies or models for economic development and
encourage it to choose a path based on the use of a skilled labour force
which would enhance the competitive position of Europe.
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However, even this response poses some problems. Thus Rodrigues
(1992) has shown the different reactions of national productive systems to
the introduction of labour standards based on external criteria. She has
shown and I have corroborated, that a simple integration of these
standards without major structural change can lead to a worsening of
disequilibria or to the development of evasion strategies, for example
through the expansion of atypical forms of employment. Thisdemonstrates
that the implementation of European standards can work only if there is a
simultaneous development of coherent policies between member states
and if negotiation between social partners at the national and community
level isestablished (see also Deakin and Muckenberger, 1992).
For the matter under discussion in this thesis the way out might be
that, without attempting to regulate at the market level, regulations could
be found at the firm level. From that angle, European WorksCouncils might
offer a good starting point for this development, as this offers the social
partners the opportunity, and forces them, to find transnational requlotlons:
regulations in the sense of co-ordination and IIpattern bargaining". The
evolution of European WorksCouncils has been rapid since the adoption of
the directive in the autumn of 1994, triggered by the reality of economic
Europeanisation. The directive alone shows that the European Union
possessessome regulatory power to guide the process of social integration.
However, according to Martin (1996), the European institutions' support has
a definite bias with respect to the kind of trade union structure it
encourages. It cultivates primarily the top or intersectoral level, and
secondarily the lowest or company level. It gives least encouragement to
the intermediate or sectoral level. As I have mentioned above, it isdubious
whether unions will give mandates to supranational organisations.
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Even with the most optimistic view on the impact those steps can
have, one has to consider the likelihood of such a process to develop, if at
all, over a long period. The limited cognitive and organisational capacity of
mankind makes it impossible to design and implement grand, spectacular
schemes of institutional and economic transformation without running
grave risksof errorsand even catastrophic failures. Overwhelming empirical
evidence indicates that really efficient institutional solutions and
organisational structures were shaped over long periods of time, through
painstaking efforts and numerous trials and errors, evolving gradually in an
organic, evolutionary way. Thisiswhy development is- among other things
and perhaps above all- a learning process. To arrive at a rational
institutional framework, one needs a lot of time and learning. Knowledge,
being an invisible but most significant production factor, can only be
obtained in and with sufficient time. With some stretches of imagination,
time can be ascribed a normative significance: it turns out to be the
peculiar input needed to secure high levels of development and a really
efficient institutional machinery (Aslund, 1992).
In that far the current strategy of pressing on with the economic
integration and establishing of the European Monetary System, while
hoping that European social integration will follow in line with the economic
integration has to be seen as a high risk strategy. As Ramos Yuste and
Foden point out (1995), all the present talk of supply side reform can do
very little to bring unemployment down in the absence of sufficient macro-
economics stimulus.And as long as unemployment remains so high it isvery
hard for national unions to do anything but try to save whatever jobs they
can for their insiders, so that sustaining cross-company solidarity is all the
harder, not to speak of sorely needed transnational solidarity.
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On the other hand, the current climate of change and the
awareness of the importance of some 'social values' growing, means that if
current pressing problems in all the member states can be used to create a
new solidarity, the current situation can also be interpreted as a chance for
Europe. Growing frustration may motivate key actors to seek alternatives
that avoid the problems outlined above.
The overall conclusions of this study are as follows. First, the main
reason behind the use of "new" forms of labour vary between different
labour markets in Europe, they do not even point to a main reason for the
use of each one of them, excluding universal rationales of economic
rationality. Secondly, these atypical forms of work do not represent a move
towards new modes of organisation; on the contrary they are more often
than not used for conservative reasons, to support and prolong the lifetime
of existing modes, being adapted to societal circumstances. Third, the
underlying systems of work organisation differ in European Union member
states, thus, any debate or policy has to take account of national systems,
thus coming back to characteristic universalism. Fourth, the variance in
existing systems has serious implications for policy making on a European
level, as decision making becomes increasingly prone to gridlock. Finally, to
avoid (unhealthy) competition between the Member States, which could
lead to lowest common denominator policies, stronger co-ordination is
needed, and this requires a consensus on the desirable future, which due to
the differences and pre-conditions is difficult to achieve in itself, but could
perhaps be achieved through social dialogue on European level, if this
would maintain a healthy standard of solidarity.
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ONE FLEXIBLE FUTURE FOR EUROPE? THE CASE OF EUROPEAN CONVERGENCE AND / OR DIVERGENCE
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FLEXIBILITY DEBATE
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Appendix A
The European Labour Force Survey
Appendix A 1 Comparability of Data
The European Labour Force Survey was chosen as a source of
background information, to ensure a certain degree of comparability of
the data between the member states, since common definitions are used
in the Labour Force Surveysthroughout the countries. Data is presented for
years from 1984 onwards, since between the surveys for 1983 and 1984
some countries changed the questionnaire, and comparability would not
be given. However, when comparing the presented data, the usual
precautions needed for the comparison of international data should be
taken. Some words of caution will be given next, for further information on
the organisation of the survey as well as on technical and/or
methodological issues,please refer to the surveys themselves, or to the
publications from 1988: Labour force sample survey - Methods and
definitions and A usersguide.
The LFSprovides reliable estimates for the principal aggregates into
which the labour force is divided. However, at a detailed level of
disaggregation, the estimates are not reliable, as the sampling base on
which the estimates would depend would be too small. It isalso because of
this reason that there are also limits to what can be accomplished in
monitoring trends over time. If the movements are small in relation to the
aggregates themselves, it is possible that a sampling error may exceed the
sizeof variation from one year to the next, resulting in an estimated change
which is,in fact, in the opposite direction to the 'true' change (LFS,1993).
Other features that might reduce comparability over time are for
instance, the independent population estimates used for grossing up the
survey results may have to be revised on the basis of a new population
census. Besides,the reference period may not remain precisely the same
for a given country from year to year. Moreover, in order to improve the
quality of the results, some countries may have changed the content or
order of their questionnaire; such changes, as I mention later in this section
are particularly important between 1983and 1984,thus my period choice.
Countries can also modify their sample designs. Finally,the manner in which
certain questions are answered may be influenced by political or social
circumstances at the time of the interview.
II
Appendix B
The New Formsof Work and Activity Survey
Appendix B 1 Technical and Methodological Information
As the NWFA survey is less known than the LFS,I will present here an
extended summary of its methodology. A detailed listing of methodological
issues and information about the survey results (in tabulated form) may be
found in the following sixdocuments:
- Technical Report
- Management Interviews (Tables, 2 Volumes)
- Employee Representatives Interviews (Tables)
- Documentation of National Questionnaires (2 Volumes)
which have been published by Infratest Sozialforschung. The first
general results have been published by Bielenski (1994a). This report also
drew on work carried out by researchers from the eight countries, who had
been involved in the survey. The central point of interest in this report was
Europe as a whole, and differences in the eight countries were only
superficially explored, without seeking to explain them.
I was granted permission to use the raw data set. Here I only intent to
give a small overview of the aspects more to the point for the subsequent
analysis.
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Appendix B 2 The Universe of the Survey
The universe of the survey was defined as all private sector
establishments with ten or more employees, excluding agricultural
establishments. The distinction between private sector and public sector
was based on the European Classification for Economic Activities (NACE)
(see Appendix C, for a listing of the NACEclassification). The survey includes
the following sectors: NACE 1 to 6 (Energy and Water; Chemical Industry;
Metal Manufactures; Other Manufacturing Industry; Building; Distribution,
Hotels, Repairs), and with the exception of NACE 71, 721 and 79 most of
NACE 7 (Transport), NACE 8 (Banking, Finance, etc.) and parts of NACE 9
(Other Services)(excluding NACE91,921,922,93,95,962 and 99).
The data collected in the survey are representative for 972.000
establishments with 42 million employees in the eight member states
included in the sample. That means that although the survey covers only
10%of all non agricultural establishments, it covers as many as 51% of all
non agricultural employees in the eight countries. Thiscan be explained by
the fact that most employees work for medium and large sized
establishments, and by the fact that the vast majority of establishments
have less than ten employees. So the missing49%employees work in small
establishments or in the public sector, which had both been excluded from
the universe of the survey.
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Appendix B3 Sampling
National research agencies were responsible for building the samples
of establishments for their country. More detailed information about
sampling methods, is given in the Technical Report. Overall the sampling
process can be summarised as follows.
The unit of enquiry was the establishment, which is an adequate unit
of analysis to give clues about work organisation, one of the major factors
for competitiveness, and to answer the question of why firms make use of
certain forms of work. Thisquestion ismeaningful because of its bearing on
competitiveness, which is central for the political decision making process.
In multi-unit companies information was collected for local units only, and
not for the company as a whole. As Atkinson (1994) explains, this way of
collecting data has the enormous advantage of bearing a strong link with
practise, rather than with drafted policy; highlighting the actual practices
and not the policy statements of head offices. This perspective is the
appropriate one for the objectives of this investigation. The establishment is
an interesting unit of enquiry in so far as it is the place where at a given
historic moment (Le. under certain legal, economic and social conditions)
supply and demand on the labour market have met.
The Samples were stratified by size classes and sector of activity
(often by using combinations of NACE sectors). The stratification matrix was
different for the different countries. Using this method the investigation
attained, as iscustomary in enterprise based surveys, the aim of making the
sample ideally proportional to the number of employees. That means
though, that compared to establishment proportional data, large
v
establishments, due to their higher share of employees, are over-
represented. Within each cell establishments were chosen randomly.
As we have already pointed out, the samples were at least
theoretically employee proportional, however, in order to compensate for
disproportional non-responses and to get correspondence between the
net sample and the distribution of employees in the universe, employee
proportional weighting became necessary.
To incorporate the quantitative relations between the eight countries
involved in the survey, Infratest carried out an additional 'international
employee proportional' weighting, by multiplying the 'national employee
weighting factors' by a constant for each country. Weights were supplied
by Infratest. The variable was denominated "weight 1", having values
ranging from below 1 to below 7.
In order to carry out analysis, using the quantitative data collected in
the sample, (e.g. number of employees, number of female part timers,
number of skilled manual workers) it is necessary to transform the data into
'establishment proportional data'. Usingweighting factors it is also possible
to transform the data into establishment proportional figures. The weighting
factor was supplied as "weight 2" in the data set. Establishment
proportional weighting can be considered as the projection to the total of
establishments in the universe of each country, hence a further
international weighting is not necessary. It should be noted that the basic
structure of the sample was employee proportional, and that the weighting
factors to transform the data to establishment proportional range from
below 1 to more than 2200, which means that the analysis requires a great
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amount of caution, since one single case with a high weight might have
too strong an impact on the result.
Results will be presented indicating the use of 'employee
proportional' or establishment proportional data.
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Appendix B4 The Interviews
Interviews were held in 3520 establishments (see table 8.1). In each of
those establishments management and, when there were any, employee
representatives were interviewed, thiswas the case in 1.573establishments.
The analysis in the statistical chapters is only based on management
question naires.
It was possible to do several checks for consistency. In order to use as
much data as possible, the analysis is based on all questionnaires which
have been completed and consistent in the answers under consideration.
For instance, I will make use of data from establishments who made
inconsistent or incomplete answers in the fixed term section, but gave
otherwise complete and consistent answers in the analysis about part time
work. This practise is in line with the suggested practise in the technical
report, however one can also find reports which are only based on
questionnaires which have been answered completely and were
consistent throughout, or on samples based on other subsets.Subsequently,
when trying to compare between different reports which have been
written based on the data set, with sub-samples assembled in slightly
different ways, one might find trifling different distributions. The consistency
checks which were performed were in line with the checks proposed in the
technical report, and 73 flags for different inconsistencies had to be
entered.
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Table B.l. Distribution of cases
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
All 3520 494 506 404 500 500 200 404 512
Part-Time 2091 309 409 273 96 218 79 351 356
Fixed-Term 1734 195 288 101 381 347 54 304 64
Table B.l indicates the number of management interviews held in
each country; how many of them where held in establishments with at least
one part time employee; and how many where held in establishments with
at least one employee with a fixed term contract. The number of cases for
the later two reflect the pattern of use of those atypical forms of work in the
countries.
Table B.2and Table B.3show the number of interviews conducted by
sector of main activity of the establishment and the number of cases by size
class of each establishment. Thistwo variables had been used to stratify the
sample (see section 5.3 on Sampling).
Table B.2 Distribution of cases by sector of main activity
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRL NL UK
Energy & water 85 6 25 8 15 3 4 15 9
Ch.mlcallndustry 267 31 65 12 54 63 13 20 9
M.tal Manufactur. 601 38 119 56 117 124 29 58 60
oth.r Manufactur. 790 99 71 84 111 146 65 71 143
Building 311 44 59 42 46 37 13 34 36
R.tall. Hot.1. R.palr 649 105 81 89 74 48 43 87 122
Tran.port. Communication 148 24 18 21 14 17 3 20 31
Banking. In.uranc. 383 46 42 60 51 50 15 58 61
oth.r S.rvlc •• 278 94 26 31 18 12 15 41 41
Oth.r. 8 7 1
IX
Table 8.3 Distribution of Cases by Size Class
EUR8 B 0 OK E I IRl Nl UK
10 - 19 employees 555 69 56 94 66 107 45 33 85
20 - 49 760 83 97 92 122 104 44 86 132
50 - 99 554 134 72 55 57 71 36 'ZY 100
100-199 528 96 68 74 78 58 26 68 60
200 - 499 589 60 75 57 80 108 39 80 90
500+ 533 51 138 32 97 52 10 108 45
not answered 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
x
Appendix B 5 Differences in LFSand NWFA
The service sector has a puissant presence in total employment in
Europe, accounting, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, for around 60%of
total employment. The sectoral distribution in the various member states
shows nonetheless conspicuous national characteristics (see table 5.1). The
Greek, Irish,Spanish, and to a lesserextend, Italian economies are marked
by the relative importance of the primary sector for employment. In
Greece this sector accounts for more than three (2 in the case of Ireland
and above average for the Spanish and to a lesser extent for Italy) times
the average European proportion for employment. Germany's
employment structure is marked by the relative importance of industrial
employment, accounting for more than 40% of total employment, a
relatively low rate of employment in this particular sector can be found in
the Netherlands and in Denmark, even if the difference with the average is
lessmarked here, than in Germany. The service sector employs more than
half of the total workforce in all countries, and is of singular importance in
the Netherlands and Denmark. In table 5.1 we can see the distribution of
Employment by Sector of Activity. The divergences in the distribution of
employment over the various sectors becomes even more distinct, when
they are further broken down into the different NACE classes. Table BA
represents the proportional participation of total employment in these
sectors, for sectors researched by the 'New Forms of Work and Activity' -
Survey ( Bielenski, 1994a).
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Table B.4 Distribution of Employment by Sector of Activity
(NACE classes )1989
EUR 8 B 0 OK E I IRL NL UK F GR L P EUR 12
1 1.8 1.5 2.1 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.2 2.4 1.5 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.8
2 4.5 5.9 6.3 2.3 4.4 4.1 4.1 3.4 3.4 3.8 3.5 10.4 5.0 4.4
3 11.9 10.4 18.6 8.3 8.9 8.4 8.5 7.6 10.7 11.0 4.7 3.7 6.4 11.4.. 12.0 11.4 11.3 11.6 14.3 14.7 13.6 10.1 10.3 10.8 18.2 8.1 22.8 12.3
5 8.9 7.0 7.9 8.2 11. 1 10.2 8.8 7.9 8.8 9.0 9.6 9.6 11.5 9.1
6 22.4 20.5 19.1 17.7 27.0 25.8 23.8 20.7 22.4 20.3 27.7 23.0 23.6 22.2
7 6.9 8.3 6.6 8.6 7.1 6.7 7.0 6.8 6.9 7.2 9.7 7.4 5.8 7.0
8 9.0 9.3 9.3 11.2 6.5 5.0 10.3 12.1 11.7 10.5 6.8 14.1 4.6 9.1
9 22.5 25.7 18.8 31.0 19.3 23.9 22.4 30.2 23.5 25.8 18.0 22.2 19.0 22.8
Source: Euroslal Labour Force Survey
The Universe of the survey had been defined as non agricultural, non
public establishments, with more than 10 employees. Thus excluding
establishments that are very small. Since small establishments are not
distributed equally over the different NACE sectors, this definition will
obviously affect the distributionof employees over the sectors.
Given the way in which the universe was defined, and the differing
structure of Member States' economies, the resultsare somewhat sensitive
to this convention in sampling and weighting. Therefore some degree of
caution must be exerted at the time of interpreting the results. E.g.: the
conventions mean that in the resultsfor the United Kingdom the productive
industrieswill be over represented, since a high proportion of employment
in the United Kingdom is concentrated in very small establishments in the
service sector. Thisfact iswell illustrated in Table B.5 which compares the
survey distributionof the population of the survey's universe with the actual
XII
distribution and shows that about 47% of all UK employees in the sample
work in the secondary sector, while the actual number isabout 1/310wer.
Table 8.5 Comparison of Actual and Survey Distributionof Employment by
Sector of main Activity In the United Kingdom
EUR8 EUR8 UK UK
Survey Actual Survey Actual
Energy & water 2 1.8 1 2.4
Chemical Industry 7 4.5 2 3.4
Metal Manufacture 20 11.9 12 10.7
other Manufacture 22 12.0 26 10.3
Building 8 8.9 6 8.8
Retail, Hotel, Repair 19 22.4 26 22.4
Transport, Communication 4 6.9 6 6.9
Banking, Insurance 11 9.0 12 11.7
other Services 6 22.5 8 23.5
Total Industry 59 39.1 47 35.6
Total Service 40 60.8 52 64.5
The distribution of employees in the sample over the NACE sectors (in
the scope of the study) does look as given in table 6.1, variations from the
actual distribution as given in table B.4 can be explained by a rationale
similar to that applicable to the explanation of the variations in the UKdata,
given above. The same holds for other differences from the data presented
in Chapter 4, like part time rates, female participation rates, fixed term rates,
etc., which are also linked to the sectoral distribution. The correlation
between sector distribution and other labour market indicators will be
shown in more detail ensuing.
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Appendix C
NACE Classification
Appendix C 1 Summary table of divisions and classes of the N.A.C.E.
O.Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
01 Agriculture and hunting
02 Forestry
03 Fishing
1. Energy and Water
11 Extraction and briquetting of solid fuels
12 Coke ovens
13 Extraction of petroleum and natural gas
14 Mineral oil refining
15 Nuclear fuels industry
16 Production and distribution of electricity, gas, steam and hot
water
17 Water supply: collection, purification and distribution
2. Extraction and Processing of Non-Energy-Producing Minerals and
Derived Products: Chemical Industry
21 Extraction and preparation of metaliferous ores
22 Production and preliminary processing of metals
23 Extraction of minerals other than metaliferous and energy-
producing minerals; peat extraction
24 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products
25 Chemical industry
26 Man-made fibres industry
3. Metal Manufacture; Mechanical, Electrical and Instrument
Engineering
31 Manufacture of metal articles (except 32, 34 and 37)
32 Mechanical engineering
33 Manufacture of offices machinery and data processing
machinery
34 Electrical engineering
35 Manufacture of motor vehicles and of motor vehicle parts
and accessories
36 Manufacture of other means of transport
37 Instrument engineering
XIV
4. Other Manufacturing Industries
41/2 Food, drink and tobacco industry
43 Textile industry
44 Leather and leather goods industry (except 45)
45 Footwear and clothing industry
46 Timber and wooden furniture industries
47 Manufacture of paper and paper products; printing and
publishing
48 Processing of rubber and plastics
49 Other manufacturing industries
5. Building and Civil Engineering
50 Building and civil engineering
6. Distributive Trades, Hotels, Catering, Repairs
61 Wholesale distribution (except 62)
62 Dealing in scrape and waste materials
63 Agents
64/5 Retail distribution
66 Hotels and catering
67 Repair of consumer goods and vehicles
7. Transport and Communication
71 Railways
72 Other land transport
73 Inland water transport
74 Sea transport and coasting shipping
75 Air transport
76 Supporting services to transport
77 Travel agents, freight brokers and other agents facilitating
the transport of passengers or goods; storage and warehousing
79 Communication
8. Banking and Finance, Insurance, BusinessServices, Renting
81 Banking and finance
821nsurance except for compulsory social insurance
83 Activities auxiliary to banking and finance and insurance;
real estate transactions (except 85), business services
84 Renting, leasing and hiring of movable
85 Letting of real estate by the owner
9. Other Services
91 Public administration, national defence and compulsory
social insurance
92 Sanitary services and administration of cemeteries
93 Education
94 Research and development
xv
95 Medical and other health services; veterinary services
96 Other services provided to the general public
97 Recreational services and other cultural services
98 Personal services
99 Domestic services
00 Diplomatic representation; international organisations and
allied armed forces
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